Auditory Priming for Nonverbal Information: Implicit and Explicit Memory for Environmental Sounds

Three experiments examined repetition priming for meaningful environmental sounds (e.g., clock ticking, tooth brushing, toilet flushing, etc.) in a sound stem identification paradigm using brief sound cues. Prior encoding of target sounds together with their associated names facilitated subsequent identification of sound stems relative to nonstudied controls. In contrast, prior exposure to names alone in the absence of the environmental sounds did not prime subsequent sound stem identification performance at all (Experiments 1 and 3). Explicit and implicit memory were dissociated such that sound stem cued recall was higher following semantic than nonsemantic encoding, whereas sound priming was insensitive to manipulations of depth encoding (Experiments 2 and 3). These results extend the findings of long-term repetition priming into the auditory nonverbal domain and suggest that priming for environmental sounds is mediated primarily by perceptual processes.     

Reply to William R. Ferrell’s paper “A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination”

Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model and our subjective distance model belong to the same family of Thurstonial models. The subjective distance model is limited to sensory discrimination with the method of constant stimuli and rooted in such notions as discriminal dispersion and sense distance. Ferrell’s model is intended to be wider in scope and to apply to both cognitive and sensory tasks. Both models need supplementary assumptions to predict calibration phenomena. The point of departure for us is the fact that the model predicts under-confidence under “guessing” and the empirical finding that people are about 100% correct when they report “absolutely certain.” Ferrell makes assumptions about cutoffs on the decision variable. The respondent is assumed to adjust or not adjust cutoffs according to “cues to difficulty.” We disagree with Ferrell’s claim that the hard-easy effect is explained by the respondent’s failure to adjust cutoffs sufficiently when there is a change in level of difficulty, and argue that this amounts to little more than a translation of the hard-easy effect into the lingua of Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model. Our argument is that the hard-easy effect is a consequence of the post hoc division of items according to solution probability. In addition, error variance may contribute to regression effects that enlarge the hard-easy effect. Finally, in contrast to Ferrell’s position, we regard inference (cognitive uncertainty) and discrimination (sensory uncertainty) as different psychological processes. An understanding of calibration in these two areas requires separate models.     

Extraction of relief from visual motion

We quantified the ability of human subjects to discriminate the relative distance of two points from a slanted plane when viewing the projected velocities of this scene (orthographic projection). The relative distance from a plane (called relief) is a 3-D property that is invariant under linear (affine) transformations. As such, relief canin principle be extracted from the instantaneous projected velocity field; a metric representation, which requires the extraction of visual acceleration, is not required. The stimulus consisted of a slanted planeP (specified by three points) and two pointsQ ₁ andQ ₂ that are non-coplanar withP. This configuration of points oscillated rigidly around the vertical axis. We have measured thesystematic error andaccuracy with which human subjects estimate the relative distance of pointsQ ₁ andQ ₂ from planeP as a function of the slant of_P. The systematic error varies with slant: it is low for small slant values, reaches a maximum for medium slant values, and drops again for high slant values. The accuracy covaries with the systematic error and is thus high for small and large slant values and low for medium slant values. These results are successfully modeled by a simple relief-from-motion computation based on local estimates of projected velocities. The data are well predicted by assuming (1) a measurement error in velocity estimation that varies proportionally to velocity (Weber’s law) and (2) an eccentricity-dependent underestimation of velocity.     

Three- and four-year-olds’ perceptual confusions for spoken words

Although infants have the ability to discriminate a variety of speech contrasts, young children cannot always use this ability in the service of spoken-word recognition. The research reported here asked whether the reason young children sometimes fail to discriminate minimal word pairs is that they are less efficient at word recognition than adults, or whether it is that they employ different lexical representations. In particular, the research evaluated the proposal that young children’s lexical representations are more “holistic” than those of adults, and are based on overall acoustic-phonetic properties, as opposed to phonetic segments. Three- and four-year-olds were exposed initially to an invariant target word and were subsequently asked to determine whether a series of auditory stimuli matched or did not match the target. The critical test stimuli were nonwords that varied in their degree of phonetic featural overlap with the target, as well as in terms of the position(s) within the stimuli at which they differed from the target, and whether they differed from the target on one or two segments. Data from four experiments demonstrated that the frequency with which children mistook a nonword stimulus for the target was influenced by extent of featural overlap, but not by word position. The data also showed that, contrary to the predictions of the holistic hypothesis, stimuli differing from the target by two features on a single segment were confused with the target more often than were stimuli differing by a single feature on each of two segments. This finding suggests that children use both phonetic features and segments in accessing their mental lexicons, and that they are therefore much more similar to adults than is suggested by the holistic hypothesis.     

