Adult age differences in the rate of learning serial patterns: evidence from direct and indirect tests.

Subjects performed a serial reaction time task (adopted from Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) that contained a repeating pattern of spatial locations. In Experiment 1, following 20 repetitions of a 10- or 16-element pattern, reaction time was equally disrupted for both younger and older people when the sequence became random. In Experiment 2, the response times for subjects encountering the 10-element pattern were compared with those of subjects encountering a random sequence. These response time functions diverged at the same point in training for the 2 age groups. Thus, on this indirect measure of response time facilitation, both experiments revealed age similarity in the rate of pattern learning. In contrast, on a subsequent direct test of pattern learning that required prediction, the younger people earned a higher percentage correct score than the older in both experiments. Age-related dissociations between direct and indirect measures of learning and comparisons with memory-impaired populations are discussed.     

Adult age differences in short-term memory and subsequent long-term memory for actions.

Short-term memory for actions was investigated for young adult and elderly adult subjects with the Brown-Peterson procedure at retention intervals of 0 and 15 s. The short-term memory trials were followed by the long-term recall of the prior to-be-remembered actions. The 15-s retention interval was filled either with no activity or with 1 of 3 different interfering activities. Verbal interference had little effect on short-term memory at either age level. Actions performed in the interval either by the subjects or by the experimenter produced significantly lower recall scores at each age level, with the decrement being more pronounced for the elderly than for the young subjects. The long-term memory results indicated that successful short-term recall enhanced later long-term recall, regardless of age level.     

Dimensions of affective experience in three age groups.

The dimensions by which adults of differing ages experience emotion were studied by self-administering questionnaires administered to older adults (n = 828) recruited from Elderhostel programs, middle-aged (ages 30-59) children of Elderhostel attenders (n = 231), and young adult (ages 18-29) subjects recruited from college classes or through Elderhostel participants (n = 207). Elders were higher in emotional control, mood stability, and emotional maturity through moderation and leveling of positive affect and lower in surgency, psychophysiological responsiveness, and sensation seeking. These findings are consistent with the hypothesized increase in self-regulatory capacity with age. These cross-sectional differences cannot, however, be distinguished from cohort-related explanations; they require considerable replication across different types of subjects and further characterization of the dimensions in terms of their functions for self-regulation.     

American Indian Secondary School Students' Preferences for Counselors

Researchers examined the importance of similar ethnicity and the preference for a counselor of the same sex among American Indian secondary school students.     

The relationship between attitude,assertiveness and condom use

The Australian study investigated condom-specific assertiveness and condom use as a means of prevention infection from sexually transmitted diseases. 211 men participated including 83 homosexual men (aged 19-62 years) and 128 heterosexual men (aged 17-49) who completed a questionnaire that comprised demographic details such as age, monogamy, and sexual activity as well as attitudinal and assertiveness measures. General assertiveness was measured by the Rathus Assertiveness Schedule (RAS) which had been widely used across a wide range of social situations. Assertiveness relating specifically to situations involving condoms was measured by the Condom Assertiveness Scale (CAS). Intention to use condoms was positively related to favorable attitudes, which were related to condom-specific assertiveness for both groups. For the heterosexual men only, general social assertiveness was negatively related to attitudes toward condoms. For both groups, the condom-specific measure of assertiveness was positively correlated with attitudes toward condoms. Condom-specific assertiveness was positively related to general social assertiveness as measured by the Rathus Assertiveness Schedule for the homosexual, but not for the heterosexual men. The negative relationship between general assertiveness and attitude to condoms among the heterosexual men implies that the risk reducing behavior of condom use did not seem to accord with the perceptions of masculinity and social assertiveness among heterosexual men. Thus, female partners of such heterosexual men exhibiting negative attitudes toward condom use combined with assertiveness would have to overcome resistance to insist on the use of condoms. Recently some advertising campaigns have been directed at women. The promotion of condom use among heterosexual men has to deal with the perceptions of condom use as unmasculine behavior.     

