The Suppositional Ramsey Test and Decision-Instability

I analyse the relationship between the Ramsey Test (RT) for the acceptance of indicative conditionals and the so-called problem of decision-instability. In particular, I argue that the situations which allegedly bring about this problem are troublesome just in case the relevant conditionals are evaluated by non-suppositional versions, e.g. causal/evidential, of the test. In contrast, a suppositional RT, by highlighting the metacognitive nature of the evaluation of indicative conditionals, allows an agent to run a simulation of such evaluation, without yet committing her to the acceptance of such conditionals. I conclude that a suppositional interpretation of RT is superior to its non-suppositional counterparts and by briefly showing that a suppositional RT is compatible with a deliberational decision theory.     

Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.     

If-Clauses and Probability Operators

Adams’ thesis is generally agreed to be linguistically compelling for simple conditionals with factual antecedent and consequent. We propose a derivation of Adams’ thesis from the Lewis-Kratzer analysis of if-clauses as domain restrictors, applied to probability operators. We argue that Lewis’s triviality result may be seen as a result of inexpressibility of the kind familiar in generalized quantifier theory. Some implications of the Lewis-Kratzer analysis are presented concerning the assignment of probabilities to compounds of conditionals.     

Cantankerous creativity: Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, and the HEXACO structure of creative achievement

Creativity research has suggested that creative people are low in agreeableness. To explore this issue, we applied the HEXACO model of personality structure, which offers an expanded representation of interpersonal traits, particularly a distinction between Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness. A sample of 1304 adults completed the HEXACO-60 and several measures of creative achievement and activities. Latent variable models found that Agreeableness had no relationship with creativity, but Honesty-Humility did: people lower in Honesty-Humility had higher creativity scores, consistent with past work on arrogance and pretentiousness among creative people.     

Interaction Between the Parenting Alliance and Parent–Child Activities in a Clinic-Referred Sample of 2 to 18-year-olds

Several decades of research have demonstrated a link between marital, parenting, and child domains. The present study examined the nature of these links by testing the moderating effect of the parent–child relationship on the association between the parenting alliance and internalizing and externalizing problems in 324 dual-parent families of 2-to-18-year-old clinic-referred youth. Findings indicated that positive parent–child activities directly related to children’s internalizing and externalizing problems, and modified the nature of the association between the parenting alliance and internalizing problems in families of 6-to-10-year-olds. Interestingly, in families where parents engaged in fewer positive activities with their children, a strong parenting alliance actually related to greater child internalizing problems. Findings support the importance of understanding the interaction between the marital and child domains in order to effectively intervene with families of children experiencing behavior problems.     

What really separates casuistry from principlism in biomedical ethics

Since the publication of the first edition of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics there has been much debate about what a proper method in medical ethics should look like. The main rival for Beauchamp and Childress’s account, principlism, has consistently been casuistry, an account that recommends argument by analogy from paradigm cases. Admirably, Beauchamp and Childress have modified their own view in successive editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics in order to address the concerns proponents of casuistry and others have had about principlism. Given these adjustments to their view, some have claimed that principlism and casuistry no longer count as distinct methods. Even so, many still consider these two conceptions of bioethical methodologies as rivals. Both accounts of the relationship between casuistry and principlism are wrong. These two conceptions of methodology in biomedical ethics are significantly different, but the differences are not the ones pointed out by those who still claim that they are distinct positions. In this article, I explain where the real similarities and differences lie between these two views.     

The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’.     

The structure of executive functioning in 11 to 14 year olds with and without special educational needs

The structure and development of executive functioning (EF) have been intensively studied in typically developing populations, with little attention given to those with Special Educational Needs (SEN). This study addresses this by comparing the EF structure of 132 adolescents (11–14 years-old) with SEN and 138 adolescents not requiring additional support (Non-SEN peers). Participants completed verbal and non-verbal assessments of key components of EF: inhibition, working memory and switching. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on each group tested one-, two- and three-factor models of EF. In both groups, there was statistical support for the fit of one- and two-factor models with no model being clearly better than the others; there was little support for three-factor models. Parsimony suggests that the one-factor model best represents the structure of EF. In light of our results, the implications for the nature of EF in early adolescence in both SEN and Non-SEN groups are discussed.