A dynamic investigation of cognitive dedifferentiation with control for retest: evidence from the Swiss Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on the Oldest Old

Empirical examinations of the hypothesis of dedifferentiation of cognitive abilities in old and very old age (a) do not account for possible retest effects, which consequently may yield biased estimates of age effects, and (b) focus on time-independent relations (e.g., number of latent constructs, correlations between latent or measured variables). The authors applied a structural equation model with statistical control for retest effects to investigate the dynamic relations between a marker of perceptual speed (cross out) and a marker of verbal fluency (category-fruits). Longitudinal data are from 5 waves of the Swiss Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on the Oldest Old (N = 377, baseline age range = 79.5- 84.5 years). The authors found that, independently of retest effects, performance on the cross-out task affected changes in performance on the category task while the opposite did not hold true. This analytical technique could be applied to various markers of broad fluid-mechanic and broad crystallized-pragmatic components of cognition.     

Reasoning from inconsistency to consistency

This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an inconsistency arises from an incontrovertible fact, they retract any singularly dubious proposition or any proposition that is inconsistent with the fact; otherwise, they retract whichever proposition mismatches the fact. A mismatch can arise from a proposition that has only mental models that conflict with the fact or fail to represent it. Third, individuals use their causal knowledge-in the form of models of possibilities-to create explanations of what led to the inconsistency. A computer program implements the theory, and experimental results support each of its principles.     

Rethinking the focusing effect in decision-making

According to Legrenzi et al. [Cognition 49 (1993) 37], in making a choice people consider only the alternatives explicitly represented in their mental model of the decision situation. Their idea has found empirical support in the "focusing effect": Individuals focus on the alternatives explicitly stated in the problem context, and do not take into account other possibilities. In their original study, Legrenzi and colleagues considered only one factor to account for the explicit representation of an alternative--i.e., its explicit verbal formulation in the decision problem. Recent theories of relevance and information gain can help articulate their original idea, suggesting that individuals explicitly represent relevant alternatives, whether or not they are explicitly formulated in the decision problem. In three experiments we first replicated Legrenzi et al.'s original experiment, and then showed that the explicit verbal mention of an alternative is neither sufficient nor necessary to focus on it. The results suggest that individuals are able to consider relevant alternatives, even when they are not made explicit in the verbal formulation of a decision problem.     

Proof-Theoretic Modal PA-Completeness III: The Syntactic Proof

This paper is the final part of the syntactic demonstration of the Arithmetical Completeness of the modal system G; in the preceding parts [9] and [10] the tools for the proof were defined, in particular the notion of syntactic countermodel. Our strategy is: PA-completeness of G as a search for interpretations which force the distance between G and a GL-LIN-theorem to zero. If the GL-LIN-theorem S is not a G-theorem, we construct a formula H expressing the non G-provability of S, so that ⊢_GL-LIN ∼ H and so that a canonical proof T of ∼ H in GL-LIN is a syntactic countermodel for S with respect to G, which has the height θ(T) equal to the distance d(S, G) of S from G. Then we define the interpretation ξ of S which represents the proof-tree T in PA. By induction on θ(T), we prove that ⊢_PA S^ξ and d(S, G) > 0 imply the inconsistency of PA. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Hopelessness, Temperament, Anger and Interpersonal Relationships in Holocaust (Shoah) Survivors�� Grandchildren

The psychiatric literature is divided with regard to the long-term psychological effects associated with Holocaust (Shoah) experiences because the findings of clinical and empirical studies often contradict each other. Despite case reports of emotional sequelae related to intergenerational transmission of trauma, recent empirical research has suggested that offspring of survivors of the Shoah did not differ from other children and found no evidence that traumatic experiences of survivors of the Shoah affected their children??s and grandchildren??s adjustment. To shed light on some of the differences between the empirical and clinical observations, the present study set out to compare the grandchildren of survivors of the Shoah and persons of the same age whose families had not been through the Shoah experience. This study compared the two groups on some psychological dimensions relevant to traumatic sequelae: hopelessness, temperament, personality, attitudes, and interpersonal expectations. Subjects were 124 equally divided among the Shoah survivors?? grandchildren and comparison groups; we administered to all subjects TEMPS-A Rome, Beck Hopelessness Scale, State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory, and 9AP (9 Attachment Profile). We found no differences between two groups in Hopelessness, Dysthimic/Cyclotimic/Anxious, Hyperthimic temperament, and self-perception; instead the Shoah survivors?? grandchildren have a view of the other as rejecting, hostile, submissive, insecure, unreliable, and competitive in the interpersonal relationships. The Shoah survivors?? grandchildren are similar to controls in affective temperament, hopelessness and self-perception, but they are more irritable and angry than controls, and their perception about others is deeply negative. Attribution theory was used to elucidate these findings.     

Depression and suicidality in obese patients

In a sample of 50 psychiatric patients, suicidality as measured by a 54-item scale was associated with scores on scales to assess the presence of comorbidities, family history, medical factors, clinical ratings of psychiatric diagnosis, psychosocial/environmental factors, and protective factors (multiple R2 = .66).     

Comparison between Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 2 (GSS2) and Bonn Test of Statement Suggestibility (BTSS) in measuring children’s interrogative suggestibility

Susceptibility of children to leading questions and interrogative pressure is an important forensic issue. The most used techniques for assessing interrogative suggestibility are the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales (GSS) and the Bonn Test of Statement Suggestibility (BTSS). Apart from minor differences, the two tests, investigate the same dimensions: Yield, Shift, Immediate Recall, and Total Suggestibility. In this study, to investigate correlation measures for the corresponding variables in the two tests, we individually examined 84 children from the fourth and fifth grades (44 boys and 40 girls). All the participants completed the GSS2 the BTSS-1, the Vocabulary and the Similarity subtests of the WISC-R, and Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices. No significant gender differences were observed for any of the variables studied. Comparison between the corresponding variables for the two tests showed a positive correlation. Yield and Total Suggestibility scores correlated negatively with the three cognitive variables. We conclude that although the two suggestibility scales measure analogous variables, the BTSS seems more suitable than the GSS2 for assessing a child’s suggestibility during police and forensic interviews.