Confidence in expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis

Kelley and Stahelski's (1970) triangle hypothesis states that competitors hold homogeneous views of others by assuming that most others are competitive, whereas cooperators or pro-social people hold more heterogeneous views by assuming that others are either cooperative or competitive. To evaluate the triangle hypothesis, this study examines differences between pro-socials, individualists, and competitors not only in their expectations about others' choice behaviour, but also in the confidence with which such expectations are held. It was found that pro-social subjects expected more cooperation than individualists and competitors. More importantly, as predicted on the basis of the triangle hypothesis, pro-socials were less confident about their expectations than competitors, with individualists holding intermediate levels of confidence.     

La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)

Aristotle considers all examples, as far as they are used as rhetorical arguments, to be inductions (Rhetoric 1, 2, 8). On the other hand, he finds it worthwhile to distinguish different kinds of examples (viz., historical example, comparison, and fable). Moreover, comparisons and fables are said to be made by the orator, whereas historical examples are not (Rhetoric 2, 20, 2s). The present article attempts to explain this opposition.A close examination of what can be meant by induction reveals that this term applies differently to historical examples and to comparisons and fables. In a broader sense, all examples can be called inductions, insofar as a certain logical relation, different from the syllogistic one, obtains between conclusion and premises. This relation, however, is unable to explain why examples can serve as arguments. Applied to historical examples only, the term induction preserves its original meaning of checking samples in a number sufficient to yield generalization. In its narrow sense, induction gives a satisfactory account of how historical examples work. As for comparisons and fables — to which induction applies in a broader sense only — Aristotle fails to explain what makes them arguments. The explanation, missing in Rhetoric 2, 20, can, however, be given according to the general lines of Aristotelian dialectics and rhetorics. The main task of comparison and fable is to elaborate a so far unconsidered middle term (M) meeting the following conditions: the hearer is prepared to agree that M applies to the subject of the conclusion and that the predicate of the conclusion applies to M. All examples make use of a general proposition from which their conclusion can be inferred. Historical examples (like real inductions) produce instances, in order to confirm a proposition previously admitted as suitable premise, provided that its truth can be proved. Comparison and fables, by introducing a new middle term, try to form a premise susceptible of being admitted without proof.

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La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)

     

‘Healthy eating’ clinics in primary care: Programme intensity and patients' health beliefs

The primary care setting is seen by many to be at the forefront of the attempt to encourage people to follow healthier diets. Conducted in a single practice, the present study firstly considered the effectiveness of three ‘healthy eating’ clinics for patients found to have elevated cholesterol levels at screening. Through the use of a randomised trial, these patients received either basic dietay information or were invited back more frequently and requested to complete food diaries, half of which were then analysed through a computer program. At one year follow up the three programmes were found to have produced a 6.7% reduction in cholesterol levels. However, no differences were found between the three programmes. The study secondly examined a range of health belieji, based on the health belief model, as predictors of reductions in cholesterol levels. These were generally found to be poor predictors, with only the belief that one's diet is related to the chances of developing a number of major conditions and the perception of bam'ers dealing with confidence predicting these reductions. Finally, the case for incorporating self-efficacy beliefs into the healh belief model is outlined and the need for health counsellors to tailor their messages to the pre-existing beliefi and behaviours of patients is highlighted.     

Relevance reviewed: The case of argumentum ad hominem

This article aims tt providing some conceptual tools for dealing adequately with relevance in argumentative discourse. For this purpose, argumentative relevance is defined as a functional interactional relation between certain elements in the discourse. In addition to the distinction between interpretive and evaluative relevance that can be traced in the literature, analytic relevance is introduced as an intermediary concept. In order to classify the various problems of relevance arising in interpreting, analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, a taxonomy is proposed in which the concept of relevance is differentiated along three co-ordinate dimensions: object, domain and aspect. With the help of this taxonomy, it can be shown that the problems of evaluative relevance with which the standard approach to fallacies cannot satisfactory deal can be more systematically approached within a pragma-dialectical framework. This is demonstrated for the argumentum and hominem, which is erroneously treated as a homogenous type of relevance fallacy in logico-centric analyses, so that cases where this is not justified must be treated as ad hoc exceptions.