In Defense of Imperative Inference

“Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight” is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, “since surrender” or “it follows that surrender or fight”, and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (“surrender or fight” permits you to fight without surrendering, but “surrender” does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one’s mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of ‘inference’, some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing one’s mind.     

Cross-cultural psychology: Some accomplishments and challenges

The development of cross-cultural psychology over the past 40 years is briefly reviewed. Cross-cultural psychologists have focused on differences between populations, explanations based on individualism-collectivism and reduction of explanations to the individual-level of analysis. Cultural variations have been incompletely sampled, with an excessive focus on North America and East Asia. However, the cross-cultural approach is compatible with the perspective of cultural psychologists because in both traditions there has been a focus both on mechanisms of cultural stability and of cultural change. Promising new developments are identified, including classifications of a broader range of cultures based on communication behaviors, contrasting ways of satisfying identity motives in individualistic and collectivist cultures, and the use of experimental cultural primes for theory testing within bicultural populations.     

What time travelers may be able to do

Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, 1996), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such a challenge unscathed.     

Hierarchical Bayes Models for Response Time Data

Human response time (RT) data are widely used in experimental psychology to evaluate theories of mental processing. Typically, the data constitute the times taken by a subject to react to a succession of stimuli under varying experimental conditions. Because of the sequential nature of the experiments there are trends (due to learning, fatigue, fluctuations in attentional state, etc.) and serial dependencies in the data. The data also exhibit extreme observations that can be attributed to lapses, intrusions from outside the experiment, and errors occurring during the experiment. Any adequate analysis should account for these features and quantify them accurately. Recognizing that Bayesian hierarchical models are an excellent modeling tool, we focus on the elaboration of a realistic likelihood for the data and on a careful assessment of the quality of fit that it provides. We judge quality of fit in terms of the predictive performance of the model. We demonstrate how simple Bayesian hierarchical models can be built for several RT sequences, differentiating between subject-specific and condition-specific effects.     

Selective exposure: The impact of framing information search instructions as gains and losses

Previous research has found that people prefer information that supports rather than conflicts with their decisions (selective exposure). In the present paper, we investigated whether selective exposure was influenced by the method of information collection. Based on Prospect Theory we hypothesized that the method of selection (MOS), where simply selected pieces of information are considered, would lead to a higher selective exposure compared to the method of elimination (MOE), where pieces of information are rejected and the remaining pieces of information are considered. In fact, we found that participants collected information more selectively when they were instructed to use the MOS compared to the MOE. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When planning is not enough: Fighting unhealthy snacking habits by mental contrasting with implementation intentions (MCII)

In two experiments a self‐regulatory strategy combining mental contrasting with the formation of implementation intentions (MCII) was tested for its effectiveness in diminishing unhealthy snacking habits. Study 1 (N = 51) showed that participants in the MCII condition consumed fewer unhealthy snacks than participants in a control condition who thought about and listed healthy options for snacks. In Study 2 (N = 59) MCII was more effective than mental contrasting or formulating implementation intentions alone and mental contrasting was found to increase perceived clarity about critical cues for unhealthy snacking. Together, these findings suggest that MCII is an effective strategy for fighting habits and that one of the underlying processes making MCII superior to implementation intentions alone may be that mental contrasting produces clarity about the critical cues for the unwanted habitual behavior. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spinozistic Pantheism,the Environment and Christianity

I am not a pantheist and I don’t believe that pantheism is consistent with Christianity. My preferred speculation is what I call the Swiss Cheese theory: we and our artefacts are the holes in God, the only Godless parts of reality. In this paper, I begin by considering a world rather like ours but without any beings capable of sin. Ignoring extraterrestrials and angels we could consider the world, say, 5 million years ago. Pantheism was, I say, true at that time. That is my qualified endorsement of pantheism. I then use the Sin premise, namely that we are capable of sinning, to argue that beings like us are not parts of God and I examine some consequences.     

Reviews

History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Soviet Union 1917–1938

(Geschichte der Evangelisch‐Lutherischen Gemeinden in der Sovetunion 1917–1938) by Wilhelm Kahle, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1974, 625 pp. No price.

Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions

Amnesty International Report, A. I. Publications (53 Theobald's Road, London, W.C.1) 1975, 154 pp., £1.00

Marxism and the Church of Rome by Hervé Leclerc, Conflict Studies (Institute for the Study of Conflict) No. 45, 1974, 13 pp., £1.00.

Questions of scientific atheism

(Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma) No. 16, “Mysl”, Moscow, 1974, 358 pp.     

Whose Fault? The Origins and Evitability of the Analytic–Continental Rift

This is a broad survey of the chronology of the rift between continental and analytic philosophy, starting in 1899. Whereas at that time there was no discernible divide, as the twentieth century progresses we can see a gradual parting of the ways in which philosophy was done, culminating in a period of maximum separation in 1945-68, followed by some convergence. There is one substantial historical thesis proposed, and facts are adduced from the chronology to back it up: that the divide was never absolute, never purely geographical, and above all that it was not inevitable, but was largely the product of accidental historical circumstances, of which the most crucial was the flourishing of totalitarianism in Europe and the disruption caused by two world wars.     

Scientific Discovery With Law-Encoding Diagrams

This article introduces the concept of law-encoding diagrams (LEDs) and presents the argument that they have had a role in scientific discovery that has not been previously recognized. An LED is a representation that correctly encodes the underlying relations of a law, or a system of simultaneous laws, in the structure of a diagram by the means of geometric, topological, and spatial constraints, such that the instantiation of a particular diagram represents a single instance of the phenomena or a particular case of the law(s). Examples of LEDs in the history of science are discussed, and the benefits of using LEDs in discovery are considered. LEDs are distinguished from other forms of diagrammatic representation. Previous work on the computational modeling of diagrammatic law induction is reinterpreted in terms of the search for diagrammatic constraints of LEDs. A general characterization of the role of LEDs in discovery is considered, and a framework for classifying processes of discovery based on LEDs is proposed.