Memory for sequences of tone bursts in the rat: Reliance on temporal cues and evidence for an instructional ambiguity explanation of the choose-few effect

Two groups of rats were trained in a symbolic delayed matching-to-sample task with a 0-s delay to discriminate sample stimuli that consisted of sequences of tone bursts. For one group, sequences varied in number with total sequence duration controlled. For the other group, total sequence duration, sum of the tone durations, and sum of the gap durations were all controlled. The former group of rats acquired the discrimination, but the latter group of rats were not able to learn the discrimination with the additional temporal cues controlled. Retention functions for the group that acquired the discrimination exhibited a choose-many bias at the 1-s delay and a choose-few bias at the 8-s delay regardless of the similarity in the intertrial interval and delay interval illumination condition. The asymmetrical retention functions appeared to be due to instructional ambiguity which resulted from the similarity of the delay interval to temporal features of the tone burst sequence, such as the gap between tone bursts and the total duration of tone. In Experiment 2, diagnostic tests provided evidence that rats discriminated the sequences of tone bursts by timing and summing the duration of individual tone bursts rather than using an event switch to count tones. Like pigeons, rats use multiple temporal features rather than number to discriminate sequences of successive events.     

Utilization of covariation knowledge in source monitoring: no evidence for implicit processes

In three experiments, a "hidden covariation" (Lewicki, in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 135-146, 1986) of nonsalient stimulus attributes and the source of stimulus information was established to test whether implicit knowledge about this correlation influences source memory judgments. The source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay, in Psychological Bulletin, 114, 3-28, 1993) postulates heuristic and strategic judgment processes in source attributions. A multinomial model analysis disentangled memory and guessing processes. While there were large strategic guessing biases involving explicit knowledge in all experiments, there was no evidence for the use of implicit covariation knowledge. Only participants who were later able to verbalize the covariation had shown corresponding biases during the source memory test, suggesting that implicit covariation knowledge plays no prominent role in the reconstruction processes in source monitoring.     

Humans do not switch between path knowledge and landmarks when learning a new environment

Using a metric shortcut paradigm, we have found that like honeybees (Dyer in Animal Behaviour 41:239–246, 1991), humans do not seem to build a metric “cognitive map” from path integration. Instead, observers take novel shortcuts based on visual landmarks whenever they are available and reliable (Foo, Warren, Duchon, & Tarr in Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition 31(2):195–215, 2005). In the present experiment we examine whether humans, like ants (Wolf & Wehner in Journal of Experimental Biology 203:857–868, 2000), first use survey-type path knowledge, built up from path integration, and then subsequently shift to reliance on landmarks. In our study participants walked in an immersive virtual environment while head position and orientation were recorded. During training, participants learned two legs of a triangle with feedback: paths from Home to Red and Home to Blue. A configuration of colored posts surrounded the Red location. To test reliance on landmarks, these posts were covertly translated, rotated, or left unchanged during six probe trials. These probe trials were interspersed during the training procedure to measure changes over learning. Dependence on visual landmarks was immediate and sustained during training, and no significant learning effects were observed other than a decrease in hesitation time. Our results suggest that while humans have at least two distinct navigational strategies available to them, unlike ants, a computationally-simpler landmark strategy dominates during novel shortcut navigation.     

Rebuilding the tower of Babel: a revised nomenclature for the study of suicide and suicidal behaviors. Part 2: Suicide-related ideations, communications, and behaviors

A revised and refined version of the O'Carroll et al. (1996) nomenclature for suicidology is presented, with a focus on suicide‐related ideations, communications, and behaviors. The hope is that this refinement will result in the development of operational definitions and field testing of this nomenclature in clinical and research settings. This revision would not have been possible without the international collaboration and dialogue addressing the nomenclature of suicidology since the O'Carroll et al. nomenclature appeared in 1996. Although it is doubtful that we will ever be able to construct universally unambiguous criteria to comprehensively characterize suicidal behaviors (and, overall, firmly establish the intention behind them), for scientific clarity it would be highly desirable that the set of definitions and the associated terminology be explicit and generalizable. De Leo, Burgis, Bertolote, Kerkhof, & Bille‐Brahe, 2006 , p. 5)     

Beyond the Tower of Babel: A Nomenclature for Suicidology

Suicidology finds itself confused and stagnated for lack of a standard nomenclature. This paper proposes a nomenclature for suicide-related behavior in the hope of improving the clarity and precision of communications, advancing suicidological research and knowledge, and improving the efficacy of clinical interventions.     

II—Patrick Greenough

ABSTRACT To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe's response to combat both paradoxes.