A Game of Inches: Spontaneous Use of Counterfactuals by Broadcasters During Major League Baseball Playoffs1

We tested whether counterfactuals are made spontaneously outside of the laboratory by coding sportscasters’ online verbalizations during 1998 and 1999 Major League Baseball (MLB) playoff broadcasts, and we assessed whether naturally occurring game features relating to closeness (score closeness, series closeness, game end, and playoff end) delineated some conditions under which counterfactuals were more likely. Sportscasters made counterfactuals quite frequently during these MLB playoff games. In addition, sportscasters uttered greater numbers of counterfactuals as games progressed from early to late innings, which was particularly true when scores were close. Counterfactuals were also uttered in greater numbers with closer scores when series were tied than when one team had a lead. Results are discussed in terms of spontaneous counterfactuals, closeness as an antecedent, and the ecological validity of such thoughts.     

Image reconstruction and Gestalt formation in human spatial vision

A sampling theoretical and experimental framework for the study of spatial vision is introduced. It is suggested that spatial Gestalt perception can be fruitfully analyzed by applying the concepts and methods of modern spatial filtering theory as they are known in the theory of image sampling and reconstruction. Demonstrations of the sampling processes in spatial vision are given and an experimental method for estimating the spatial reconstruction power of the human visual system is described. The experimental results presented suggest that high spatial frequency information has a special significance for human vision. Evidently, high frequency information is transmitted more easily through the visual system than has been generally assumed on the basis of contrast sensitivity studies.     

Sharp-edged vs. diffuse illusory circles: The effects of varying luminance

As had been found previously, one experiment demonstrated that reducing the luminance of a pattern that induced an abrupt-edged illusory figure increased mean ratings of that illusory effect. More importantly, the same result had not been found for a pattern that induced a diffuse illusory figure; in fact, a second experiment with such patterns produced a reliable tendency in the opposite direction. These results are at variance with the suggestion that an abrupt-edged illusory effect involves merely a minor variation in the boundary definition of a diffuse illusory lightness effect.     

Relationships between scores on Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence--Revised and Stanford-Binet IV

The Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence--Revised and the Stanford Binet-Intelligence Scale: Fourth Edition were given to 51 preschool, kindergarten, first, and second grade students. Twelve of 15 Pearson correlations between Wechsler IQs and composite and area scores of the Stanford-Binet IV were statistically significant. It is apparent that the two tests measure similar, but not identical, concepts.     

Do rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) attribute knowledge and ignorance to others?

The ability of 4 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to understand the causal connection between seeing and knowing was investigated. The subjects were tested to determine if they could discriminate between information provided by experimenters who randomly alternated between roles of guesser and knower. In a series of tests, the knower either hid food under 1 of 3 cups or watched as someone else hid the food. The guesser waited outside the room or covered her or his head until the food was hidden. The subjects watched this procedure occur but could not see which cup the food was hidden under. The knower pointed to the correct cup while the guesser pointed to an incorrect one. None of the macaques provided any evidence that they realized the different states of knowledge possessed by the guesser and knower. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that rhesus macaques are incapable of making inferences about the mental states of others.     

Enduring visual memory despite forced verbal rehearsal.

The ability to decide rapidly that two visual stimuli are nominally the same when they are also visually the same (the Posner effect) was examined for stimuli of increasing visual complexity (Experiment 1) and when a greater variety of visual differences between the two stimuli was employed (Experiment 2). When the two stimuli each consisted of a pair of letters or when to single-letter stimuli sometimes differed in both case and style, the Posner effect occurred even though subjects made overt verbal rehearsals of the first stimulus. The results suggest that losses of the Posner effect found under simpler circumstances are not attributable to a switch from visual to exclusively verbal coding.