Locke,Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity

Abstract

Personal Identity theorists as diverse as Derek Parfit, Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson have noted that the experiencing subject (the locus of present psychological experience) and the person (a human being with a career/narrative extended across time) are not necessarily coextensive. Accordingly, we can become psychologically alienated from, and fail to experience a sense of identity with, the person we once were or will be. This presents serious problems for Locke’s original account of “sameness of consciousness” constituting personal identity, given the distinctly normative (and indeed eschatological) focus of his discussion. To succeed, the Lockean project needs to identify some phenomenal property of experience that can constitute a sense of identity with the self figured in all moments to which consciousness can be extended. I draw upon key themes in Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of moral imagination to show that Kierkegaard describes a phenomenal quality of experience that unites the experiencing subject with its past and future, regardless of facts about psychological change across time. Yet Kierkegaard’s account is fully normative, recasting affective identification with past/future selves as a moral task rather than something merely psychologically desirable (Schechtman) or utterly contingent (Parfit, Strawson).     

Linguistic focus and good-enough representations: An application of the change-detection paradigm

A number of lines of study suggest that word meanings are not always fully exploited in comprehension. In two experiments, we used a text-change paradigm to study depth of semantic processing during reading. Participants were instructed to detect words that changed across two consecutive presentations of short texts. The results suggest that the full details of word meanings are not always incorporated into the interpretation and that the degree of semantic detail in the representation is a function of linguistic focus. The results provide evidence for the idea that representations are only good enough for the purpose at hand (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002).     

Why Frankenstein is a Stigma Among Scientists

As one of the best known science narratives about the consequences of creating life, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818) is an enduring tale that people know and understand with an almost instinctive familiarity. It has become a myth reflecting people’s ambivalent feelings about emerging science: they are curious about science, but they are also afraid of what science can do to them. In this essay, we argue that the Frankenstein myth has evolved into a stigma attached to scientists that focalizes the public’s as well as the scientific community’s negative reactions towards certain sciences and scientific practices. This stigma produces ambivalent reactions towards scientific artifacts and it leads to negative connotations because it implies that some sciences are dangerous and harmful. We argue that understanding the Frankenstein stigma can empower scientists by helping them revisit their own biases as well as responding effectively to people’s expectations for, and attitudes towards, scientists and scientific artifacts. Debunking the Frankenstein stigma could also allow scientists to reshape their professional identities so they can better show the public what ethical and moral values guide their research enterprises.     

Does Rumination Mediate the Association of Private Prayer,Stress, and Their Interaction with Depression among Christians? A Cross-Sectional Study

Mechanisms underlying significant associations between different types of prayer and depression are unknown. Based on the conceptualization of prayer as stress buffering coping style and the Response Style Theory, we proposed that rumination mediates the association of prayer types and stress with depression. This cross-sectional study (N?=?227 Christians, M_age 41.74, SD 14.82, age range 18–82 years, 76% female) used path modeling to test whether rumination mediated the associations between prayer types and prayer types by stress interactions with depression. Rumination fully mediated the associations of the colloquial and ritual prayer by stress interactions with depressive symptoms, while meditative and petitionary prayer was directly associated with depressive symptoms. Further, petitionary prayer and the ritual prayer by stress interaction were associated with more and not with less rumination and depressive symptoms, respectively. Summarized, first empirical evidence supports an integration of prayer, stress, and rumination into one model of depression. However, the exact nature of their interplay depends on the prayer type. If replicated, our findings allow the integration of prayer into cognitive-behavioral treatment of depression in religious and spiritual clients.     

Creative thought in Artists

One hundred and eleven subjects, 14 and 15 years of age, were administered the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory and two questionnaires, modified from Bienvenu's Adolescent Communication Inventory, eliciting adolescents’ perceptions of their communication with both parents. The 10 males and 10 females with the highest self-esteem scores, and the 10 males and 10 females with the lowest scores were identified to form two groups: the High Self-Esteem Group and the Low Self-Esteem Group. Parents of these students completed questionnaires concerning parent-adolescent communication and marital communication and adjustment.

The five hypotheses tested were strongly supported. Adolescents with low self-esteem viewed communication with their parents as less facilitative than did adolescents with high self-esteem. Parents of adolescents with low self-esteem perceived their communication with their spouses as less facilitative, and rated their marriages as less satisfying, than did parents in the High Self-Esteem Group. There was lack of congruence between the perceptions of adolescents with low self-esteem and those of their parents; both mothers and fathers in the Low Self-Esteem Group viewed parent-adolescent communication as more facilitative than did the adolescents themselves.     

Protecting God from Science and Technology: How Religious Criticisms of Biotechnologies Backfire

Many religious critics argue that biotechnology (such as cloning and genetic engineering) intrudes on God's domain, or plays God, or revolts against God. While some of these criticisms are standard complaints about human hubris, I argue that some of the recent criticism represents a "Promethean" concern, in which believers unreflectively seem to fear that science and technology are actually replicating or stealing God's special deity–defining powers. These criticisms backfire theologically, because they diminish God, portraying God as an anthropomorphic superbeing whose relevance and special nature are increasingly rivaled by human power.     

Relationships between ability and personality:does intelligence contribute positively to personal and social adjustment?

Intelligence/personality associations were studied in four large datasets. Correlations between general ability (g) and major personality traits were generally consistent with previous findings. For other traits, an interpretation of the correlation patterning is that traits classifiable as adaptive in terms of personal and social adjustment have positive correlations with g, whilst maladaptive traits have negative correlations. Regression modelling confirmed these associations and structural equation modelling of selected traits showed that Neuroticism acts as a mediator of g on the outcome. Non-linear relationships between intelligence and personality were not found. In two of the datasets the correlation between Neuroticism and Psychoticism decreased with ability level, and the correlation between fluid and crystallised ability increased with level of Neuroticism.     

There are stable individual differences in performance variability, both from moment to moment and from day to day

Individual differences in decision speed have been regarded as direct reflections of a primitive functional neurophysiological characteristic, which affects performance on all cognitive tasks and so may be regarded as the biological basis of intelligence, or of age-related changes in mental abilities. More detailed analyses show that variability within an experimental session (WSV) is a stable individual difference characteristic and that mean choice reaction times (CRTs) are gross summary statistics that reflect variability, rather than maximum speed of performance. A total of 98 people aged from 60 to 80 years completed 36 weekly sessions on six different letter categorization tasks. After effects of practice and of circadian variability had been eliminated, individuals with lower scores on the Cattell Culture Fair intelligence test had slower CRTs and greater WSV on all tasks. A simulation study showed that the greater WSVs of low Cattell scorers led directly to the significantly greater variability of their mean CRTs from session to session. However because CRTs on tasks co-varied from session to session it was apparent that, besides being affected by WSV, individuals' between-session variabilities (BSVs) also vary because of state changes that affect their performance from day to day. It seems that both variability in performance from trial to trial during a session and variability in average performance from day to day are correlated, stable, individual difference characteristics that vary inversely with intelligence test performance. Methodological consequences of these results for interpretations of age-related cognitive changes, for variability between as well as within individuals, for individual differences in decision speed, and for circadian variability in performance are discussed.