Laterality effects in perceived spatial location of hallucination-like voices

Aydin and colleagues reported a reversal of physiological 'right-ear advantage' in a group of right-handed patients with schizophrenia, using an auditory acuity test. In schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations may appear to be spatially located inside or outside the patient's head. Here we show, using virtual acoustic space techniques, that normal right-handed subjects have a right-ear advantage for correctly locating the 'source' of hallucination-like voices as from either inside or outside the head. We propose a model for understanding lateralised, external hallucinations in schizophrenia based upon reversal of normal cortical asymmetry for auditory spatial processing.     

Inductive reasoning and judgment interference: experiments on Simpson's paradox

In a series of experiments on inductive reasoning, participants assessed the relationship between gender, success, and a covariate in a situation akin to Simpson's paradox: Although women were less successful then men according to overall statistics, they actually fared better then men at either of two universities. Understanding trivariate relationships of this kind requires cognitive routines similar to analysis of covariance. Across the first five experiments, however, participants generalized the disadvantage of women at the aggregate level to judgments referring to the different levels of the covariate, even when motivation was high and appropriate mental models were activated. The remaining three experiments demonstrated that Simpson's paradox could be mastered when the salience of the covariate was increased and when the salience of gender was decreased by the inclusion of temporal cues that disambiguate the causal status of the covariate.     

Hypnotic control of attention in the Stroop task: a historical footnote

Raz, Shapiro, Fan, and Posner (2002) have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say "green"), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a "case study" from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis.     

Signed Orders, Choice Probabilities, and Linear Polytopes

Self-reflecting signed orders were proposed as an aid in estimating preference between subsets of items on the basis of limited information. The data of a signed order are preference comparisons that consider the desirability of excluding items from a subset as well as including items in a subset. This paper investigates signed orders within the setting of probabilistic choice and random utility theory. It focuses on linear signed order polytopes and their relationship to binary choice probabilities. The theory applies both to individual choice behavior and to group decision making. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Drawing Movements as an Outcome of the Principle of Least Action

According to the two-thirds power law the cube of the speed of a drawing movement is proportional to the radius of curvature of the trajectory, and the coefficient of proportionality has the meaning of mechanical power. We derive this empirical law from the variational principle known in physics as the principle of least action. It states that if a movement between two points of a given path obeys the two-thirds law, then the amount of work required to execute a trajectory in a fixed time is minimal. In this strict sense one may say that among infinitely many ways to execute a given path, the central nervous system chooses the most economical. We show that the kinematic equations for all drawing movements are solutions of a certain differential equation with a single (time-variable) coefficient. We consider several special cases of drawing movements corresponding to simplest forms of this coefficient. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Emotional intelligence meets traditional standards for an intelligence

An intelligence must meet several standard criteria before it can be considered scientifically legitimate. First, it should be capable of being operationalized as a set of abilities. Second, it should meet certain correlational criteria: the abilities defined by the intelligence should form a related set (i.e., be intercorrelated), and be related to pre-existing intelligences, while also showing some unique variance. Third, the abilities of the intelligence should develop with age and experience. In two studies, adults (N=503) and adolescents (N=229) took a new, 12-subscale ability test of emotional intelligence: the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS). The present studies show that emotional intelligence, as measured by the MEIS, meets the above three classical criteria of a standard intelligence.     

Logic and Aggregation

Paraconsistent logic is an area of philosophical logic that has yet to find acceptance from a wider audience. The area remains, in a word, disreputable. In this essay, we try to reassure potential consumers that it is not necessary to become a radical in order to use paraconsistent logic. According to the radicals, the problem is the absurd classical account of contradiction: Classically inconsistent sets explode only because bourgeois classical semantics holds, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that both A and A cannot simultaneously be true! We suggest (more modestly) that there is, at least sometimes, something else worth preserving, even in an inconsistent, unsatisfiable premise set. In this paper we present, in a new guise, a very general version of this preservationist approach to paraconsistency.     

Absolute Probability Functions for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic

Provided here is a characterisation of absolute probability functions for intuitionistic (propositional) logic L, i.e. a set of constraints on the unary functions P from the statements of L to the reals, which insures that (i) if a statement A of L is provable in L, then P(A) = 1 for every P, L's axiomatisation being thus sound in the probabilistic sense, and (ii) if P(A) = 1 for every P, then A is provable in L, L's axiomatisation being thus complete in the probabilistic sense. As there are theorems of classical (propositional) logic that are not intuitionistic ones, there are unary probability functions for intuitionistic logic that are not classical ones. Provided here because of this is a means of singling out the classical probability functions from among the intuitionistic ones.