Differences in occupational stress in three European countries

In this study, the reliabilities of the Dutch translation of the Occupational Stress Inventory, which is based on the theory of Cooper (Cooper & Marshall, 1976), was investigated. The sample comprised 436 nurses. A comparison is made of the individual and job satisfaction stress levels of Dutch and British nurses (N = 546), and of British managers (N =123) and German managers (N =133). The differences in the reliabilities of the Dutch version, compared to the British and German, are small. The differences between the stress and satisfaction scores are found to be greater between occupational groups than between nations.     

Children's capacity to agree to psychological research: knowledge of risks and benefits and voluntariness

A series of studies investigated the capacity of children between the ages of 7 and 12 to give free and informed consent to participation in psychological research. Children were reasonably accurate in describing the purpose of studies, but many did not understand the possible benefits or especially the possible risks of participating. In several studies children's consent was not affected by the knowledge that their parents had given their permission or by the parents saying that they would not be upset if the children refused. In contrast, other studies found that children were much more likely to stop their participation if the experimenter said explicitly that she would not be upset if they stopped. We suggest that experimenters should pay more attention to describing the possible risks and benefits of participation in research, and that they should also make it clearer to children that they are free to stop once they have begun.     

Auditory Priming for Nonverbal Information: Implicit and Explicit Memory for Environmental Sounds

Three experiments examined repetition priming for meaningful environmental sounds (e.g., clock ticking, tooth brushing, toilet flushing, etc.) in a sound stem identification paradigm using brief sound cues. Prior encoding of target sounds together with their associated names facilitated subsequent identification of sound stems relative to nonstudied controls. In contrast, prior exposure to names alone in the absence of the environmental sounds did not prime subsequent sound stem identification performance at all (Experiments 1 and 3). Explicit and implicit memory were dissociated such that sound stem cued recall was higher following semantic than nonsemantic encoding, whereas sound priming was insensitive to manipulations of depth encoding (Experiments 2 and 3). These results extend the findings of long-term repetition priming into the auditory nonverbal domain and suggest that priming for environmental sounds is mediated primarily by perceptual processes.     

Reply to William R. Ferrell’s paper “A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination”

Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model and our subjective distance model belong to the same family of Thurstonial models. The subjective distance model is limited to sensory discrimination with the method of constant stimuli and rooted in such notions as discriminal dispersion and sense distance. Ferrell’s model is intended to be wider in scope and to apply to both cognitive and sensory tasks. Both models need supplementary assumptions to predict calibration phenomena. The point of departure for us is the fact that the model predicts under-confidence under “guessing” and the empirical finding that people are about 100% correct when they report “absolutely certain.” Ferrell makes assumptions about cutoffs on the decision variable. The respondent is assumed to adjust or not adjust cutoffs according to “cues to difficulty.” We disagree with Ferrell’s claim that the hard-easy effect is explained by the respondent’s failure to adjust cutoffs sufficiently when there is a change in level of difficulty, and argue that this amounts to little more than a translation of the hard-easy effect into the lingua of Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model. Our argument is that the hard-easy effect is a consequence of the post hoc division of items according to solution probability. In addition, error variance may contribute to regression effects that enlarge the hard-easy effect. Finally, in contrast to Ferrell’s position, we regard inference (cognitive uncertainty) and discrimination (sensory uncertainty) as different psychological processes. An understanding of calibration in these two areas requires separate models.     

Extraction of relief from visual motion

We quantified the ability of human subjects to discriminate the relative distance of two points from a slanted plane when viewing the projected velocities of this scene (orthographic projection). The relative distance from a plane (called relief) is a 3-D property that is invariant under linear (affine) transformations. As such, relief canin principle be extracted from the instantaneous projected velocity field; a metric representation, which requires the extraction of visual acceleration, is not required. The stimulus consisted of a slanted planeP (specified by three points) and two pointsQ ₁ andQ ₂ that are non-coplanar withP. This configuration of points oscillated rigidly around the vertical axis. We have measured thesystematic error andaccuracy with which human subjects estimate the relative distance of pointsQ ₁ andQ ₂ from planeP as a function of the slant of_P. The systematic error varies with slant: it is low for small slant values, reaches a maximum for medium slant values, and drops again for high slant values. The accuracy covaries with the systematic error and is thus high for small and large slant values and low for medium slant values. These results are successfully modeled by a simple relief-from-motion computation based on local estimates of projected velocities. The data are well predicted by assuming (1) a measurement error in velocity estimation that varies proportionally to velocity (Weber’s law) and (2) an eccentricity-dependent underestimation of velocity.     

