Affective learning increases sensitivity to graded emotional faces

How does the affective significance of emotional faces affect perceptual decisions? We manipulated affective significance by pairing 100% fearful faces with aversive electrical stimulation and hypothesized that increasing the significance of a stimulus via its prior history would lead to enhanced processing. After fear conditioning, participants viewed graded emotional faces that ranged from neutral to fearful. Faces were shown either in a color that was previously paired with shock or a color not paired with shock during conditioning. Increases in the frequency of "fearful" responses for faces shown in the shock-paired color were most robust for faces at intermediate intensity levels (40-60% fearful). Psychometric fits to the data revealed significant increased sensitivity for shock-paired relative to unpaired faces. Thus, despite identical physical features for shock-paired and unpaired stimuli (aside from the color, which was counterbalanced), more frequent (and faster) "fearful" responses were made when participants viewed affectively significant stimuli.     

Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches

The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track graded consciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We identify possible and actual conflicts among measures that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude that measures must prove themselves by iteratively building knowledge in the context of theoretical frameworks. Advances in measuring consciousness have implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for comparative studies of consciousness and for clinical applications.     

Sustained and transient modulation of performance induced by emotional picture viewing

We investigated how viewing task-irrelevant emotional pictures affects the performance of a subsequent nonemotional visual detection task. Subjects performed target-detection trials following the offset of individual unpleasant, pleasant, and neutral pictures. Sustained interference occurred when subjects viewed unpleasant pictures (mutilated bodies) in a sequential, "blocked" fashion. Such slowing down of reaction time appeared to build up with time, consistent with the instatement of a defensive emotional state. With a randomized picture presentation, only a transient interference effect was observed, consistent with increased attentional demands during the processing of unpleasant pictures. During blocked presentation of affiliative pleasant pictures, reaction times were faster, suggesting the activation of appetitive motivational systems. Ultimately, both attentional and motivational systems are intricately tied in the brain and, together, determine behavior.     

Multiple influences of reward on perception and attention

Visual processing is influenced by stimulus-driven and goal-driven factors. Recent interest has centred on understanding how reward might provide additional contributions to visual perception and unravelling the underlying neural mechanisms. In this review, I suggest that the impact of reward on vision is not unitary and depends on the type of experimental manipulation. With this in mind, I outline a possible classification of the main paradigms employed in the literature and discuss potential brain processes that operate during some of the experimental manipulations described.     

Moment-to-moment fluctuations in fMRI amplitude and interregion coupling are predictive of inhibitory performance

We investigated how moment-to-moment fluctuations in fMRI amplitude and interregional coupling are linked to behavioral performance during a stop signal task. To quantify the relationship between single-trial amplitude and behavior on a trial-by-trial basis, we modeled the probability of successful inhibition as a function of response amplitude via logistic regression analysis. At the group level, significant logistic slopes were observed in, among other regions, the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), caudate, and putamen, all bilaterally. Furthermore, we investigated how trial-by-trial fluctuations in responses in attentional regions covaried with fluctuations in inhibition-related regions. The coupling between several frontoparietal attentional regions and the right IFG increased during successful versus unsuccessful performance, suggesting that efficacious network interactions are important in determining behavioral outcome during the stop signal task. In particular, the link between responses in the right IFG and behavior were moderated by moment-to-moment fluctuations in evoked responses in the left intraparietal sulcus. A supplemental figure for this article may be downloaded from http:// cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Embracing integration and complexity: placing emotion within a science of brain and behaviour

ABSTRACT

The present paper addresses conceptual issues that are central to emotion research. What is emotion? What are its defining characteristics? The field struggles with questions like these almost constantly. I argue that definitions, and deciding what is the proper status of emotion, are not a requirement for scientific progress – in fact, they can hinder it. Therefore, “emotion” researchers should strive to develop a science of complex behaviours, and worry less about their exact nature. But for interesting behaviours, is most of the explaining that is needed present at the level of isolated systems (perception, cognition, etc.) or at the level of interactions between them? I suggest that the level of interactions is where most of the work is needed. Accordingly, I advocate that it is important to embrace integration, and not to strive to necessarily disentangle the multiple contributions underlying behaviours. More generally, it is argued that we need to revise models of causation adopted when reasoning about the mind and brain. Instead, a “complex systems” approach is required where the interactions between multiple components lead to system-level – emergent – properties that cannot be isolated or attributed to more elementary parts.