Reflections on human pavlovian decelerative heart-rate conditioning with negative tilt as US: Alternative approaches

The negative-tilt preparation that has been reported since the late seventies is a specific form of Pavlovian conditioning that is of scientific interest and has potential applications. In this paper I reflect on the usefulness, to the development of this preparation, of two approaches to Pavlovian conditioning. One approach is the older S-R learning, stimulus-substitution paradigm exemplified by learning texts of the sixties. The other is the modern, Tolman-like view, according to which the phenomenon of Pavlovian conditioning is “now described as the learning of relations among events so as to allow the organism to represent its environment.” The three assumptions encapsulated by this approach are: (a) that only CS-US contingency relations are learned; (b) that teleological modes of explanations are adequate; (c) that the representational theory of knowledge is sound. Concerning Pavlovian conditioning in general, questions been raised in the literature for all three assumptions; they have not been adequately answered. Regarding the specific problem of developing the human Pavlovian heart-ratedecelerative conditioning with negative tilt as the US, I suggest that the cognitive approach has been much less helpful than the older, S-R, stimulus-substitution paradigm. Nevertheless, other literature clearly indicates that the cognitive, S-S approach has generated considerable interest and research, especially in preparations like the conditioned emotional response (CER), which are CS-IR ones in the sense that the effects on the CR are assessed indirectly through measuring an indicator or instrumental response (IR). Finally, even in CS-CR preparations like human GSR conditioning, it is important to study the cognitive, S-S learning process through using such dependent variables as continuously assessed subjective CS-US contingency.     

Motion coherence and conjunction search: Implications for guided search theory

Feature integration theory has recently been revised with two proposals that visual conjunction search can be parallel under some circumstances—either because items with nontarget features are inhibited, or because items with target features are excited. We examined whether excitatory or inhibitory guidance controlled conjunction search for an X oscillating in one direction among Os oscillating in that direction and Xs oscillating in another. Search was affected by whether items oscillated in phase with each other, and it was exceptionally difficult when items with target motion moved out of phase with each otherand items with nontarget motion moved out of phase. The results suggest that conjunction search can be guided both by excitation of target features and by inhibition of nontarget features.     

Initial experiences with cognitive therapy of schizophrenic patients

Based on earlier experiences of various groups of authors, we developed and modified a programme of cognitive therapy for schizophrenic patients. The aim of the application of the therapeutic programme to subacute patients was to decrease subjectively perceptible basic disorders and to improve the functions of performance. The present results and experiences with 4 groups consisting of a total of 31 patients encourage us to continue applying cognitive procedures of therapy. Problems of the ascertainment of measuring values and fundamental questions of therapeutic efficacy are discussed.     

The architecture of complexity: A new blueprint

The logic of scientific discovery is now a concern of computer scientists, as well as philosophers. In the computational approach to inductive inference, theories are treated as algorithms (computer programs), and the goal is to find the simplest algorithm that can generate the given data. Both computer scientists and philosophers want a measure of simplicity, such that simple theories are more likely to be true than complex theories. I attempt to provide such a measure here. I define a measure of simplicity for directed graphs, inspired by Herbert Simon's work. Many structures, including algorithms, can be naturally modelled by directed graphs. Furthermore, I adapt an argument of Simon's to show that simple directed graphs are more stable and more resistant to damage than complex directed graphs. Thus we have a reason for pursuing simplicity, other than purely economical reasons.This paper is based on part of my doctoral dissertation. Thanks to my thesis supervisor Professor Alasdair Urquhart for his encouragement, constructive criticism, and for directing me to several relevant articles; to my advisor, Professor Ian Hacking, for reminding me to concentrate on results that might have some application in the real world; to Professor Eric Mendelsohn for checking my use of graph theory; and to my friend Wendy Brandts for sharing her ideas on a closely related problem.Thanks to my friends and family (the latter being a (proper) subset of the former, and both including Dr. Louise Linney, of course) for ongoing support in my scholastic endeavors.Thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for financial assistance. (Awards 452-86-5885 and 453-87-0513.) Thanks to the University of Toronto for financial assistance.     

Expert evidence by psychologists: Sometimes problematic and often premature

This article provides a critical review of two major types of expert evidence: (a) clinical assessments, and (b) generalizations drawn from psychological research. Strong arguments both for and against both types of testimony have been offered by legal experts and psychologists. These arguments are evaluated and the conclusion is drawn that there are two fundamental problems for psychologists in the role of expert. First, the types of assessments clinicians are asked to make (e.g., concerning the accused's mental state at the time of committing the offense) may exceed the capacity of the discipline; such assessments are problematic. Second, the research foundation that psychologists employ in court does not always apply to the court situation in the way experts imply; the application of laboratory research findings to real world contexts is sometimes premature. The article concludes with an admonition that psychologists should adopt a more conservative response to requests to provide expert evidence.