Method: Thirty-eight participants wrote in a personal online diary of at least 10 times in 40 weeks. We analyzed the conditions for managing ADTs by means of multilevel in stages models.
Results: Emotional intensity negatively predicted successful management of ADTs. Attempts to control ADTs and work context positively predicted successful management of ADTs. The negative relation between the emotional intensity and the management of ADTs was stronger as individuals were less aware of their own emotions, and was weaker as they had less clear representations of their own emotions. Superior access to emotion regulation strategies explained a stronger relationship between the work context and the successful management of ADTs.
Conclusions: We discuss theoretical and practical implications of the results. 相似文献
Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it.
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