Reasons why in normative explanation

Normative explanations, which specify why things have the normative features they do, are ubiquitous in normative theory and ordinary thought. But there is much less work on normative explanation than on scientific or metaphysical explanation. Skow [2016. Reasons Why. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that a complete answer to the question why some fact Q occurs consists in all of the reasons why Q occurs. This paper explores this theory as a case study of a general theory that promises to offer us a grip on normative explanation which is independent of particular normative theories. I first argue that the theory doesn't give an adequate account of certain enablers of reasons which are important in normative explanation. I then formulate and reject three responses on behalf of the theory. But I suggest that since theories of this general sort have the right kind of resources to illuminate how normative explanation might be similar to and different from explanations in other domains, they nonetheless merit further exploration by normative theorists.     

IMAGO DEI AND HUMAN RATIONALITY

There is a pervasive trend in Western theology to identify imago Dei with human intellectual and cognitive capacities. However, several contemporary theologians have criticized this view because, according to the critics, it leads to a truncated view of humanity. In this article, I shall concentrate on the question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Lutheran Robert Jenson, and second, in some branches of recent cognitive psychology. I will argue that there is a significant overlap between contemporary scientific interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. Consequently, it is possible to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of structuralism point out.     

Regulating emotions under exposure to negative out-group-related news material results in increased acceptance of out-groups

ABSTRACT

Negative emotions affect the acceptance of out-groups. Here, we investigated whether modifying negative emotions would affect perceptions of out-groups. We experimentally manipulated the use of two emotion regulation strategies: suppression of emotional expression and cognitive reappraisal, the latter involving reframing a situation to mitigate its emotional impact. Using a population-based sample (N = 317), we conducted an online randomized controlled trial. Participants regulated their emotions while reading threatening news about out-groups. Not only reappraisal, but also suppression increased immediate acceptance of out-groups. The effect of reappraisal was partly mediated by decreased disgust, suggesting unique effects of reappraisal on this emotion. In the suppression condition acceptance decreased at high levels of habitual emotion regulation, whereas reappraisal showed an opposite tendency. Previous research may have underestimated the importance of different emotion regulation strategies on prejudice, and that relatively simple interventions can affect prejudice. The findings are of interest to prejudice prevention programs.     

An evolutionary approach to support decision making with linear decision models

In this paper we consider decision problems that can be described as linear decision models. These models have been traditionally solved using linear programming, fuzzy linear programming, multiple-objective linear programming or ‘what-if’ analysis. Using these approaches, one encounters a number of difficulties. We propose an ‘evolutionary approach’ to overcome these difficulties. In the proposed approach the decision maker does not have to precisely specify the model (i.e. the objective functions, the RHS values, etc.) at the beginning of the solution procedure. In fact, the model evolves as the solution procedure proceeds.