Sensory and conceptual representations in memory: Motor images that cannot be imaged

Summary The paper argues for a distinction between sensory-and conceptual-information storage in the human information-processing system. Conceptual information is characterized as meaningful and symbolic, while sensory information may exist in modality-bound form. Furthermore, it is assumed that sensory information does not contribute to conscious remembering and can be used only in data-driven process reptitions, which can be accompanied by a kind of vague or intuitive feeling. Accordingly, pure top-down and willingly controlled processing, such as free recall, should not have any access to sensory data. Empirical results from different research areas and from two experiments conducted by the authors are presented in this article to support these theoretical distinctions. The experiments were designed to separate a sensory-motor and a conceptual component in memory for two-digit numbers and two-letter items, when parts of the numbers or items were imaged or drawn on a tablet. The results of free recall and recognition are discussed in a theoretical framework which distinguishes sensory and conceptual information in memory.     

Subconscious image recognition

Two experiments demonstrate the influence of an unconscious form of information storage on behavior. In the learning phase, subjects see pictures in which other pictures or figures are embedded. The experimental procedure makes sure that these embedded figures cannot be seen (or consciously identified) by the subjects. Nevertheless, the results of a perceptual identification task in the test phase prove that information of these unidentified figures has been stored by the subjects: In a clarification task, subjects were shown the cut out, previously embedded figures and other pictures which they had to name as quickly as possible. The experimental group, which had seen the pictures with the embedded figures in the learning phase, was much quicker in responding to the naming task than the control group, which had not seen these pictures before. These results are discussed in terms of a distinction between sensori-perceptual and conceptual information storage in humans. Conceptual information is characterized as meaningful, symbolic, and accessible to conscious reasoning and remembering, while sensori-perceptual information is seen as nonsymbolic, modality-bound, and restricted to unconscious reactivations in data-driven process repetitions.     

Differential age effects in load-dependent memory processing

This study examined differential age effects in a young and a middle-aged sample by means of a sequential n-back task with increasing memory load. Participants processed two streams of stimuli either separately as a single task, or simultaneously as a dual task. We investigated age effects as a function of memory load in both the single and the dual-task version. In accuracy, we observed differential age effects as a function of load, which were more prominent in the dual-compared to the single-task versions. That is, middle-aged participants performed poorer than young adults in the dual-task conditions, suggesting that early age-related changes become especially apparent in conditions where task coordination and resource sharing come into play. Regarding latencies, we observed no differential age effect, which we believe is due to characteristics of the sequential n-back task.     

Decomposing intuitive components in a conceptual problem solving task

Research into intuitive problem solving has shown that objective closeness of participants' hypotheses were closer to the accurate solution than their subjective ratings of closeness. After separating conceptually intuitive problem solving from the solutions of rational incremental tasks and of sudden insight tasks, we replicated this finding by using more precise measures in a conceptual problem-solving task. In a second study, we distinguished performance level, processing style, implicit knowledge and subjective feeling of closeness to the solution within the problem-solving task and examined the relationships of these different components with measures of intelligence and personality. Verbal intelligence correlated with performance level in problem solving, but not with processing style and implicit knowledge. Faith in intuition, openness to experience, and conscientiousness correlated with processing style, but not with implicit knowledge. These findings suggest that one needs to decompose processing style and intuitive components in problem solving to make predictions on effects of intelligence and personality measures.     

Cognitive functioning, behavior, and quality of life after stroke in childhood.

Rationale: To provide a better understanding of cognitive functioning, motor outcome, behavior and quality of life after childhood stroke and to study the relationship between variables expected to influence rehabilitation and outcome (age at stroke, time elapsed since stroke, lateralization, location and size of lesion). Methods: Children who suffered from stroke between birth and their eighteenth year of life underwent an assessment consisting of cognitive tests (WISC-III, WAIS-R, K-ABC, TAP, Rey-Figure, German Version of the CVLT) and questionnaires (Conner's Scales, KIDSCREEN). Results: Twenty-one patients after stroke in childhood (15 males, mean 11;11 years, SD 4;3, range 6;10-21;2) participated in the study. Mean Intelligence Quotients (IQ) were situated within the normal range (mean Full Scale IQ 96.5, range IQ 79-129). However, significantly more patients showed deficits in various cognitive domains than expected from a healthy population (Performance IQ p = .000; Digit Span p = .000, Arithmetic's p = .007, Divided Attention p = .028, Alertness p = .002). Verbal IQ was significantly better than Performance IQ in 13 of 17 patients, independent of the hemispheric side of lesion. Symptoms of ADHD occurred more often in the patients' sample than in a healthy population (learning difficulties/inattention p = .000; impulsivity/hyperactivity p = .006; psychosomatics p = .006). Certain aspects of quality of life were reduced (autonomy p = .003; parents' relation p = .003; social acceptance p = .037). Three patients had a right-sided hemiparesis, mean values of motor functions of the other patients were slightly impaired (sequential finger movements p = .000, hand alternation p = .001, foot tapping p = .043). In patients without hemiparesis, there was no relation between the lateralization of lesion and motor outcome. Lesion that occurred in the midst of childhood (5-10 years) led to better cognitive outcome than lesion in the very early (0-5 years) or late childhood (10-18 years). Other variables such as presence of seizure, elapsed time since stroke and size of lesion had a small to no impact on prognosis. Conclusion: Moderate cognitive and motor deficits, behavioral problems, and impairment in some aspects of quality of life frequently remain after stroke in childhood. Visuospatial functions are more often reduced than verbal functions, independent of the hemispheric side of lesion. This indicates a functional superiority of verbal skills compared to visuospatial skills in the process of recovery after brain injury. Compared to the cognitive outcome following stroke in adults, cognitive sequelae after childhood stroke do indicate neither the lateralization nor the location of the lesion focus. Age at stroke seems to be the only determining factor influencing cognitive outcome.