Predictive testing and oncogenes

Case vignette: sharing unanticipated genetic information. The Questor family has experienced an unusual number of malignancies in the past two generations and has been advised by an oncologist that the p53 oncogene known as Li-Fraumeni Syndrome may be present in the family genome. The option of predictive genetic testing has been raised and several branches of the family have chosen to undergo screening to determine whether they are at risk for cancer because of the gene. Roger and Liz Questor have arranged for screening of themselves and their three children, ages 12, 10, and 7. The couple has, by all appearances, been happily married for 14 years. None of the family members are found to carry the oncogene; however, the geneticist conducting the analyses has made an interesting incidental discovery. The 10-year-old child is not the biological progeny of Roger Questor. Although the 12- and 7-year-olds are clearly the biological children of the couple, it is evident that the 10-year-old born to Liz Questor was fathered by a person other than Roger. What are the ethical obligations of the geneticist with respect to any sharing or disclosure of the information that has been discovered incidentally? What course of action, if any, do you recommend?     

Reply to William R. Ferrell’s paper “A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination”

Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model and our subjective distance model belong to the same family of Thurstonial models. The subjective distance model is limited to sensory discrimination with the method of constant stimuli and rooted in such notions as discriminal dispersion and sense distance. Ferrell’s model is intended to be wider in scope and to apply to both cognitive and sensory tasks. Both models need supplementary assumptions to predict calibration phenomena. The point of departure for us is the fact that the model predicts under-confidence under “guessing” and the empirical finding that people are about 100% correct when they report “absolutely certain.” Ferrell makes assumptions about cutoffs on the decision variable. The respondent is assumed to adjust or not adjust cutoffs according to “cues to difficulty.” We disagree with Ferrell’s claim that the hard-easy effect is explained by the respondent’s failure to adjust cutoffs sufficiently when there is a change in level of difficulty, and argue that this amounts to little more than a translation of the hard-easy effect into the lingua of Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model. Our argument is that the hard-easy effect is a consequence of the post hoc division of items according to solution probability. In addition, error variance may contribute to regression effects that enlarge the hard-easy effect. Finally, in contrast to Ferrell’s position, we regard inference (cognitive uncertainty) and discrimination (sensory uncertainty) as different psychological processes. An understanding of calibration in these two areas requires separate models.     

Extraction of relief from visual motion

We quantified the ability of human subjects to discriminate the relative distance of two points from a slanted plane when viewing the projected velocities of this scene (orthographic projection). The relative distance from a plane (called relief) is a 3-D property that is invariant under linear (affine) transformations. As such, relief canin principle be extracted from the instantaneous projected velocity field; a metric representation, which requires the extraction of visual acceleration, is not required. The stimulus consisted of a slanted planeP (specified by three points) and two pointsQ ₁ andQ ₂ that are non-coplanar withP. This configuration of points oscillated rigidly around the vertical axis. We have measured thesystematic error andaccuracy with which human subjects estimate the relative distance of pointsQ ₁ andQ ₂ from planeP as a function of the slant of_P. The systematic error varies with slant: it is low for small slant values, reaches a maximum for medium slant values, and drops again for high slant values. The accuracy covaries with the systematic error and is thus high for small and large slant values and low for medium slant values. These results are successfully modeled by a simple relief-from-motion computation based on local estimates of projected velocities. The data are well predicted by assuming (1) a measurement error in velocity estimation that varies proportionally to velocity (Weber’s law) and (2) an eccentricity-dependent underestimation of velocity.     

Axiomatic justifications of the utility principle: A formal investigation

It is argued that existing axiomatic theories of utility do not provide the utility principle or the principle of maximising expected utility with a formal justification. It is also argued that these theories only put mild constraints on a decision-maker in a decision-context. Finally, it is argued that the prospects are not particularly bright for finding formal non-circular arguments for the utility principle that do not rely on the law of large numbers.     

Classical harmony: Rules of inference and the meaning of the logical constants

The thesis that, in a system of natural deduction, the meaning of a logical constant is given by some or all of its introduction and elimination rules has been developed recently in the work of Dummett, Prawitz, Tennant, and others, by the addition of harmony constraints. Introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant must be in harmony. By deploying harmony constraints, these authors have arrived at logics no stronger than intuitionist propositional logic. Classical logic, they maintain, cannot be justified from this proof-theoretic perspective. This paper argues that, while classical logic can be formulated so as to satisfy a number of harmony constraints, the meanings of the standard logical constants cannot all be given by their introduction and/or elimination rules; negation, in particular, comes under close scrutiny.     

