D. Z. Phillips’ contemplations on religion and literature

This paper critically discusses D. Z. Phillips’ use of literary works as a resource for philosophical reflection on religion. Beginning by noting Phillips’ suggestion, made in relation to Waiting for Godot, that the possibilities of meaning that we see in a literary work can reveal something of our own religious sensibility, I then proceed to show what we learn about Phillips from his readings of certain works by Larkin, Tennyson, and Wharton. Through exploring alternative possible readings, I argue that, although Phillips’ discussions are of considerable philosophical interest, they undermine his claim to be deploying a purely contemplative hermeneutical method.     

A quasi-experimental analysis of the influence of neighborhood disadvantage on child and adolescent conduct problems

A quasi-experimental comparison of cousins differentially exposed to levels of neighborhood disadvantage (ND) was used with extensive measured covariates to test the hypothesis that neighborhood risk has independent effects on youth conduct problems (CPs). Multilevel analyses were based on mother-rated ND and both mother-reported CPs across 4-13 years (n = 7,077) and youth-reported CPs across 10-13 years (n = 4,524) from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. ND was robustly related to CPs reported by both informants when controlling for both measured risk factors that are correlated with ND and unmeasured confounds. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that ND has influence on conduct problems.     

Development of decision making: sequential versus integrative rules

Decisions can be made by applying a variety of decision-making rules-sequential rules in which decisions are based on a sequential evaluation of choice dimensions and the integrative normative rule in which decisions are based on an integration of choice dimensions. In this study, we investigated the developmental trajectory of such decision-making rules. In the Gambling Machine Task, participants choose between options that differ in three dimensions: frequency of loss, amount of loss, and certain gain. The task was administered to 231 children and adolescents (age range=8-17 years). Latent group analysis of their performance allowed precise classification of the underlying decision rules. The majority of participants used sequential decision rules, and the number of evaluated dimensions in these rules increased with age. Integrative rule use decreased with age. We discuss these results in light of traditional developmental theories and fuzzy trace theory.     

Distinct discrimination learning strategies and their relation with spatial memory and attentional control in 4- to 14-year-olds

Behavioral, psychophysiological, and neuropsychological studies have revealed large developmental differences in various learning paradigms where learning from positive and negative feedback is essential. The differences are possibly due to the use of distinct strategies that may be related to spatial working memory and attentional control. In this study, strategies in performing a discrimination learning task were distinguished in a cross-sectional sample of 302 children from 4 to 14 years of age. The trial-by-trial accuracy data were analyzed with mathematical learning models. The best-fitting model revealed three learning strategies: hypothesis testing, slow abrupt learning, and nonlearning. The proportion of hypothesis-testing children increased with age. Nonlearners were present only in the youngest age group. Feature preferences for the irrelevant dimension had a detrimental effect on performance in the youngest age group. The executive functions spatial working memory and attentional control significantly predicted posterior learning strategy probabilities after controlling for age.     

On reconciling conflicting meta-analytic findings regarding integrity test validity

We react to the Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, and Odle-Dusseau (2012a) meta-analysis of the relationship between integrity test scores and work-related criteria, the earlier Ones, Viswesvaran, and Schmidt (1993) meta-analysis of those relationships, the Harris et al. (2012) and Ones, Viswesvaran, and Schmidt (2012) responses, and the Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, and Odle-Dusseau (2012b) rebuttal. We highlight differences between the findings of the 2 meta-analyses by focusing on studies that used predictive designs, applicant samples, and non-self-report criteria. We conclude that study exclusion criteria, correction for artifacts, and second order sampling error are not likely explanations for the differences in findings. The lack of detailed documentation of all effect size estimates used in either meta-analysis makes it impossible to ascertain the bases for the differences in findings. We call for increased detail in meta-analytic reporting and for better information sharing among the parties producing and meta-analytically integrating validity evidence.     

Intentional response distortion on personality tests: using eye-tracking to understand response processes when faking

Intentional response distortion or faking among job applicants completing measures such as personality and integrity tests is a concern in personnel selection. The present study aimed to investigate whether eye-tracking technology can improve our understanding of the response process when faking. In an experimental within-participants design, a Big Five personality test and an integrity measure were administered to 129 university students in 2 conditions: a respond honestly and a faking good instruction. Item responses, response latencies, and eye movements were measured. Results demonstrated that all personality dimensions were fakeable. In support of the theoretical position that faking involves a less cognitively demanding process than responding honestly, we found that response times were on average 0.25 s slower and participants had less eye fixations in the fake good condition. However, in the fake good condition, participants had more fixations on the 2 extreme response options of the 5-point answering scale, and they fixated on these more directly after having read the question. These findings support the idea that faking leads to semantic rather than self-referenced item interpretations. Eye-tracking was demonstrated to be potentially useful in detecting faking behavior, improving detecting rates over and beyond response extremity and latency metrics.     

Even simple forms of social learning rely on intention attribution in marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus)

Intention attribution guides the cognitively most demanding forms of social learning, such as imitation, thereby scaffolding cumulative cultural evolution. However, it is not thought to be necessary for more basic forms of social learning. Here we present evidence that in marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus) even most basic forms of social learning such as enhancement depend on intention attribution. Marmosets perceived the behavior of a conspecific and a conspecific-like robot, but not that of a moving black box, as goal directed. Their subsequent choice behavior was shaped by social facilitation and stimulus enhancement, that is, by very simple forms of social learning, but only when exposed to the conspecific and robot, which they previously had perceived as intentional agents. We discuss the implications of this finding for contemporary debates about social learning, including emulation learning and ghost control studies, the necessity of goal-directed copying for cumulative cultural evolution, and the limits of current classification systems of social learning for the evolution of social and asocial learning.     

Refusing intergroup help from the morally superior: How one group's moral superiority leads to another group's reluctance to seek their help

We examine how group members paradoxically refuse intergroup help where they might need it most: in the moral status domain. Based on the Sacred Value Protection Model (Tetlock, 2002), we predicted and found that group members felt stronger group-based anger and a stronger motivation to reaffirm their group's moral status when an outgroup was morally superior to them. Despite this moral motivation, however, we also predicted and found that group members more strongly refused intergroup help to improve their moral status vis-à-vis the morally superior outgroup (compared to an uninvolved outgroup). Consistent with the Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995), group members thus strategically refused intergroup help to defend their group identity. Supporting this interpretation, particularly highly identified group members were most likely to refuse intergroup help when they needed it most. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings.