Stochastic catastrophe analysis of switches in the perception of apparent motion

Dynamical phenomena such as bistability and hysteresis have been found in a number of studies on perception of apparent motion. We show that new developments in stochastic catastrophe theory make it possible to test models of these phenomena empirically. Catastrophe theory explains discontinuous changes in responses caused by continuous changes in experimental parameters. We propose catastrophe models for two experimental paradigms on perception of apparent motion and present experiments that support these models. We test these models by using an algorithm for fitting stochastic catastrophe models. We derive from catastrophe theory the prediction that a dynamical phenomenon called divergence is necessary when hysteresis is found. This new prediction is supported by the data.     

Speech vs. reading comprehension: an explorative study of gender representations in Norwegian

As research on the construction of a mental representation of referent gender in speech comprehension is scarce, this study examined whether factors identified in reading comprehension exert similar influence in speech comprehension. Conceptually replicating previous research, a sentence continuation evaluation task was set up in two modalities, as a listening task and as a time-confined reading task (i.e. to correspond to the time constraint when listening). In line with previous findings from self-paced reading paradigms we found gender representations in language comprehension to be grounded in the interaction between textual (grammatical) and background (stereotypical) information. Extending previous research, the effect of stereotypical information was however modulated by presentation modality. In all, although speech and reading comprehension share higher-level processes of comprehension, this study provides first evidence that differences in comprehension might occur due to differences such as orthographic access or attention allocation.     

Simplified Estimation and Testing in Unbalanced Repeated Measures Designs

In this paper we propose a simple estimator for unbalanced repeated measures design models where each unit is observed at least once in each cell of the experimental design. The estimator does not require a model of the error covariance structure. Thus, circularity of the error covariance matrix and estimation of correlation parameters and variances are not necessary. Together with a weak assumption about the reason for the varying number of observations, the proposed estimator and its variance estimator are unbiased. As an alternative to confidence intervals based on the normality assumption, a bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap technique is considered. We also propose the naive percentile bootstrap for Wald-type tests where the standard Wald test may break down when the number of observations is small relative to the number of parameters to be estimated. In a simulation study we illustrate the properties of the estimator and the bootstrap techniques to calculate confidence intervals and conduct hypothesis tests in small and large samples under normality and non-normality of the errors. The results imply that the simple estimator is only slightly less efficient than an estimator that correctly assumes a block structure of the error correlation matrix, a special case of which is an equi-correlation matrix. Application of the estimator and the bootstrap technique is illustrated using data from a task switch experiment based on an experimental within design with 32 cells and 33 participants.

     

Generalizations of Paradoxical Results in Multidimensional Item Response Theory

Maximum likelihood and Bayesian ability estimation in multidimensional item response models can lead to paradoxical results as proven by Hooker, Finkelman, and Schwartzman (Psychometrika 74(3): 419–442, 2009): Changing a correct response on one item into an incorrect response may produce a higher ability estimate in one dimension. Furthermore, the conditions under which this paradox arises are very general, and may in fact be fulfilled by many of the multidimensional scales currently in use. This paper tries to emphasize and extend the generality of the results of Hooker et al. by (1) considering the paradox in a generalized class of IRT models, (2) giving a weaker sufficient condition for the occurrence of the paradox with relations to an important concept of statistical association, and by (3) providing some additional specific results for linearly compensatory models with special emphasis on the factor analysis model.     

EEG source imaging during two Qigong meditations

Experienced Qigong meditators who regularly perform the exercises "Thinking of Nothing" and "Qigong" were studied with multichannel EEG source imaging during their meditations. The intracerebral localization of brain electric activity during the two meditation conditions was compared using sLORETA functional EEG tomography. Differences between conditions were assessed using t statistics (corrected for multiple testing) on the normalized and log-transformed current density values of the sLORETA images. In the EEG alpha-2 frequency, 125 voxels differed significantly; all were more active during "Qigong" than "Thinking of Nothing," forming a single cluster in parietal Brodmann areas 5, 7, 31, and 40, all in the right hemisphere. In the EEG beta-1 frequency, 37 voxels differed significantly; all were more active during "Thinking of Nothing" than "Qigong," forming a single cluster in prefrontal Brodmann areas 6, 8, and 9, all in the left hemisphere. Compared to combined initial-final no-task resting, "Qigong" showed activation in posterior areas whereas "Thinking of Nothing" showed activation in anterior areas. The stronger activity of posterior (right) parietal areas during "Qigong" and anterior (left) prefrontal areas during "Thinking of Nothing" may reflect a predominance of self-reference, attention and input-centered processing in the "Qigong" meditation, and of control-centered processing in the "Thinking of Nothing" meditation.     

The Impact of Type of Examples on Originality: Explaining Fixation and Stimulation Effects

There are obstacles to creativity: one of them is called fixation effect, the fact that some knowledge about existing or obvious solutions is spontaneously activated and constrains the generation of new solutions. Converging evidence in cognitive psychology has indicated that the ability to generate original ideas can be limited by recently activated knowledge, such as examples of solutions. On the other hand, neuroimaging studies have recently demonstrated that exposure to examples could, on the contrary, have a stimulating effect on originality. To make sense of what seems to be contradictory studies, we hypothesized that two types of examples could have opposite effects on originality: (1) restrictive examples—within the fixation effect—could lead to a reduction in the originality of the solutions, whereas (2) expansive examples—outside the fixation effect—could provoke solutions of higher originality. Results from a total of 160 participants confirmed that the solutions proposed by the group exposed to restrictive examples were less original than those given by the group exposed to expansive examples.     

Clinical and psychopathological research on attachment: the contribution of the psychic envelopes model

This paper proposes to put into perspective the attachment model (Bowlby) and that of psychic envelopes (Anzieu) so as to grasp the contribution of attachment theory to the field of psychopathology. Having laid the foundations of the epistemological debate between these two models, relying on a discussion of the stakes inherent in the psychoaffective development approach, the author refers to current forms of psychopathology, which draw massively on the borderline and narcissistic concepts, in order to discuss the sense and benefits of the “skin–ego” model as an alternative and complement to attachment theory. Beyond altering reference models in psychopathology, this debate and related inputs lead to consider therapeutic applications through a combination of the notion of “caregiving group” – a group version of the attachment figure – and the notion of therapeutic offer as a necessary alternative to the ideology of demand.     

IS EPISTEMIC AGENCY POSSIBLE?

There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons for beliefs are exclusive in a sense in which our reasons for actions are not. Epistemic agency is possible in the weak sense that we can be active, but not in the strong one in which we could have some elbow room for our epistemic reasons in reasoning leading to beliefs and other epistemic states.     

II. Rejoinder to Gray and Wolfe

This rejoinder to J. Patrick Gray's and Linda Wolfe's ‘The Loving Parent Meets the Selfish Gene’ (Inquiry, this issue), which in turn was in response to the author's ‘Human Tragedy and Natural Selection’ (Inquiry, Vol. 21, No. 4), briefly addresses their major objections and suggests that in many instances they have misunderstood the point of that paper. They argue that many of the traits referred to are more cultural than genetic. That this is not the central issue is made clearer by stressing certain aspects of the view underlying the original article, chiefly concerning the extent of human irrationality and insensitivity.     

Empty Depth,Empty Breadth,and the Forging of a Therapeutic Alliance

This paper describes a case in which analyst and analysand became interlocked in battles that drew out the 'mad' parts of each other. It explores how the extreme conflict may have actually been an integral part of what has become a truly therapeutic process for both. Theoretically, the dialectical movement of becoming through contradiction is used to help explicate how mutually destructive enactments were necessary building blocks of genuine intimacy.