Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.     

". . . On the Basis of Velocity Clues Alone": Some Perceptual Themes 1946-1996

Three factors that have transformed perceptual research in the last fifty years are the digital computer, single-unit electrophysiology, and molecular biology. Amongst the developments in which members of the Experimental Psychology Society have been central are: the recognition of the role of optic flow in spatial vision; the demonstration that our perceptual systems contain parallel pathways extracting different information from the sensory array; the identification of specific detectors that can be selectively adapted in psychophysical experiments; and the transfer of the concepts of fourier analysis from audition to vision. The history of Opponent Process Theory offers an example where experimental psychologists have been misled by too simple an interpretation of physiological recordings.