The Lost Analyst and the Phoenix: Image,Word, Myth,and the Journey from Dissociation to Integration

ABSTRACT

The Phoenix myth is commonly thought of as a simple Egyptian parable of re-incarnation. In contrast, this analytic dyad found that the visual images evoked by its elaborated mythemes (sub-plots) related to the various existential moods and affects characteristic of trauma identified by Stolorow (2007 Stolorow, R. D. (2007), Trauma and Human Experience: Autobiographical, Psychoanalytic, and Philosophical Reflections [Psychoanalytic Book Series, Vol. 23]. New York: The Analytic Press. [Google Scholar]), suggesting a psychological purpose, that of emotional self-renewal. Mythology has most consistently been adopted for use in Jung’s analytical psychology, but this article demonstrates this myth’s usefulness with a contemporary relational psychoanalytic approach, that of intersubjective-systems theory. This was effective for an analysand whose former analysis had been abruptly terminated. It was found that the dialogic exploration of possible meaning in the mythemes brought dissociated experience into language, assisted with the emotional integration of the trauma, and restored the analysand’s diminished sense-of-being. Images bring together diverse somatic, cognitive, and verbal information, normally separated into different communication “codes” (Bucci, 1997a Bucci, W. (1997a), Symptoms and symbols: A multiple code theory of somatization. Psychoanal. Inq., 17: 151–172.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This ancient myth’s longevity may be due to a useful psychological function; its images can aid the organizing of unformulated unconscious chaotic experience and assist in the process of bringing dissociated or preverbal emotions and moods into language. The utility of the Phoenix myth in a relational dialogical process that helps symbolize unsymbolized unconscious content could assist in work with other survivors of catastrophic loss.     

Spirituality and Post-Stroke Aphasia Recovery

Journal of Religion and Health - The role of spirituality in post-stroke aphasia recovery has been ignored despite its potential contribution to positive health outcomes, particularly stroke...     

Infant care from infants' viewpoint: the views of some professionals

Debate about infant care tends to focus on still unresolved questions about whether or not day care is harmful, while research studies often confine care options to an unrealistic axis of choice between group care and mother care. Research that delineates constituents of day care quality in relation to measurable outcomes for different groups of children is urgently needed and should be based on a broader view of infant care options. A postal opinion survey sought the confidential views of members of an international organization of infant mental health professionals as to the kinds of care they considered likely to be best for infants from birth to 36 months, assuming that all types of care were of equally high quality and availability. Surprisingly lengthy periods of care by mothers were consistently endorsed; fathers were almost entirely disregarded as principal or joint caregivers; all forms of family care were endorsed over all forms of purchased care, but all forms of individual care were preferred to full-day group care for all age groups and to half-day group care up to the age of 2. The patterns of care judged by these respondents as likely to be best for infants are very different from those which most infants experience now, and from those which policy- and opinion-makers, practitioners and parents aspire, publicly at least, to provide for infants in the future. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Counterfactuals and the fixity of the past

I argue that David Lewis’s attempt, in his ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, to explain the fixity of the past in terms of counterfactual independence is unsuccessful. I point out that there is an ambiguity in the claim that the past is counterfactually independent of the present (or, more generally, that the earlier is counterfactually independent of the later), corresponding to two distinct theses about the relation between time and counterfactuals, both officially endorsed by Lewis. I argue that Lewis’s attempt is flawed for a variety of reasons, including the fact that his own theory about the evaluation of counterfactuals requires too many exceptions to the general rule that the past is counterfactually independent of the present. At the end of the paper, I consider a variant of Lewis’s strategy that attempts to explain the fixity of the past in terms of causal, rather than counterfactual, independence. I conclude that, although this variant avoids some of the objections that afflict Lewis’s account, it nevertheless seems to be incapable of giving a satisfactory explanation of the notion of the fixity of the past.     

Individual differences in attachment and dispositional mindfulness: The mediating role of emotion regulation

Recent interest in the relationship between individual differences in attachment and dispositional mindfulness has led to empirical investigations into this association. Although several studies have demonstrated an association between attachment and mindfulness, little is known as to why these two seemingly distinct constructs are related. In a sample of 572 individuals we explored whether the relationship between attachment and mindfulness was mediated by emotion regulation difficulties. Difficulties in emotion regulation fully mediated the association between attachment anxiety and mindfulness, and between attachment avoidance and mindfulness. Thus, the mechanism by which attachment and mindfulness are related is through emotion regulation difficulties. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.     

Remembering the time: a continuous clock

The neural mechanisms for time measurement are currently a subject of much debate. This article argues that our brains can measure time using the same dorsolateral prefrontal cells that are known to be involved in working memory. Evidence for this is: (1) the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is integral to both cognitive timing and working memory; (2) both behavioural processes are modulated by dopamine and disrupted by manipulation of dopaminergic projections to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; (3) the neurons in question ramp their activity in a temporally predictable way during both types of processing; and (4) this ramping activity is modulated by dopamine. The dual involvement of these prefrontal neurons in working memory and cognitive timing supports a view of the prefrontal cortex as a multipurpose processor recruited by a wide variety of tasks.