The Riddle of Laughter: Neural and Psychoevolutionary Underpinningsof Joy

Modest advances are being made in understanding the neurology and functions of laughter. The discovery of tickle-induced "laughter" in animals should facilitate the characterization of this basic emotional response of the mammalian brain. The existence of such vocal activities in species other than humans (e.g., rats) suggests that the fundamental brain processes for joyful affect may have emerged early in vertebrate brain evolution. Here, I summarize the little that we know about the evolutionary and brain sources of laughter, and how the accompanying positive emotions may solidify social bonds within the mammalian brain. Discovery of unique neurochemistries that specifically promote laughter and joy may provide clues for development of new classes of antidepressants.     

Personality and biological markers of creativity

The aim of the present study was to test (i) Eysenck's theory that psychoticism (P) should be related to creativity, (ii) whether testosterone (T), due to its association with P claimed in the literature, can be identified as a biological marker of creativity, and (iii) whether the SEEK dimension of the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales (ANPS) was also related to creativity and to testosterone due to its relationship to Sensation Seeking. In a sample of N = 48 male and female subjects, test scores on figural, verbal, and numeric creativity were compared between high and low P‐scorers as well as between high and low SEEK‐scorers. Effects were controlled for fluid intelligence as measured by Cattell's CFT‐3 and crystallized intelligence as assessed by the Structure‐of‐Intelligence‐Test (Intelligenz‐Struktur‐Test, I‐S‐T 2000 R). Neither a main effect of P or T nor an interaction effect P×T on creativity could be obtained. Instead, SEEK was related to all components of creativity and explained more than 15% of the variance of total creativity. Moreover, significant differences in SEEK could be explained by differences in T, independently of gender. Furthermore, 39% of the variance of SEEK could be explained by the two uncorrelated indicators testosterone and creativity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness.     

The Power of the Word May Reside in the Power of Affect

This commentary on Dan Shanahan’s, A New View of Language, Emotion and the Brain, basically agrees with an emotion-based view of the evolutionary and developmental basis of language acquisition. It provides a supplementary neuroscience perspective that is more deeply affective and epigenetic in the sense that all claims about neocortically-based language modules need to be tempered by the existing genetic evidence as well as the robust neuroscience evidence that the cortex resembles random-access-memory space, a tabula rasa upon which epigenetic and learning processes create functional networks. The transition from non-linguistic creatures to linguistic ones may have required the conjunction of social-affective brain mechanisms, morphological changes in the articulatory apparatus, an abundance of cross-modal cortical processing ability, and the initial urge to communicate in coordinate prosodic gestural and vocal ways, which may have been more poetic and musical than current propositional language. There may be no language instinct that is independent of these evolutionary pre-adaptations.

Cognitive Conceptualism—Where Have All the Affects Gone? Additional Corrections for Barrett et al. (2007)

ABSTRACT— Barrett et al. (2007) claim that their approach to emotions covers more of the available evidence than does my affective neuroscience approach ( Panksepp, 2007b ). In fact, the weight of neurological evidence indicates that raw affect, as monitored by many behavioral tasks, is an aspect of the arousal of instinctual-emotional networks. This provides an empirical approach to understanding how primary-process emotional feelings are constituted by neural activities ( Panksepp, 2008 ). There is abundant evidence for the existence of a variety of primal emotions shared across mammalian species that are biologically ingrained tools for living and learning and that may allow higher brain regions to conceptualize what is really important in the world. Barrett et al., misrepresent my views; an accurate depiction of them can be found in this article and in Gallagher (2008) . Abundant cross-species evidence of basic affective systems exists to enrich cognitive-conceptual and attributional theories of human emotions.     

Ultrasonic vocalizations as indices of affective states in rats

Adult rats spontaneously vocalize in ultrasonic frequencies. Although these ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) have been described as by-products of locomotor activity or social signals, accumulating evidence suggests that they may also index anticipatory affective states. Converging ethological, pharmacological, and brain stimulation research indicates that whereas long low-frequency (> 0.3-s, approximately 22-kHz) USVs occur during anticipation of punishment or avoidance behavior, short, high-frequency (< 0.3-s, approximately 50-kHz) USVs typically occur during anticipation of reward or approach behavior. Thus, long 22-kHz USVs may index a state of negative activation, whereas short, 50-kHz USVs may instead index a state of positive activation. This hypothesis has theoretical implications for understanding the brain circuitry underlying mammalian affective states and clinical applicability for modeling hedonic properties of different psychotropic compounds.     

Neuro-Evolutionary Foundations of Infant Minds: From Psychoanalytic Visions of How Primal Emotions Guide Constructions of Human Minds toward Affective Neuroscientific Understanding of Emotions and Their Disorders

ABSTRACT

As Louis Sander understood, human infants are evolutionarily endowed with emotional minds that allow them to experience themselves as affectively vibrant creatures, who seek to be recognized as important players in the world. If so recognized, they experience themselves as positive individuals; if merely neglected as predetermined beings whose affects and intentions do not matter in the long-term construction of their minds, paths toward adult disturbance are paved. The neuroscience of affective processes has been substantively advancing through the use of animal models where the needed detailed experimental work can be conducted. Critical neural networks and neuro-epigenetic brain changes are being documented that provide neuroscientific confirmations for the insights advanced by Sander and his many colleagues. Here we show how the deeply intersubjective, flexible nature of the mother-infant relationship is firmly expressed in the underlying biology of the basic limbic emotional systems. Rather than being deterministic, hard-wired affective switches, these emotional systems (e.g., CARE, PLAY, PANIC, SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, and LUST) are modulated by (and, in turn, modify) the developing relationship between mother and infant. Thus, the nature-nurture debate can be meaningfully reconceptualized as a bio-psycho-social interactive model, in which biology shapes relationships, which, in turn, shape and sometimes radically modify the biology.