Waking‐up: A neglected model for the afterlife

An inquiry into the possibility that life‐after‐death be understood as waking from a shared dream into the real world. Attempts to outlaw the possibility that ‘really’ we are, e.g., vat‐brains are shown to lead to unwelcome, anti‐realist conclusions about either the world or consciousness. The unsatisfactory nature of empirically observable (Humean) causal connections suggests that real causes may be found beyond the world of our present experience. Though such a story cannot now be proved to be true, we are entitled to entertain it as a serious possibility. An attempt is made to say what life is like in the ‘Real World’, whether this be a spatial world like our present one or not, and what moral it holds for our present life. I suggest (like Plato) that there are many levels of waking, and that our ‘Real Self should not be identified simply with our present egos.     

Blurred boundaries

Since 1990 it has been illegal in Britain to create human/animal hybrids. But what is the objection to hybrids? A proposal based on a fear of blurring conceptual boundaries is offered; this fear also seems to underlie several other of our deep‐seated taboos, such as incest and bestiality, which are often explained in other, quite inappropriate, ways. The new law shows that the boundary between the human and the animal is still thought of as crucial and untransgressable in modern Britain, yet it is not clear why; the world‐views that in the past justified protecting this particular boundary are usually thought of as having been abandoned centuries ago. Thus it would seem that within our culture there are firmly entrenched taboos that are not readily justifiable from within that culture; the taboo against blurring the human/animal boundary is one such. This raises the question whether this human/animal boundary is one we should still want to protect in this way.     

IV. Logic and truth‐finding in society and sociology

The question of sociological truth‐finding is posed in the light of the view that logical formalizations, along with other arguments, only acquire relevance in illocutionary contexts, where it is not so much the abstract correctness of a sentence as the stating of it that counts. In order to become a counterfactual an argument requires its antecedent to be recognized as being contrary to the ‘facts’. To this extent there is a clear link with ‘reality’ or with a view of the world that is taken as factually given. Social science develops on the basis not only of generalizations but also of historical facts and political requirements. The question arises: in terms of what world‐view or purpose can we unambiguously declare a conditional to be a counterfactual ‐ and a significant or non‐trivial one at that? Further, can Elster's clarifications help identify political agents and the proper entities within and through which political action is performed? Finally, the problem‐solving capacity of the concept of closeness of one possible world to another or to the actual world, especially with regard to counterfactuals and causality, is questioned.     

Selective exposure among advisors: the impact of impression motivation

Audience confirmation bias (ACB) refers to the extent to which people prefer information supporting (vs. conflicting with) their audience's views. In two studies, we showed that advisors shifted their ACB toward the needs of their advisees (i.e., audience): When advisors were led to believe that their advisees wanted to defend their views, the ACB was higher compared with when advisees were open minded for critique. Study 2 indicated that this pattern occurred because advisors wanted to have a pleasant interaction with their advisees (impression motivation): Whereas impression‐motivated advisors exhibited a stronger ACB when they were asked to give advice to a defensive (vs. open‐minded) advisee, accuracy‐motivated advisors showed a balanced ACB, regardless of their advisee's needs.     

Fathers and Perceptions of God Play an Important Role in Psychological Adjustment Among Emerging Adults in Guatemala and the United States

Interpersonal acceptance-rejection theory posits that people require parental acceptance in childhood to develop healthy psychological adjustment. People’s beliefs about and their relationship with deity also influences their psychological adjustment. The purpose of the present study was to investigate how both perceived parental acceptance and a relationship with deity are related to psychological adjustment for emerging adults in Guatemala and the United States. Participants (N?=?189) from Guatemala and the United States completed measures of perceived parental acceptance-rejection, images of God, attachment to God, and psychological adjustment. Results indicate that perceived paternal acceptance-rejection was only a significant predictor of psychological adjustment in U.S. participants, and not in Guatemalan participants. In both samples, images of God did not predict psychological adjustment. However, an anxious attachment with God predicted psychological maladjustment for both groups. The findings suggest that two important factors to be considered by researchers, educators, and mental health professionals are adults’ perceptions of their father’s level of acceptance-rejection and the amount of anxiety they experience in their relationship with God.