Attentional bias to threat: Roles of trait anxiety, stressful events, and awareness

Attentional biases for threat stimuli were assessed in high and low trait anxious subjects (n = 66) using a probe detection task. To examine the effects of trait anxiety and situational stressors, each subject was tested three times: Under no stress, laboratory-induced stress, and examination-induced stress. To evaluate the role of awareness, half the word stimuli were presented very briefly (14 msec) and masked, and the other half were presented for 500 msec without a mask. Results showed that high trait anxious subjects under exam stress showed an attentional bias towards unmasked threat stimuli compared with low trait subjects. This effect was not found under lab-induced stress, suggesting that the attentional bias for unmasked threat in high trait subjects may be a function of a prolonged stressor, rather than a transient increase in state anxiety. The results from the masked exposure condition were not predicted; high trait anxious subjects shifted attention towards the spatial location of threat words despite lack of awareness of their lexical content, but this bias was only apparent in the no-stress condition. The results are discussed in relation to recent cognitive theories of anxiety.     

Does stimulus correspondence account for the Simon effect? Comments on Hasbroucq and Guiard (1991)

Summary In a recent paper analysing the Simon effect, Hasbroucq and Guiard (1991) concluded that stimulus congruence, a correspondence relationship between stimulus components, accounts for the Simon effect and explains its reversal in the Hedge and Marsh experiment (1975). We contend that their definition of stimulus congruence is applied inconsistently, which invalidates their conclusion. It is argued here that the effect of display-control arrangement correspondence (Simon, Sly, & Vilapakkam, 1981) is an alternative account that fits the presented data better. In a second experiment, Hasbroucq and Guiard (1991) claimed to have invalidated the suggestion that display-control arrangement correspondence could be considered to be an alternative account of the findings in their Experiment 1. However, we assert that the type of display-control arrangement employed in their second experiment was so unpredictable that no effect of display-control arrangement correspondence could occur.     

Indirect modes of aggression among women of Buenos Aires,Argentina

This study utilizes the construct indirect aggression to investigate aggressive behavior among middle class Argentine women and men by administering an attitude and self-report survey to 95 inhabitants of Buenos Aires and by analyzing ethnographic interviews and observations conducted over a nine month period in 1992. An examination of sex roles in Argentina, including machismo and marianismo, provide a cultural context for interpreting aggression. Factor analyses revealed the presence of indirect aggression (e.g., social manipulation, gossip, exclusion) in addition to verbal and physical aggression. Survey and ethnographic findings converge in suggesting that women employ more indirect aggression than men, while men utilize more physical aggression. While competition and aggression are salient elements of social life for both sexes, women and men tend to favor different approaches. The findings are compared with the literature on female aggression from other cultural settings. We conclude that cultural and evolutionary perspectives elucidate aspects of female aggression.We would like to thank the Ford Foundation for providing the financial support to make this research possible. We would also like to thank Patricia de Gyldenfeldt and Debbie Bandura for their endless contributions with translations, ideas, and help in general. Finally, we would like to thank Eckerd College, la Universidad del Salvador, and Michael Hobson for their base of support, all those in Argentina, especially Agueda, Andrea, Carmen, Cecilia, Claudio, Daniela, Heidi, Ingrid, Javier, Julio, María, Mariela, Roberto, and Victor, who offered their enthusiastic assistance and ideas, and Victoria Burbank, Ayala Gabriel, and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful suggestions.     

The dynamics of Prägnanz

Summary There is quite wide-spread agreement about the relevance of pattern Pragnanz (Koffka, 1935) with respect to the human interpretation of visual patterns. There is less agreement about whether pattern Pragnanz is based solely on pattern information (static) or also on the history of the perceiver (dynamic). In Van Leeuwen and Van den Hof (1991), experimental data concerning serial patterns are presented within the framework of the dynamic-network approach initiated by Buffart (1986, 1987). These experimental data are claimed to give evidence against the static-coding approach initiated by Leeuwenberg (1969, 1971). In the present paper, however, I show first that Buffart's theoretical basis is incorrect, and that in fact Leeuwenberg's static-coding approach is the basis for the dynamic-network approach. Second, I show that those experimental data rather give evidence in favor of the static-coding approach, by using those same data for a test of the most recent static-coding model (Van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1991; Van der Helm, Van Lier, & Leeuwenberg, 1992). Finally, I propose a reconciliation between the two approaches, in the sense that the dynamic-network model could be shaped in such a way that it yields a simulation, and maybe even an enrichment, of the static-coding model.