首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   4325篇
  免费   168篇
  国内免费   2篇
  2022年   32篇
  2021年   45篇
  2020年   69篇
  2019年   91篇
  2018年   118篇
  2017年   143篇
  2016年   126篇
  2015年   100篇
  2014年   137篇
  2013年   549篇
  2012年   224篇
  2011年   225篇
  2010年   121篇
  2009年   136篇
  2008年   164篇
  2007年   193篇
  2006年   164篇
  2005年   124篇
  2004年   145篇
  2003年   130篇
  2002年   104篇
  2001年   63篇
  2000年   62篇
  1999年   73篇
  1998年   57篇
  1997年   42篇
  1996年   34篇
  1995年   38篇
  1994年   38篇
  1993年   43篇
  1992年   39篇
  1991年   29篇
  1990年   40篇
  1989年   25篇
  1988年   37篇
  1987年   32篇
  1986年   41篇
  1985年   45篇
  1984年   40篇
  1983年   42篇
  1982年   38篇
  1981年   34篇
  1980年   37篇
  1979年   33篇
  1978年   41篇
  1977年   26篇
  1976年   36篇
  1975年   40篇
  1974年   38篇
  1973年   28篇
排序方式: 共有4495条查询结果,搜索用时 18 毫秒
991.
992.
Conclusion Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects.  相似文献   
993.
Quasi-continuous work settings often involve sleep loss and requirements to perform at unpredictable times. Napping may alleviate some of the sleep-loss problems, but it increases the risk that the person will have difficulty functioning upon abrupt awakening. This paper describes an experimental approach, techniques, and analyses for investigating performance upon abrupt awakening from 2 h naps placed near either the circadian peak (P) or trough (T) in body temperature and preceded by 6, 18, 30, 42, or 54 h of sleep deprivation. Five groups of healthy young adults performed quasi-continuously for 54 h and were permitted a 2-h nap at one of five times. Reaction time (RT) to answer a phone terminating the nap, subjective estimates, and performance of a brief, challenging cognitive task were related to nap-sleep parameters of each group. Sleep deprivation increased the amount of deep sleep in the naps, and this was associated with greater postnap cognitive performance decrements; subjective estimates were unaffected, and RT performance was related simply to stage of sleep prior to awakening. Circadian placement of the naps also modulated the postnap cognitive decrement: T naps produced greater cognitive decrements than P naps, even when the latter involved more prior sleep loss. These findings have both practical and theoretical significance for evaluating the awakening process, and would not have been possible without the approach, techniques, and procedures described.  相似文献   
994.
This article focuses on the idea of sacrifice in the work of the Czech phenomenologist Jan Pato?ka. It presents and examines this philosopher from a theological perspective against the background of the theological turn in contemporary philosophy. First, the article focuses on Pato?ka's reflections on the kenotic sacrifice, which he defines as the sacrifice for nothing. Second, Pato?ka's thought is put into dialog with Jean‐Luc Marion's phenomenological sketch of sacrifice embedded in his phenomenology of the gift. Although both Pato?ka and Marion share an interest in sacrifice, a phenomenon of high theological importance, only the latter enjoys reception on the part of theology. Yet, the article argues, on the basis of further inquiry into Pato?ka's writings, Pato?ka presents a complementary and alternative perspective that not only precedes the theological turn but also challenges and opens new ways for theology. The conclusion thus portrays a kenotic form of Christianity after the end of Christianity, drawn from Pato?ka, as a specific spiritual being‐in‐the‐world.  相似文献   
995.
996.
997.
998.
999.
1000.
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号