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904.
Peter Hawke 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):351-364
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday
modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed
from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism,
offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s
recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The
author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account
of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology. 相似文献
905.
Christoph Kelp 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):287-292
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing
a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical
propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining
a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge. 相似文献
906.
Chad Kidd 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(3):361-383
In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational
approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems
arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation.
In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is
contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This
contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid
the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three
other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the
need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2)
a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are
a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure
of inner-representational states. 相似文献
907.
Ram Neta 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):3-17
In his volume reflective knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers an account of knowledge, an argument against internalist foundationalism,
and a solution to the problem of easy knowledge. This paper offers challenges to Sosa on each of those three things. 相似文献
908.
Marya Schechtman 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):65-79
Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity.
Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose
personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my
comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated
than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal
identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that
the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features
of memory that must be part of a complete account. 相似文献
909.
Richard Woodward 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):155-166
The standard Kripkean semantic theories for quantified modal logic allow the individuals that exist at other worlds to vary
from those that exist at the actual world. This causes a problem for those who deny the existence of non-actual individuals.
I focus on two prominent strategies for solving this problem, due respectively to Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta (who identify
the possible individuals with the actual individuals) and Alvin Plantinga (who identifies the possible individuals with the
individual essences). I argue, contra various commentators, that both of these solutions are acceptable by the lights of those
who deny the existence of mere possibilia. 相似文献
910.
Clare Batty 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):161-174
Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have begun to correct this ‘tunnel vision’ by considering other modalities. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written about the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. The focus of this paper is olfaction. In this paper, I consider the question: does human olfactory experience represents objects as thus and so? If we take visual experience as the paradigm of how experience can achieve object representation, we might think that the answer to this question is no. I argue that olfactory experience does indeed represent objects—just not in a way that is easily read from the dominant visual case. 相似文献