Circumstances and Outcomes of a Firearm Seizure Law: Marion County,Indiana, 2006–2013

Indiana statute allows police to seize firearms without a warrant if the officer believes a person meets the law's definition of “dangerous.” Review of the use of this law in Marion County (Indianapolis), Indiana, showed that prosecutors filed petitions in court to retain weapons seized by police under this law 404 times between 2006 and 2013. Police removed weapons from people due to identification of a risk of suicide (68%) or violence (21%), or the presence of psychosis (16%). The firearm seizures occurred in the context of domestic disputes in 28% of cases and intoxication was noted in 26% of cases. There were significant demographic differences in the circumstances of firearm seizures and the firearms seized. The seized firearms were retained by the court at the initial hearing in 63% of cases; this retention was closely linked to the defendant's failure to appear at the hearing. The court dismissed 29% of cases at the initial hearing, closely linked to the defendant's presence at the hearing. In subsequent hearings of cases not dismissed, the court ordered the destruction of the firearms in 72% of cases, all when the individual did not appear in court, and dismissed 24% of the cases, all when the individual was present at the hearing. Overall, the Indiana law removed weapons from a small number of people, most of whom did not seek return of their weapons. The firearm seizure law thus functioned as a months-long cooling-off period for those who did seek the return of their guns. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.