Are rats short-sighted? Effects of stimulus distance and size on visual detection

Behavioural evidence concerning short-sightedness in rats is apparently conflicting: in some experiments rats have performed poorly with visual stimuli further than about 60 cm distant, while in others they have made efficient use of more distant cues, for example to find their way through mazes. However, in the experiments suggesting short-sightedness, the physical size of the stimuli was not varied, so that stimulus distance and visual angle were confounded. In the present experiment, therefore, the size and distance of the stimuli to be detected were varied independently. Over the range tested (30-160 cm), distance was found to produce relatively slight effects on the smallest detectable visual angle, and these tended to diminish with practice. Thus, no good evidence was found for short-sightedness in rats up to 160 cm, a finding consistent with current views of the structure and image-forming capacities of the rat's eye. The smallest detectable targets were, however, surprisingly large in view of the rat's visual acuity (which is about 1c/deg): at the distances tested, animals required considerable training to run reliably to targets subtending less than 5-10° of visual angle. Difficulties in responding to stationary stimuli of this size are likely to restrict severely the use that rats make of vision both in the laboratory and in their natural surroundings.     

The recovery of structure from motion: no evidence for a special link with the convergent disparity mechanism

Convergent and divergent stereo mechanisms were compared in their ability to recover structure from motion. Contrary to a recent result reported by Richards and Lieberman, no difference in their performance was found; both mechanisms appeared equally capable of supporting the perception of good structure from motion. Possible reasons for the disparate results are discussed.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.