Classical harmony: Rules of inference and the meaning of the logical constants

The thesis that, in a system of natural deduction, the meaning of a logical constant is given by some or all of its introduction and elimination rules has been developed recently in the work of Dummett, Prawitz, Tennant, and others, by the addition of harmony constraints. Introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant must be in harmony. By deploying harmony constraints, these authors have arrived at logics no stronger than intuitionist propositional logic. Classical logic, they maintain, cannot be justified from this proof-theoretic perspective. This paper argues that, while classical logic can be formulated so as to satisfy a number of harmony constraints, the meanings of the standard logical constants cannot all be given by their introduction and/or elimination rules; negation, in particular, comes under close scrutiny.     

The dynamics of Prägnanz

Summary There is quite wide-spread agreement about the relevance of pattern Pragnanz (Koffka, 1935) with respect to the human interpretation of visual patterns. There is less agreement about whether pattern Pragnanz is based solely on pattern information (static) or also on the history of the perceiver (dynamic). In Van Leeuwen and Van den Hof (1991), experimental data concerning serial patterns are presented within the framework of the dynamic-network approach initiated by Buffart (1986, 1987). These experimental data are claimed to give evidence against the static-coding approach initiated by Leeuwenberg (1969, 1971). In the present paper, however, I show first that Buffart's theoretical basis is incorrect, and that in fact Leeuwenberg's static-coding approach is the basis for the dynamic-network approach. Second, I show that those experimental data rather give evidence in favor of the static-coding approach, by using those same data for a test of the most recent static-coding model (Van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1991; Van der Helm, Van Lier, & Leeuwenberg, 1992). Finally, I propose a reconciliation between the two approaches, in the sense that the dynamic-network model could be shaped in such a way that it yields a simulation, and maybe even an enrichment, of the static-coding model.     

Vasopressin, glucose homeostasis, and sucrose taste preferences

Previous research indicates that vasopressin-containing (LE) rats are capable of adapting to the stress of food restriction, whereas vasopressin-deficient (DI) rats cannot adapt to this stressor. It has been postulated that abnormalities in glucose metabolism may be one of the factors leading to the demise of food-restricted DI rats. The present study was conducted to determine if taste preferences are altered in DI animals and if the presentation of exogenous glucose, in the form of sucrose solutions, can ameliorate the effects of the stress of food restriction. Four different concentrations of sucrose solutions were presented to LE and DI rats under the food-restricted condition. In both strains, an 8% sucrose solution was preferred over 0%, 16%, and 32% concentrations, with DI rats consuming more of this concentration than LE rats. Thus, when DI rats had the opportunity of maintaining glucose homeostasis by exogenous supplements, they maintained body weight, displayed no stomach pathology, and survived.     

Daniel levinson and his theory of adult development: A reminiscence and some clarifications

I offer some reminiscences occasioned by the death of Daniel Levinson, a modern pioneer in the study of the human life cycle. I clarify three controversial aspects of Levinson's theory—its universality, the role of critical life events, and the place of relationships—as well as briefly foreshadow findings from his forthcoming book on women. I show that relationships to people, enterprises, and social institutions are the stuff out of which the individual life structure—Levinson's central concept—is formed. Levinson's dream was of a society in which the developmental needs of adults were better understood and met so that they could more generatively fill their roles in the institutions upon which the young depend. He thought this essential to the evolution of a society that would be both more competent and more humane. In this dream, which was a product of his own difficult mid-life transition and a measure of the success he achieved in integrating its polarities, Levinson united a warm, scientific interest in others with an affectionate curiosity about nature.     

Two-month-old infants’ sensitivity to allophonic differences

The present study investigated 2-month-olds’ abilities to discriminate allophonic differences that are potentially useful in segmenting fluent speech. Experiment 1 investigated infants’ sensitivity to the kind of distinction that may signal the presence or absence of a word boundary. When tested with the high-amplitude sucking procedure, infants discriminated pairs of items, such as “nitrate” versus “night rate” and “nikrate” versus “nike rate.” By greatly reducing the potential contribution of prosodic differences to these contrasts, Experiment 2 evaluated whether the allophonic differences for /t/ and /r/ were sufficient for infants to distinguish the “nitrate” versus “night rate” pair. Infants distinguished “nitrate” from a cross-spliced version of “night rate,” which differed only in the allophones for /t/ and /r/ that it included. Thus, infants appear to possess one of the prerequisite capacities (i.e., the ability to discriminate allophonic distinctions) necessary to use allophonic information in segmenting fluent speech.