Classical harmony: Rules of inference and the meaning of the logical constants

The thesis that, in a system of natural deduction, the meaning of a logical constant is given by some or all of its introduction and elimination rules has been developed recently in the work of Dummett, Prawitz, Tennant, and others, by the addition of harmony constraints. Introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant must be in harmony. By deploying harmony constraints, these authors have arrived at logics no stronger than intuitionist propositional logic. Classical logic, they maintain, cannot be justified from this proof-theoretic perspective. This paper argues that, while classical logic can be formulated so as to satisfy a number of harmony constraints, the meanings of the standard logical constants cannot all be given by their introduction and/or elimination rules; negation, in particular, comes under close scrutiny.     

The dynamics of Prägnanz

Summary There is quite wide-spread agreement about the relevance of pattern Pragnanz (Koffka, 1935) with respect to the human interpretation of visual patterns. There is less agreement about whether pattern Pragnanz is based solely on pattern information (static) or also on the history of the perceiver (dynamic). In Van Leeuwen and Van den Hof (1991), experimental data concerning serial patterns are presented within the framework of the dynamic-network approach initiated by Buffart (1986, 1987). These experimental data are claimed to give evidence against the static-coding approach initiated by Leeuwenberg (1969, 1971). In the present paper, however, I show first that Buffart's theoretical basis is incorrect, and that in fact Leeuwenberg's static-coding approach is the basis for the dynamic-network approach. Second, I show that those experimental data rather give evidence in favor of the static-coding approach, by using those same data for a test of the most recent static-coding model (Van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1991; Van der Helm, Van Lier, & Leeuwenberg, 1992). Finally, I propose a reconciliation between the two approaches, in the sense that the dynamic-network model could be shaped in such a way that it yields a simulation, and maybe even an enrichment, of the static-coding model.     

Conditional Control of Fluid Consumption in an Occasion Setting Paradigm Is Independent of Pavlovian Associations

Drug states, flavors, and contextual cues were each trained as conditional discriminative stimuli to control a saccharin-LiCl association. In transfer tests, drug states transferred control over consumption to other flavored solutions and to food. Contexts and flavors transferred control only to other flavored solutions. Pavlovian control groups given direct pairings of context-LiCl or flavor-LiCl did not show reliable transfer. However, these control groups did show greater or the same aversion to the specific context or flavor predicting LiCl compared to the context or flavor discrimination groups. The dissociation of the discrimination and Pavlovian groups on transfer versus preference tests suggests that performance on the occasion setting task cannot be due to simple excitation or learning about a unique compound cue. Data from extinction procedures provide further support for the dissociation between simple excitation and occasion setting.     

Are beliefs brain-states? And if they are what might that explain?

Philosophical Studies -     

Daniel levinson and his theory of adult development: A reminiscence and some clarifications

I offer some reminiscences occasioned by the death of Daniel Levinson, a modern pioneer in the study of the human life cycle. I clarify three controversial aspects of Levinson's theory—its universality, the role of critical life events, and the place of relationships—as well as briefly foreshadow findings from his forthcoming book on women. I show that relationships to people, enterprises, and social institutions are the stuff out of which the individual life structure—Levinson's central concept—is formed. Levinson's dream was of a society in which the developmental needs of adults were better understood and met so that they could more generatively fill their roles in the institutions upon which the young depend. He thought this essential to the evolution of a society that would be both more competent and more humane. In this dream, which was a product of his own difficult mid-life transition and a measure of the success he achieved in integrating its polarities, Levinson united a warm, scientific interest in others with an affectionate curiosity about nature.