Mental extrapolation in patterns constructed from memory

Finke and Pinker (1982, 1983) showed subjects an array of dots followed by an arrow in a blank field, and asked them to determine whether the arrow pointed to any of the previously seen dots. Response times were linearly related to the distance between the arrow and the nearest dot, suggesting that subjects spontaneously used an internal scanning or extrapolation process to perform the task. We replicate and extend this finding by varying the retention interval, and by employing a paradigm in which subjects’ eyes are closed and the arrows are described to them using a coordinate scheme. We also show that subjects are unable to predict the form of the data when the task simply is described to them. Results suggest that mental scanning along a straight path can be performed on images reconstructed from memory, and that it does not depend on the ongoing perception of a continuous surface, on physical eye movements, or on demand characteristics.     

Take care of egotism,and redemption will take care of itself: Comments on Tracy Llanera's Richard Rorty: Outgrowing modern nihilism

This commentary critically examines two facets of Tracy Llanera's recent book Richard Rorty: Outgrowing Modern Nihilism. First, it considers her interpretation of Richard Rorty's redemptive project. It argues that, while Llanera succeeds in resolving tensions in Rorty's public-private distinction, her account downplays the role of abnormal discourse within projects of self-creation. Second, it raises several questions about Llanera's strategy for situating this redemptive project within debates concerning existential nihilism. On her view, one ought to follow Rorty in addressing the problem of egotism instead of the problem of nihilism, since the former is prior to the latter. But it is not clear who counts as an egotist, or why egotists are especially prone to becoming nihilists. Moreover, there are reasons to think that egotism and nihilism are fundamentally different kinds of problems.     

Worldviews about change: Their structure and their implications for understanding responses to sustainability,technology, and political change

People hold different perspectives about how they think the world is changing or should change. We examined five of these “worldviews” about change: Progress, Golden Age, Endless Cycle, Maintenance, and Balance. In Studies 1–4 (total N = 2733) we established reliable measures of each change worldview, and showed how these help explain when people will support or oppose social change in contexts spanning sustainability, technological innovations, and political elections. In mapping out these relationships we identify how the importance of different change worldviews varies across contexts, with Balance most critical for understanding support for sustainability, Progress/Golden Age important for understanding responses to innovations, and Golden Age uniquely important for preferring Trump/Republicans in the 2016 US election. These relationships were independent of prominent individual differences (e.g., values, political orientation for elections) or context-specific factors (e.g., self-reported innovativeness for responses to innovations). Study 5 (N = 2140) examined generalizability in 10 countries/regions spanning five continents, establishing that these worldviews exhibited metric invariance, but with country/region differences in how change worldviews were related to support for sustainability. These findings show that change worldviews can act as a general “lens” people use to help determine whether to support or oppose social change.     

“Being human”: A grounded theory approach to exploring how trainers on clinical psychology doctorate programmes decide whether or not to disclose personal experiences of psychological distress to clinical psychology doctorate trainees

Objective

Recent research and guidelines recommend that trainers on clinical psychology doctorate training programmes consider disclosing personal experiences of psychological distress to trainees. Disclosure is thought to promote cultures of openness, validate and normalise trainee distress, encourage trainee disclosure and help-seeking and challenge stigmatising narratives. However, little is known about how trainers decide whether, what or how to disclose. This study aims to address that gap by exploring the processes and factors involved in trainers deciding whether or not to disclose personal experiences of psychological distress to trainees, generating findings of relevance across counselling, psychotherapy and psychology training courses.

Methods

In-depth interviews were conducted with nine trainers on UK clinical psychology doctorate programmes from around the country and analysed in accordance with constructivist grounded theory methods.

Results

Findings indicated that participants valued disclosure personally and professionally but were wary of the dangers of disclosure. Disclosure decisions were made by judging the context against internally held criteria. If criteria were not met, then disclosures were not made. Outcomes, whether positive or negative, served to reinforce the value of disclosure and the importance of managing risks, creating a positive feedback loop.

Conclusions

The findings of this study suggest factors that are important for trainers to consider when deciding whether or not to disclose. The six-factor framework developed may be useful for trainers to consider within reflective practice, supervision or during guided self-reflection in order to make safe, helpful and ethical decisions.     

Aggression as a reinforcer: operant behavior in the mouse-killing rat

Two experiments examined mouse killing as a reinforcer of key pressing by rats that killed mice. In Experiment I, mouse-killing rats performed the key-pressing response when each press was reinforced with presentation of a mouse. Offered a choice between a key that yielded presentation of mice and one that did not, the rats preferred the key that yielded mice. When the contingency was reversed, the rats preferred the other key and continued to kill mice. In Experiment II, mouse-killing rats that did not kill rat pups performed a key-pressing response reinforced with presentation of mice on a variable-interval schedule. In tests for responding reinforced on that schedule with presentation of normal mice, anesthetized mice, dead mice, or rat pups, these rats that killed mice but not rat pups exhibited a decline in response rate when rat pups were the reinforcer. Altering the condition of the mice did not significantly affect performance.     

Successive luminance difference thresholds and brightness as a function of the interstimulus interval and durations of successive flashes

Monocular,successive luminance difference thresholds (ΔI) and brightness matches (PSE) were obtained by the method of constant stimuli for two flashes successively presented to the same retinal area. Variations in interstimulus interval first-flash duration,and second-flash duration were the independent variables investigated. ΔI decreased as a function of ISI,while PSE remained relatively uninfluenced. An intensity-duration reciprocity was observed with increases in either first- or second-flash duration. Equal increases in duration of both flashes led to a constant value of ΔI. A Broca-Sulzer effect was also noted. In another study, a 10-msec, variable-luminance Standard was followed after 500 msec by either a 10-msec or a 320-msec test flash that was compared to the Standard. The results indicated that the rate of change of brightness with changes in luminance of the Standard was faster for the 10-msec flash than for the 320-msec flash. The rate-of-change hypothesis would predict that the 10-msec flash should have the smaller ΔI. The results for two Ss indicated the opposite: AI was smaller for 320-msec than for 10-msec flashes. A modification of the hypothesis was suggested such that it may be the energy increment (Δlt) required for detection that is related to the rate at which brightness changes with energy.     

Orientation of letters and errors in their recognition

Subjects named alphabetic characters that had been rotated, reflected, or inverted. Inversions induce more errors than mirror reflections and reflections induce more than rotations. In a significant number of mistakes a transformed character was assumed to be normally oriented, but in most a transformed character was confused with the mirror image of the original. The data suggest the existence of an “orientation set” in which the identiflcation of ambiguous characters depends largely on their anticipated orientation. The individuality of the data for the different orientations suggests that different transformations are compensated for in part by different mechanisms.