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931.
932.
933.
Michael Anthony IstvanJr 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(3):399-420
Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility
of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an
agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred
Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor
contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal
libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue
that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of
bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action. 相似文献
934.
Corey J. Maley 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):117-131
Representation is central to contemporary theories regarding the mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the
mind/brain and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish
between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations
vary in a step-wise manner. In other words, ‘digital’ is synonymous with ‘discrete’, while ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’.
I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is (and should be) used in
cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis’s account of analog
and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation.
I will argue that the distinctions available in this fourfold account better accord with representational features of interest
in cognitive science than the received analog/digital dichotomy. 相似文献
935.
Andrew William Howat 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):155-172
This paper explores a distinction between two types of response-dependence (RD) account (shallow vs. deep). This distinction
is inherent in much of the existing literature, however it is neither widely nor well understood, and has never been drawn
explicitly. The distinction is often taken to be a metaphysical, or ‘realism-relevant’ one—i.e. deep RD accounts entail qualified
realism (or perhaps anti-realism), while shallow RD accounts are metaphysically neutral. I argue that the distinction is not
reliably realism-relevant. I formulate a weaker version of the distinction that may help prevent some common and understandable
confusion about RD biconditionals and their relationship to realism. The weaker distinction rests on the different roles assigned
to RD biconditionals by the two types of account. 相似文献
936.
Ilhan Inan 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(2):279-283
I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they
cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer. 相似文献
937.
Casey O’Callaghan 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):143-160
Recent work on non-visual modalities aims to translate, extend, revise, or unify claims about perception beyond vision. This
paper presents central lessons drawn from attention to hearing, sounds, and multimodality. It focuses on auditory awareness
and its objects, and it advances more general lessons for perceptual theorizing that emerge from thinking about sounds and
audition. The paper argues that sounds and audition no better support the privacy of perception’s objects than does vision;
that perceptual objects are more diverse than an exclusively visual perspective suggests; and that multimodality is rampant.
In doing so, it presents an account according to which audition affords awareness as of not just sounds, but also environmental
happenings beyond sounds. 相似文献
938.
Ruth Weintraub 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):181-188
An impossibility result pertaining to the aggregation of individual judgements is thought by many to have significant implications
for political theory, social epistemology and metaphysics. When members of a group hold a rational set of judgments on some
interconnected questions, the theorem shows, it isn’t always (logically) possible for them to aggregate their judgements into
a collective one in conformity with seemingly very plausible constraints. I reject one of the constraints which engender the
dilemma. The analogy with the lottery paradox, I argue, shows that rational belief needn’t be consistent. So the alleged implications
of the dilemma are dispelled. 相似文献
939.
940.
Victor Kumar 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(1):135-154
Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain
the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because
it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized
by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential
of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding
action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational
varieties of know how. 相似文献