Do you feel better or worse? The validity of perceived deviations of mood states from mood traits

The advantages of assessing self‐perceived deviations of mood states from mood traits in cross‐sectional as well as longitudinal studies are discussed in detail. The validity of self‐perceived mood deviations is analysed in a longitudinal study with three occasions of measurement and 176 participants. In order to assess self‐perceived mood deviations, participants rated the deviation of their momentary mood from how they felt in general with respect to 32 mood adjectives belonging to three mood scales (pleasant–unpleasant, calm–restless, awake–sleepy). Furthermore, mood states, mood traits, and other personality variables (hedonic level, neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness) are assessed by self‐report. Using models of latent state–trait theory, it is shown that the self‐perceived mood deviation scales are reliable (reliabilities between 0.73 and 0.95) and sensitive to occasion‐specific fluctuations (occasion specificities between 0.38 and 0.72). The self‐perceived deviation scales show high correlations with latent occasion‐specific deviation variables defined on the basis of repeatedly measured mood states (high convergent validity). In contrast to self‐reported mood states, however, self‐perceived mood deviations show much smaller and in most cases non‐significant correlations with personality variables (high discriminant validity). Furthermore, it is shown that self‐perceived mood deviations can be used to suppress stable situation‐specific variance in mood traits defined as aggregated states. Therefore, it can be demonstrated that including self‐perceived mood deviations in analyses on mood–personality associations enhances the association coefficients considerably. Finally, the implications of the results for the individual assessment of mood deviations, as well as for studies on affect and personality, are discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ethical issues and the family doctor

Issues recognized as having ethical or moral components are becoming increasingly common, for society in general, the health care system and for general practitioner/family physicians in particular. Some of the peculiar problems for GP's relate to the provision of continuing, comprehensive, primary medical care to large numbers of individuals who provide extensive potential for conflict between all the involved elements: patients, physicians, families, consultants and societal attitudes. There is a need for more formal education programs.     

How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.     

Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory

This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us.     

Alcohol and aggression: a test of the attention-allocation model

This article presents the first systematic test of the attention-allocation model for alcohol-related aggression. According to this model, alcohol has a "myopic" effect on attentional capacity that presumably facilitates aggression by focusing attention on more salient provocative, rather than less salient inhibitory, cues in hostile situations. Aggression was assessed using a laboratory task in which mild electric shocks were received from, and administered to, a fictitious opponent. Study 1 demonstrated that a moderate-load cognitive distractor suppressed aggression in intoxicated subjects (to levels even lower than those exhibited by a placebo control group). Study 2 assessed how varying the magnitude of a distracting cognitive load affected aggression in the alcohol and placebo conditions. Results indicated that the moderate-load distraction used in Study 1 (i.e., holding four elements in sequential order in working memory) suppressed aggression best. Cognitive loads of larger and smaller magnitudes were not successful in attenuating aggression.     

An evaluation of in situ training to teach sexual abuse prevention skills to women with mental retardation

The current study evaluated a behavioral skills training (BST) program in combination with in situ training to teach sexual abuse prevention skills to five women with mild to moderate mental retardation. In situ assessments were conducted following BST and in situ training sessions were conducted for those who were unable to demonstrate the skills in the natural setting. The results showed that generalization of the safety skills to the natural setting occurred for three of the five participants following one to two in situ training sessions. One participant required 12 in situ training sessions and three booster training sessions to reach criterion level. Three of four participants assessed 1 month following training maintained the skills. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intentional forgetting is easier after two "shots" than one

Three experiments evaluated whether the magnitude of the list-method directed forgetting effect is strength dependent. Throughout these studies, items were strengthened via operations thought to increase context strength (spaced presentations) or manipulations thought to increment the item strength without affecting the context strength (processing time and processing depth). The assumptions regarding which operations enhance item and context strength were based on the "one-shot" hypothesis of context storage (K. J. Malmberg & R. M. Shiffrin, 2005). The results revealed greater directed forgetting of strong items compared with weak items, but only when strength was varied via spaced presentations (Experiment 3). Equivalent directed forgetting was observed for strong and weak items when strengthening operations increased item strength without affecting the context strength (Experiments 1 and 2). These results supported the context hypothesis of directed forgetting (L. Sahakyan & C. M. Kelley, 2002).     

The influence of CS-US interval on several different indices of learning in appetitive conditioning

Four experiments examined the effects of varying the conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus (CS-US) interval (and US density) on learning in an appetitive magazine approach task with rats. Learning was assessed with conditioned response (CR) measures, as well as measures of sensory-specific stimulus-outcome associations (Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, potentiated feeding, and US devaluation). The results from these studies indicate that there exists an inverse relation between CS-US interval and magazine approach CRs, but that sensory-specific stimulus-outcome associations are established over a wide range of relatively long, but not short, CS-US intervals. These data suggest that simple CR measures provide different information about what is learned than measures of the specific stimulus-outcome association, and that time is a more critical variable for the former than latter component of learning.     

A defense of local miracle compatibilism

David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.