Mental extrapolation in patterns constructed from memory

Finke and Pinker (1982, 1983) showed subjects an array of dots followed by an arrow in a blank field, and asked them to determine whether the arrow pointed to any of the previously seen dots. Response times were linearly related to the distance between the arrow and the nearest dot, suggesting that subjects spontaneously used an internal scanning or extrapolation process to perform the task. We replicate and extend this finding by varying the retention interval, and by employing a paradigm in which subjects’ eyes are closed and the arrows are described to them using a coordinate scheme. We also show that subjects are unable to predict the form of the data when the task simply is described to them. Results suggest that mental scanning along a straight path can be performed on images reconstructed from memory, and that it does not depend on the ongoing perception of a continuous surface, on physical eye movements, or on demand characteristics.     

Maternal and adolescent depressive symptoms and family conflict: An autoregressive cross-lagged examination of competing models in multi-stressed mothers and adolescents

Maternal and adolescent depression are challenges that often co-occur. Many studies have drawn bivariate associations between maternal depressive symptoms, adolescent depressive symptoms, and family conflict, but few have examined reciprocal effects. Even among extant studies, there is a lack of clarity related to directionality of influence. Three competing theoretical models may explain the relationship between maternal depressive symptoms, adolescent depressive symptoms, and family conflict, and these processes may differ by adolescents’ sex. Using three time points of data from 187 diverse mother-adolescent dyads, we fit a taxonomy of autoregressive cross-lagged structural equation models to simultaneously evaluate the competing theoretical models and also examine differences by sex using multiple-group analyses. Results indicate a symptom-driven model whereby adolescent depressive symptoms predicted increases in family conflict. Sex differences were also found. For males, but not females, greater adolescent depressive symptoms predicted subsequent increases in maternal depressive symptoms, which then predicted lower family conflict—possibly indicating maternal disengagement/withdrawal. Our findings suggest addressing adolescent depressive symptoms in order to prevent family conflict and that distinctive targets for the prevention/intervention of family conflict should account for differences by adolescents’ sex.     

Take care of egotism,and redemption will take care of itself: Comments on Tracy Llanera's Richard Rorty: Outgrowing modern nihilism

This commentary critically examines two facets of Tracy Llanera's recent book Richard Rorty: Outgrowing Modern Nihilism. First, it considers her interpretation of Richard Rorty's redemptive project. It argues that, while Llanera succeeds in resolving tensions in Rorty's public-private distinction, her account downplays the role of abnormal discourse within projects of self-creation. Second, it raises several questions about Llanera's strategy for situating this redemptive project within debates concerning existential nihilism. On her view, one ought to follow Rorty in addressing the problem of egotism instead of the problem of nihilism, since the former is prior to the latter. But it is not clear who counts as an egotist, or why egotists are especially prone to becoming nihilists. Moreover, there are reasons to think that egotism and nihilism are fundamentally different kinds of problems.     

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post-hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre-establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre-establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone metaethical arguments.     

Worldviews about change: Their structure and their implications for understanding responses to sustainability,technology, and political change

People hold different perspectives about how they think the world is changing or should change. We examined five of these “worldviews” about change: Progress, Golden Age, Endless Cycle, Maintenance, and Balance. In Studies 1–4 (total N = 2733) we established reliable measures of each change worldview, and showed how these help explain when people will support or oppose social change in contexts spanning sustainability, technological innovations, and political elections. In mapping out these relationships we identify how the importance of different change worldviews varies across contexts, with Balance most critical for understanding support for sustainability, Progress/Golden Age important for understanding responses to innovations, and Golden Age uniquely important for preferring Trump/Republicans in the 2016 US election. These relationships were independent of prominent individual differences (e.g., values, political orientation for elections) or context-specific factors (e.g., self-reported innovativeness for responses to innovations). Study 5 (N = 2140) examined generalizability in 10 countries/regions spanning five continents, establishing that these worldviews exhibited metric invariance, but with country/region differences in how change worldviews were related to support for sustainability. These findings show that change worldviews can act as a general “lens” people use to help determine whether to support or oppose social change.     

“Being human”: A grounded theory approach to exploring how trainers on clinical psychology doctorate programmes decide whether or not to disclose personal experiences of psychological distress to clinical psychology doctorate trainees

Objective

Recent research and guidelines recommend that trainers on clinical psychology doctorate training programmes consider disclosing personal experiences of psychological distress to trainees. Disclosure is thought to promote cultures of openness, validate and normalise trainee distress, encourage trainee disclosure and help-seeking and challenge stigmatising narratives. However, little is known about how trainers decide whether, what or how to disclose. This study aims to address that gap by exploring the processes and factors involved in trainers deciding whether or not to disclose personal experiences of psychological distress to trainees, generating findings of relevance across counselling, psychotherapy and psychology training courses.

Methods

In-depth interviews were conducted with nine trainers on UK clinical psychology doctorate programmes from around the country and analysed in accordance with constructivist grounded theory methods.

Results

Findings indicated that participants valued disclosure personally and professionally but were wary of the dangers of disclosure. Disclosure decisions were made by judging the context against internally held criteria. If criteria were not met, then disclosures were not made. Outcomes, whether positive or negative, served to reinforce the value of disclosure and the importance of managing risks, creating a positive feedback loop.

Conclusions

The findings of this study suggest factors that are important for trainers to consider when deciding whether or not to disclose. The six-factor framework developed may be useful for trainers to consider within reflective practice, supervision or during guided self-reflection in order to make safe, helpful and ethical decisions.     

Childhood fantasy play relates to adult socio-emotional competence

Childhood fantasy play and creation of imaginary companions are thought to confer socio-emotional benefits in children, but little is known about how they relate to socio-emotional competence in adulthood. A total of 341 adults (81 males) aged 18 and above (M = 31.47, SD = 12.62) completed an online survey examining their fantasy play as a child, their childhood imaginary companion status, and their adult socio-emotional competence. Adults who reported higher levels of childhood fantasy play were found to be significantly more prosocial, empathetic, and emotionally intelligent than their counterparts after controlling for demographic factors. Recall of a childhood imaginary companion, however, was significantly related only to higher scores for perspective-taking and did not explain unique variance in any adult competence measure. Findings suggest that engagement in fantasy play during childhood may be a precursor to later socio-emotional competence, while benefits previously associated with imaginary companions specifically may not extend into adulthood.