Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

Turning the process-dissociation procedure inside-out: A new technique for understanding the relation between conscious and unconscious influences

While there is now general agreement that memory gives rise to both conscious and unconscious influences, there remains disagreement concerning the process architecture underlying these distinct influences. Do they arise from independent underlying systems (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) or from systems that are interactive (e.g., Joordens & Merikle, 1993)? In the current paper we present a novel “inside-out” technique that can be used with the process-dissociation paradigm to arrive at more concrete conclusions concerning this central question and demonstrate this technique via a meta-analysis of currently published findings. Our results suggest that the data presented in these studies vary in ways most consistent with the assumption that conscious and unconscious influences behave independently.     

A Humean objection to Plantinga’s Quantitative Free Will Defense

Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity (1974) contains a largely neglected argument for the claim that the proposition “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good” is logically consistent with “the vast amount and variety of evil the universe actually contains” (not to be confused with Plantinga’s famous “Free Will Defense,” which seeks to show that this same proposition is logically consistent with “some evil”). In this paper I explicate this argument, and argue that it assumes that there is more moral good than evil in the cosmos. I consider two arguments in favour of this assumption, proposed by William King and Plantinga respectively, and argue that they are flawed. I then consider a sceptical objection to the assumption due to David Hume, and argue that this objection is at least prima facie plausible.     

Harnessing graphics processing units for improved neuroimaging statistics

Simple models and algorithms based on restrictive assumptions are often used in the field of neuroimaging for studies involving functional magnetic resonance imaging, voxel based morphometry, and diffusion tensor imaging. Nonparametric statistical methods or flexible Bayesian models can be applied rather easily to yield more trustworthy results. The spatial normalization step required for multisubject studies can also be improved by taking advantage of more robust algorithms for image registration. A common drawback of algorithms based on weaker assumptions, however, is the increase in computational complexity. In this short overview, we will therefore present some examples of how inexpensive PC graphics hardware, normally used for demanding computer games, can be used to enable practical use of more realistic models and accurate algorithms, such that the outcome of neuroimaging studies really can be trusted.