The mechanics of reinforcement

Mathematical principles of reinforcement were developed in order to (1) account for the interaction of target responding and other behavior; (2) provide a simple graphical representation; (3) deal with measurement artifacts; and (4) permit a coherent transition from a statics to a dynamics of behavior. Rats and pigeons were trained to make a target response while general activity was measured with a stabilimeter. The course of behavioral change was represented as a trajectory through a two-dimensional behavior space. The trajectories rotated toward or away from the target dimension as the coupling between the target response and the incentive was varied. Higher rates of reinforcement expanded the trajectories; satiation and extinction contracted them. Concavity in some trajectories provided data for a dynamic generalization of the model.     

Religion and Mental Health: an exploration of the relationship between the ineffable and the indefinable

This article suggests that the relationship between religion and mental health is both important and complex. It reviews some studies of the relationship and suggests that religion can be good or bad for one's mental health, depending on the content of the religious message. It also presents a model of mental health and suggests that this or some similar scheme can be employed to assess the extent to which one's religious or value system promotes mental health.     

Can Reliabilists Believe in Subjective Probability?

According to reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, knowledge implies reliable true belief. Since reliability is an irreducibly probabilistic notion, one's view of knowledge also depends on one's view of probability. If one believes that all probability is subjective probability, knowledge becomes a relativized concept: knowledge is relative to a given body of beliefs of a given person at a given time. Since such a relativized conception of knowledge is extremely implausible and since reliabilism seems to capture at least part of the truth, one should rather give up a purely subjective view of probability.     

IN DEFENSE OF ONE FORM OF TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Philosophical Studies -