Catamnestic surveys on somato-psychosocial development in childhood and adolescence of patients with unipolar depressive and bipolar manic-depressive psychoses

The somatic and psychosocial development of 80 subjects with manifest affective-phasic psychoses is studied retrospectively and compared with that of an identically sized control group consisting of neuropsychiatrically healthy subjects. Statistically significant differences were found particularly in the answers to questions dealing with social situation and social adaptability. Achievement at school and vocational qualifications were lower among the parents of the patients than among those of the healthy subjects. Characteristic features of the patients' childhood and adolescence were transient depression, often for no apparent cause, and maladaption, and vocational wishes were fulfilled less often than among the controls. The patients experienced greater difficulty in settling in to a new group due to their contact difficulties.     

Reflections on the idea of personal fate and its psychopathology: Helene Deutsch's "Hysterical Fate Neurosis" revisited

The idea of a psychopathology of fate or what had come to be called a fate neurosis has failed to retain any established place in the structure of psychoanalytic thought. The clinical observations and theoretical formulations, to which the idea of a fate neurosis answered, have been subsumed in the course of things by more fundamental and systematic conceptualizations. A review of Helene Deutsch's (1930) paper, "Hysterical Fate Neurosis," is therefore bound to be largely an excursion into an area of intellectual history. However, such history never fails to shed light on certain ongoing clinical and theoretical problems that may have lost too much to current developments in psychoanalytic thought. It is with this historical purpose that the present study of Deutsch's classic paper on a fate neurosis is undertaken.     

Some definitions of negation leading to paraconsistent logics

In positive logic the negation of a propositionA is defined byA X whereX is some fixed proposition. A number of standard properties of negation, includingreductio ad absurdum, can then be proved, but not the law of noncontradiction so that this forms a paraconsistent logic. Various stronger paraconsistent logics are then generated by putting in particular propositions forX. These propositions range from true through contingent to false.