Urban Aboriginal‐Australian and Anglo‐Australian children: in‐group preference,self‐concept,and teachers' academic evaluations

The in‐group preference and self‐concepts of urban Aboriginal‐Australian and Anglo‐Australian children have never been compared, nor their relationships to teachers' evaluations of academic performance. In this study, 60 Aboriginal (primarily local Nyoongah) and 60 Anglo children aged 6–12 years were tested on in‐group preference; children aged 8+ were tested on self‐concept. Also, their teachers evaluated them on their general academic performance. Results indicated that Anglo children showed greater in‐group preference and scored higher on teacher evaluations than Aboriginal children, although there was no difference on self‐concept. No correlation existed between in‐group preference and self‐concept. It was concluded that the problems faced by Aboriginal children are only likely to be alleviated by a great deal of structural change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adolescent Suicidal Ideation Subgroups and their Association with Suicidal Plans and Attempts in Young Adulthood

Suicidal ideation during adolescence is quite common. Longitudinal ideation patterns may predict adolescents at greatest risk of progressing to more serious suicidal behaviors. We enumerated suicidal ideation trajectory subgroups and estimated subgroup association with later suicidal plans and attempts using data collected across a 13‐year period from 552 Caucasian adolescents. Three subgroups were found: non‐ideators (no ideation), decreasers (ideation decreased), and increasers (ideation persisted or increased). Probability of planning a suicide was greatest among increasers (females: .54, males: 51, p < .01). Probability of attempting suicide was greatest among male decreasers (.36, p < .01) and female increasers (.25, p < .01).     

Prejudice against Australian Aborigines: old-fashioned and modern forms

Prejudice is a pervasive and destructive social problem. Theories of prejudice distinguish between old-fashioned and modern forms. The former is an open rejection of minority group members; the latter is subtle and covert, with a veneer of outgroup acceptance. The present study examines the distinction in the context of contemporary attitudes to Australian Aborigines. Separate measures of each, and of other variables, were included in a random survey of the Perth metropolitan area in 1994. The two forms of prejudice were correlated (r=0.55), but factor analysis revealed that the two constructs are separable. Further, they were distributed differently in the population, with modern prejudice being more prevalent than old-fashioned prejudice (57.9 per cent scoring above the midpoint on the modern scale, and only 21.2 per cent on the old-fashioned scale). Modern prejudice was predicted more strongly by social psychological variables (R²=0.51) than was old-fashioned prejudice (R²=0.30), and the pattern of results from regression analyses differed for the two types of prejudice. Overall, the results confirm the distinction between old-fashioned and modern forms of prejudice, but indicate that the two are conceptually and empirically related to one another. Comparisons with earlier research reveal the declining prevalence of old-fashioned prejudice, but indicate prejudice is still a major social problem. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Moderate Pluralism About Truth and Logic

According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth property that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse, but instances of this property are grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. Moderate truth pluralists must answer two questions concerning logic: (Q1) Which logic governs inferences concerning each truth-apt domain considered separately? (Q2) Which logic governs inferences that involve several truth-apt domains? This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to present and explain the moderate pluralist’s answers to (Q1) and (Q2). The second objective is to argue that there is a tension between these answers. The answer to (Q1) involves a commitment to a form of logical pluralism. However, reflection on the moderate truth pluralist’s answer to (Q2) shows that they are committed to taking logic to be topic neutrality. This, in turn, forces a commitment to logical monism. It would seem that the moderate truth pluralist cannot have it both ways. The third objective is constructive in nature. I offer an account of what moderate truth pluralists should say about logic and how they might resolve the tension in their view. I suggest that, just like moderate truth pluralists distinguish truth proper and “quasi-truth,” they should endorse a distinction between logic proper and “quasi-logic.” Quasi-truth is truth-like in the sense that instances of quasi-truth ground instances of truth. Quasi-logic is logic-like in the sense that it concerns arguments that are necessarily truth-preserving but are not generally so in a topic neutral way. I suggest that moderate truth pluralists should be monists about truth proper and logic proper but pluralists about quasi-truth and quasi-logic. This allows them to say that logic proper is topic neutral while still accommodating the idea that, for different domains, different arguments may be necessarily truth-preserving.