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Kevin B. Paterson Simon P. Liversedge Geoffrey Underwood 《The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A: Human Experimental Psychology》1999,52(3):717-737
Ni, Crain, and Shankweiler (1996) present evidence to suggest that the focus operator only can guide how reduced relative clause sentences are initially parsed. In this paper, we demonstrate that this does not hold for relative clause sentences that start with a noun-phrase, verb, noun-phrase construction. We report an eye movement study in which subjects read reduced and unreduced sentences of this type with and without the focus operator only. There were longer first-pass reading times in the critical region of reduced sentences than in the same region of unreduced sentences, regardless of the inclusion of only. Furthermore, readers spent less time re-inspecting portions of text after being garden pathed when reading reduced relative clause sentences that contained the focus operator than when reading reduced relative clause sentences that did not. We conclude that subjects initially syntactically misanalysed reduced relative clause sentences with and without only, and the inclusion of a focus operator facilitated recovery procedures rather than guiding initial parsing. These results are inconsistent with the referential theory and undermine the conclusions of Ni et al. (1996). 相似文献
73.
Niall J. Paterson 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2020,58(2):302-326
Knowledge excludes luck. According to the received view, this intuition reveals that knowing is essentially modal in character. This paper demurs. Either knowledge does not exclude luck, or the entailment reveals nothing about its conceptual character. It is argued that knowledge excludes accidentality, and that this notion is not modal but causal-explanatory. There are three central tasks. The first is to explicate the concept of accident. The second is to argue that the concepts of luck and accident are “intensionally distinct,” which is to say that no member of the intension of either holds on both. The third is to argue that an anti-accident requirement on knowledge is preferable to an anti-luck analogue on abductive grounds. 相似文献