The influence of affect on self-focused attention: Conceptual and methodological issues

A number of investigators have suggested that affective states influence the focus of attention. One recent proposal is that negative moods increase self-focus. This review considers the evidence that bears on this hypothesis. Conceptual issues pertaining to the construct of self-focus are discussed first. Next, the various parameters that influence attentional focus are presented in order to provide a way of organizing the mood/selffocus literature. Studies that have used state measures of mood and self-focus are considered in this context. Methodological limitations of existing studies are discussed and directions for future work provided.     

Motion coherence and conjunction search: Implications for guided search theory

Feature integration theory has recently been revised with two proposals that visual conjunction search can be parallel under some circumstances—either because items with nontarget features are inhibited, or because items with target features are excited. We examined whether excitatory or inhibitory guidance controlled conjunction search for an X oscillating in one direction among Os oscillating in that direction and Xs oscillating in another. Search was affected by whether items oscillated in phase with each other, and it was exceptionally difficult when items with target motion moved out of phase with each otherand items with nontarget motion moved out of phase. The results suggest that conjunction search can be guided both by excitation of target features and by inhibition of nontarget features.     

Initial experiences with cognitive therapy of schizophrenic patients

Based on earlier experiences of various groups of authors, we developed and modified a programme of cognitive therapy for schizophrenic patients. The aim of the application of the therapeutic programme to subacute patients was to decrease subjectively perceptible basic disorders and to improve the functions of performance. The present results and experiences with 4 groups consisting of a total of 31 patients encourage us to continue applying cognitive procedures of therapy. Problems of the ascertainment of measuring values and fundamental questions of therapeutic efficacy are discussed.     

The architecture of complexity: A new blueprint

The logic of scientific discovery is now a concern of computer scientists, as well as philosophers. In the computational approach to inductive inference, theories are treated as algorithms (computer programs), and the goal is to find the simplest algorithm that can generate the given data. Both computer scientists and philosophers want a measure of simplicity, such that simple theories are more likely to be true than complex theories. I attempt to provide such a measure here. I define a measure of simplicity for directed graphs, inspired by Herbert Simon's work. Many structures, including algorithms, can be naturally modelled by directed graphs. Furthermore, I adapt an argument of Simon's to show that simple directed graphs are more stable and more resistant to damage than complex directed graphs. Thus we have a reason for pursuing simplicity, other than purely economical reasons.This paper is based on part of my doctoral dissertation. Thanks to my thesis supervisor Professor Alasdair Urquhart for his encouragement, constructive criticism, and for directing me to several relevant articles; to my advisor, Professor Ian Hacking, for reminding me to concentrate on results that might have some application in the real world; to Professor Eric Mendelsohn for checking my use of graph theory; and to my friend Wendy Brandts for sharing her ideas on a closely related problem.Thanks to my friends and family (the latter being a (proper) subset of the former, and both including Dr. Louise Linney, of course) for ongoing support in my scholastic endeavors.Thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for financial assistance. (Awards 452-86-5885 and 453-87-0513.) Thanks to the University of Toronto for financial assistance.     

Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational-emotive hypothesis 1. Performing in an academic seminar

Subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to present an academic seminar. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational belief or an irrational belief; (b) that they had made or had not made an effort in preparing for the seminar and (c) that their performance counted or did not count towards their final examination grade. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their performance and the responses of others. While the results supported the hypothesis that imagining that one is holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences than holding a rational belief, it was also found that not making an effort in preparing for the siminar led subjects to make more negative inferences than making an effort. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way significant interactions between the independent variables. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B) and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).Windy Dryden PhD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Julia Ferguson is Research Assistant in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Tony Clark was an Undergraduate Student in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. He graduated in 1987.     

Cognitive guidelines for simplifying medical information: Data framing and perception

In this paper, 1 describe psychological guidelines for simplifying medical information — methods to aid the perception and recognition of abnormalities in medical test reports. These techniques resemble natural human editing strategies outlined in prospect theory. The methods pre-edit data as humans do but to reduce human effort. I review empirical studies assessing these techniques and discuss needs for further research.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.