Inference-driven attention in symbolic and perceptual tasks: Biases toward expected and unexpected inputs

The aims of this paper are (a) to gather support for the hypothesis that some basic mechanisms of attentional deployment (i.e., its high efficiency in dealing with expected and unexpected inputs) meet the requirements of the inferential system and have possibly evolved to support its functioning, and (b) to show that these orienting mechanisms function in very similar ways in two perceptual tasks and in a symbolic task. The general hypothesis and its predictions are sketched in the Introduction, after a discussion of current findings concerning visual attention and the generalities of the inferential system. In the empirical section, three experiments are presented where participants tracked visual trajectories (Experiments 1 and 3) or arithmetic series (Experiments 2 and 3), responding to the onset of a target event (e.g., to a specific number) and to the repetition of an event (e.g., to a number appearing twice consecutively). Target events could be anticipated when they were embedded in regular series/trajectories; they could be anticipated, with the anticipation later disconfirmed, when a regular series/trajectory was abruptly interrupted before the target event occurred; and they could not be anticipated when the series/trajectory was random. Repeated events could not be anticipated. Results show a very similar pattern of allocation in tracking visual trajectories and arithmetic series: Attention is focused on anticipated events; it is defocused and redistributed when an anticipation is not confirmed by ensuing events; however, performance decreases when dealing with random series/trajectory—that is, in the absence of anticipations. In our view, this is due to the fact that confirmed and disconfirmed anticipations are crucial events for “knowledge revision”—that is, the fine tuning of the inferential system to the environment; attentional mechanisms have developed so as to enhance detection of these events, possibly at all levels of inferential processing.     

Grundlagen,Section 64: Frege's Discussion of Definitions by Abstraction in Historical Context

I offer in this paper a contextual analysis of Frege's Grundlagen, section 64. It is surprising that with so much ink spilled on that section, the sources of Frege's discussion of definitions by abstraction have remained elusive. I hope to have filled this gap by providing textual evidence coming from, among other sources, Grassmann, Schlömilch, and the tradition of textbooks in geometry for secondary schools (including a textbook Frege had used when teaching in a Privatschule in Jena in 1882–1884). In addition, I put Frege's considerations in the context of a widespread debate in Germany on ‘directions’ as a central notion in the theory of parallels.     

Burden, depression, and anxiety in caregivers of people with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is a progressive and fatal neurodegenerative disease caused by the degeneration of motor neurons. The burden for ALS caregivers is quite high. There are still few studies that have investigated the emotional impact of ALS care. We conducted a cross-sectional study among 40 ALS caregivers, assessing general worries, burden of care, depression, anxiety, perception of social support, and patients' severity of disease. Caregiver burden, depression, and anxiety were positively related with each other, and all these variables had a negative relation with social support. Patient's loss of physical functions was positively related with caregiver burden, anxiety, and somatic expression of depression. Caregivers expressed worries for their own health conditions. Given these results, we consider the hypothesis of an emotional-somatic impact of ALS care. The implications and limitations are discussed.     

Rehabilitating civilian victims of war through psychosocial intervention in Sierra Leone

This research assessed an intervention (involving drug therapy and psychoeducational counseling) for war trauma in Sierra Leone. We examine the impact of the intervention on symptoms of post‐traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and indicators of intergroup emotions and attitudes. Civilian war victims were drawn from a rehabilitation program (Intervention, N=50) or a waiting list Control group (N=50). The rehabilitation program combined general psychiatric treatment with additional life skills support. Those in the Intervention group had significantly lower PTSD symptoms and also scored lower on Intergroup Anxiety and Outgroup Blame, than those in Control. The intervention had an indirect effect on PTSD symptoms through Intergroup Anxiety. The reduction in PTSD in the intervention was greater for participants with a stronger identification with Sierra Leone.     

Revision: is visual perception a requisite for visual imagery?

Vision is the most highly developed sense in man and represents the doorway through which most of our knowledge of the external world arises. Visual imagery can be defined as the representation of perceptual information in the absence of visual input. Visual imagery has been shown to complement vision in this acquisition of knowledge--it is used in memory retrieval, problem solving, and the recognition of properties of objects. The processes underlying visual imagery have been assimilated to those of the visual system and are believed to share a neural substrate. However, results from studies in congenitally and cortically blind subjects have opposed this hypothesis. Here I review the currently available evidence.     

Aristotle on a Puzzle about Logical Consequence: Necessity of Being vs. Necessity of Saying

In the Posterior Analytics (I 6, 75a18–27) Aristotle discusses a puzzle which endangers the possibility of inferring a non-necessary conclusion. His solution relies on the distinction between the necessity of the conclusion's being the case and the necessity of admitting the conclusion once one has admitted the premisses. The former is a factual necessity, whereas the latter is meant to be a normative or deontic necessity that is independent of the facts stated by the premisses and the conclusion. This paper maintains that Aristotle resorts to this distinction because he thinks that, as long as it is conceived as a factual relation, logical consequence cannot exist independently of the facts expressed by the premisses and the conclusion. As a corollary, the necessity of such a consequence relation always requires the necessity of these facts. Aristotle holds this factual conception of logical consequence responsible for the puzzle, since it cannot account for valid syllogisms with contingent or false premisses. The alternative conception of necessity is then introduced by him in order to make good this deficiency. The distinction between the necessity of being and the necessity of saying was revived by the Oxford logician E. W. B. Joseph, and taken over by Frank Ramsey in his seminal Truth and Probability, but has not received attention from recent interpreters of Aristotle's logic. This paper, however, argues that, in spite of its intrinsic interest, the distinction bore no significant fruit in Aristotle's logical doctrine.