Decision theory,reinforcement learning,and the brain

Decision making is a core competence for animals and humans acting and surviving in environments they only partially comprehend, gaining rewards and punishments for their troubles. Decision-theoretic concepts permeate experiments and computational models in ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Here, we review a well-known, coherent Bayesian approach to decision making, showing how it unifies issues in Markovian decision problems, signal detection psychophysics, sequential sampling, and optimal exploration and discuss paradigmatic psychological and neural examples of each problem. We discuss computational issues concerning what subjects know about their task and how ambitious they are in seeking optimal solutions; we address algorithmic topics concerning model-based and model-free methods for making choices; and we highlight key aspects of the neural implementation of decision making.     

The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument

The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument share certain structural features, and hence are often discussed together (Bostrom 2003, Are you living in a computer simulation, Philosophical Quarterly, 53:243–255; Aranyosi 2004, The Doomsday Simulation Argument. Or why isn’t the end nigh, and you’re not living in a simulation, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/190/; Richmond 2008, Doomsday, Bishop Ussher and simulated worlds, Ratio, 21:201–217; Bostrom and Kulczycki 2011 A patch for the Simulation Argument, Analysis, 71:54–61). Both are cases where reflecting on one’s location among a set of possibilities yields a counter-intuitive conclusion—in the first case that the end of humankind is closer than you initially thought, and in the second case that it is more likely than you initially thought that you are living in a computer simulation. Indeed, the two arguments do have some structural similarities. But there are also significant disanalogies between the two arguments, and I argue that these disanalogies mean that the Simulation Argument succeeds and the Doomsday Argument fails.     

Putting the “IRT” in “Dirty”: Item response theory analyses of the Dark Triad Dirty Dozen—An efficient measure of narcissism,psychopathy, and Machiavellianism

The Dark Triad Dirty Dozen is a new, concise personality inventory designed to measure individual differences in narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism in sub-clinical populations. To date, the psychometric work on this measure has used classical test theory to assess its validity, reliability, and structure. In two independent samples (N = 1014), we provide the first analyses of this measure using item response theory. In both samples, the Dark Triad Dirty Dozen efficiently recovered information and showed some evidence of differential scale functioning by sex, with a lower endorsement threshold for men compared to women. Results shed new light on the measurement of these “dark” personality traits.     

Dissociations between Covariation Bias and Expectancy Bias for Fear-relevant Stimuli

The illusory correlation paradigm of Tomarken, Mineka, and Cook (1989) was used to examine bias in threat appraisal for biological (snake, spider) and technological (gun, knife) fear-relevant stimuli. Subjects showed bias in terms of higher on-line shock expectancy ratings and skin conductance responses, and higher post-experimental judgements of shock covariation, for fear-relevant stimuli. However, there were multiple dissociations between the measures: (1) expectancy bias was observed for both biological and technological stimuli, whereas covariation bias was restricted to biological stimuli; (2) prior fear of the target stimulus had no effect on expectancy bias, but covariation bias was restricted to high fear subjects; and (3) covariation bias was observed at the end of the experiment, by which time expectancy bias had disappeared. These results suggest that covariation bias is not simply a continuation of a pre-experimental expectancy bias.     

The Developmental Roots of Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence

The paper suggests a way of understanding borderline personality disorder in terms of the failure of a secure base. We begin with an account of optimal self-development in a secure attachment context, highlighting the importance of the caregiver's ability to help the small child think about his own and others' minds. This optimal self-development is crucial in developing the child's capacity for mentalization, which can enhance his resilience in the face of later trauma. We discuss the impact of attachment trauma in later development, arguing that the extent of this impact depends on how well early attachment relationships facilitated the capacity for mentalization. We identify some of the consequences for the representations of the internal world of a failure of mentalization that may follow trauma in individuals made vulnerable by genetic predisposition or disorganized early attachment. We link these features to the clinical presentation associated with borderline personality organization. Finally, some of the necessary characteristics of successful psychotherapeutic treatment of borderline personality disorder are briefly considered.     

Capturing the Structure of Distinct Types of Individual Differences in the Situation‐specific Experience of Emotions: The Case of Anger

The aim of this paper was to understand why some people experience certain emotions in a specific situation, whereas others do not. We postulate that these individual differences arise from individual differences in two underlying processes of emotion elicitation: (i) individual differences in the emotion components (appraisals and action tendencies) that situations activate in a person and (ii) individual differences in how these emotion components are related to subjective emotional experience. In this paper, we re‐analysed data from two studies on anger to capture the structure of these two types of individual differences by using clustering modelling techniques. Consistent results across the two studies demonstrated that individuals differ in anger because they (i) differ in how easy they experience anger‐relevant appraisals (Studies 1 and 2) and action tendencies (Study 2) in increasingly negative situations and (ii) differ in which of these components are necessary to experience anger. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward the Scientific Study of Polytheism: Beyond Forced‐Choice Measures of Religious Belief

This article argues that zero‐sum, forced‐choice approaches to measuring religious belief do not work well outside of the Abrahamic world. Positive‐sum approaches to measuring religious beliefs (in the plural) are better suited to the study of polytheistic societies. Using results from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2011 Taiwan, we demonstrate that in a polytheistic society like Taiwan, religious belief is not zero sum. We also contrast our results with those of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS), and seek to show that our positive‐sum approach to measuring religious beliefs can help us better understand the disparate causes and consequences of different religious beliefs in polytheistic societies. The challenge of Christocentrism in quantitative studies of religion is also discussed.     

Prospective Examination of Self‐Regulatory Efficacy in Predicting Walking for Active Transportation: A Social Cognitive Theory Approach

Walking for transportation is associated with health benefits. Minimal theory‐based research has examined social cognitive and environmental predictors. This study examined social cognitions (self‐regulatory efficacy to plan/schedule and overcome barriers; distance and travel time cognitions) and an environmental factor (proximity) as predictors of walking for transportation. Participants (n = 105) were university students, faculty, and staff, living within a walkable distance to campus. Social cognitions and proximity measures were completed at baseline, followed by walking for transportation to/from the campus over 2 weeks. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicted walking (R²_adjusted = .55; p < .05). Self‐regulatory efficacy to plan/schedule and overcome barriers were independent predictors (p's < .01). Findings supported theoretical contentions that self‐regulatory efficacy predicts walking for transportation.     

The Shift from Monologue to Dialogue in a Couple Therapy Session: Dialogical Investigation of Change from the Therapists’ Point of View

As part of a larger research project on couple therapy for depression, this qualitative case study examines the nature of dialogue. Drawing on Bakhtinian concepts, the investigation shows how the conversation shifts from a monologue to dialogue. Among the findings are: first, the process of listening is integral to the transforming experience. That is, the careful listening of the therapist can evoke new voices, just as the experience of one of the partners’ “listening in” to the conversation between the other partner and the therapist can create movement and new trajectories. The latter is a qualitative difference between dialogic therapy with a couple and that with an individual. Second, the therapist not only acts as creative listener, but as the dialogue unfolds, actively contributes to meaning‐making. Third, the study upholds having a team of researchers as a polyphonic forum and the usefulness of Bakhtinian concepts in clinical research on dialogue in multi‐actor sessions.     

Rational intuition and understanding

Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001; Ethical intuitionism, 2005; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007) and the Direct Awareness View (Conee, Philos Phenomenol Res 4:847–857, 1998; Bonjour, In defense of pure reason, 1998). Some overlook it; others try to account for it but fail. We can account for the role of understanding in rational intuition by returning to the view of some of the early Rationalists, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. While that view carries a prohibitive cost, it does contain an insight that may help us solve the problem of giving understanding its due.