A cognitive‐emotional account of the shape of the probability weighting function

Research has shown a tendency of decision makers to overweight small probabilities and to underweight moderate and large probabilities. In standard treatments this is graphically modeled by an inverse S‐shaped probability weighting function. We suggest that emotions play a significant role in the shaping of the probability weighting function. In particular, the weighting function is proposed to be some function of objective probability, expected elation, and expected disappointment. The overweighting of small probabilities results from the anticipated elation after having won, given that winning was very unlikely. The underweighting of large probabilities results from anticipated disappointment after having failed to win, given that winning was very likely. Hence, probability is assumed to influence utility. Three experiments investigate these hypotheses. Experiments 1 and 2 show that a convex function relates probability to surprise. Experiment 3 elicits choice data and further supports the proposed hypotheses. The model adds to the understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes underlying the shape of the probability weighting function. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Controlling your environment and yourself: Implications for career success

Given the complex and rapidly changing nature of the current work environment, individuals' capabilities to effectively influence their environment and regulate their behavior may be critical to career success. Drawing from the model of emergent interactive agency (Bandura, 1989), the current research examines this perspective, focusing on proactive personality and self-control as predictors of extrinsic and intrinsic career success. Although some studies have investigated proactive personality as a predictor of success, less research has focused on factors involved in this relationship and very little work has examined self-control in the context of career success. Study 1 involved a cross-sectional design with 249 full-time employees who completed measures assessing personality and career-related variables. Study 2 involved a longitudinal design with 1568 individuals who were rated on self-control during childhood and completed career-related measures approximately 20 years later. Study 1 results indicated proactive personality and self-control related to extrinsic career success (salary and occupational prestige) through educational attainment. Study 2 results indicated self-control related to extrinsic career success (salary and occupational prestige) through educational attainment and intrinsic career success (career satisfaction) through occupational opportunity for achievement. These findings contribute to the knowledge base regarding career success by highlighting the relevance of active control tendencies that are externally focused (proactive personality) as well as those that are internally focused (self-control) and identifying key factors linking these traits to career success.     

Is Narrative Identity Four‐Dimensionalist?

The claim that selves are narratively constituted has attained considerable currency in both analytic and continental philosophy. However, a set of increasingly standard objections to narrative identity are also emerging. In this paper, I focus on metaphysically realist versions of narrative identity theory, showing how they both build on and differ from their neo‐Lockean counterparts. But I also argue that narrative realism is implicitly committed to a four‐dimensionalist, temporal‐parts ontology of persons. That exposes narrative realism to the charge that the narratively constituted self, on the one hand, and the self that is the object of much of our everyday self‐reference and self‐experience, on the other, can't be the same thing. This conclusion may well force narrativists to abandon metaphysical realism about narrative selves—which, in turn, may leave the invocation of ‘narrativity’ as identity‐constituting somewhat under‐motivated.     

The Assessment of Goal Commitment: A Measurement Model Meta-Analysis

Goals are central to current treatments of work motivation, and goal commitment is a critical construct in understanding the relationship between goals and performance. Inconsistency in the measurement of goal commitment hindered early research in this area but the nine-item, self-report scale developed by Hollenbeck, Williams, and Klein (1989b), and derivatives of that scale, have become the most commonly used measures of goal commitment. Despite this convergence, a few authors, based on small sample studies, have raised questions about the dimensionality of this measure. To address the conflicting recommendations in the literature regarding what items to use in assessing goal commitment, the current study combines the results of 17 independent samples and 2918 subjects to provide a more conclusive assessment by combining meta-analytic and multisample confirmatory factor analytic techniques. This effort reflects the first combined use of these techniques to test a measurement model and allowed for the creation of a database substantially larger than that of previously factor analyzed samples containing these scale items. By mitigating sampling error, the results clarified a number of debated issues that have arisen out of previous small sample factor analyses and revealed a five-item scale that is unidimensional and equivalent across measurement timing, goal origin, and task complexity. It is recommended that this five-item scale be used in future research assessing goal commitment. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Executive control and the experience of regret

The experience of regret rests on a counterfactual analysis of events. Previous research indicates that regret emerges at around 6 years of age, marginally later than the age at which children begin to answer counterfactual questions correctly. We hypothesized that the late emergence of regret relative to early counterfactual thinking is a result of the executive demands of simultaneously holding in mind and comparing dual representations of reality (counterfactual and actual). To test this hypothesis, we administered two regret tasks along with four tests of executive function (two working memory tasks, a switch task, and an inhibition task) to a sample of 104 4- to 7-year-olds. Results indicated that switching, but not working memory or inhibition, was a significant predictor of whether or not children experienced regret. This finding corroborates and extends previous research showing that the development of counterfactual thinking in children is related to their developing executive competence.     

The perception of a face is no more than the sum of its parts

When you see a person's face, how do you go about combining his or her facial features to make a decision about who that person is? Most current theories of face perception assert that the ability to recognize a human face is not simply the result of an independent analysis of individual features, but instead involves a holistic coding of the relationships among features. This coding is thought to enhance people's ability to recognize a face beyond what would be expected if each feature were shown in isolation. In the study reported here, we explicitly tested this idea by comparing human performance on facial-feature integration with that of an optimal Bayesian integrator. Contrary to the predictions of most current notions of face perception, our findings showed that human observers integrate facial features in a manner that is no better than would be predicted by their ability to use each individual feature when shown in isolation. That is, a face is perceived no better than the sum of its individual parts.