Associative facilitation of word recognition as measured from a neutral prime

It is shown that lexical decision times to strong associates with an associative strength of approximately 40% are facilitated relative to targets following a neutral prime, “blank,” whereas very weak associates with an associative strength of less then 3% are neither facilitated nor inhibited. It is also shown that relative to the “blank” baseline time, a row of crosses inhibits processing of the following target. The latter finding has implications for earlier studies that have used crosses as a neutral prime. In these studies, facilitation effects have been overestimated and inhibition effects have been underestimated. Neely 1976 has proposed a predict-and-match strategy according to which subjects are assumed to predict one or more targets from the prime and to match the actual target onto the predicted targets. A part of this theory is not supported by the present data. The results are discussed in terms of the two-process theory of expectancy (Posner & Snyder, 1975). They are also considered in the light of a recent theory by Becker (1980). As an alternative interpretation of part of the reported data, a coherence assumption by the subjects about all reading materials is introduced.     

Parent and child causal attributions during clinical interviews

Attributions made by children and their parents for the cause of the child's clinical problem were monitored during assessment interviews. Results support previously observed differences obtained through questionnaires, with parents making more attributions than their children to characteristics of the child. This pattern was affected by variations in interview format. Parents and children differed in the locus of their attributions when interviewed individually, but these differences were not present when families were interviewed with both parents and children present. Implications for the methodology of attribution research with child-clinical populations are highlighted.     

Therapeutic effectiveness of differentially targeted humorous remarks in group psychotherapy

Video records of five different sessions of a single therapy group were scored for the occurrence of laughing, smiling, and talking. Successive five-minute intervals were also scored for therapeutic level through ratings derived from the Hill Interaction Matrix. Humorous remarks were categorized according to humor target: self, other in group, and generalized other. Results indicated that the vast majority of humorous remarks were directed at some specific target, and that over 50% of these remarks were negative in tone. Results also revealed that remarks targeted at others in the group tended to decrease therapeutic effectiveness whereas remarks targeted at individuals or institutions not presently in the group were found to increase therapeutic effectiveness. Selftargeted remarks were found to produce inconsistent effects. These findings are discussed in terms of their significance for a more general analysis of group humor as well as in terms of their more specific implications for therapeutic interventions.     

The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes

Evidence from four studies demonstrates that social observers tend to perceive a “false consensus” with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses. A related bias was shown to exist in the observers' social inferences. Thus, raters estimated particular responses to be relatively common and relatively unrevealing concerning the actors' distinguishing personal dispositions when the responses in question were similar to the raters' own responses; responses differing from those of the rater, by contrast, were perceived to be relatively uncommon and revealing of the actor. These results were obtained both in questionnaire studies presenting subjects with hypothetical situations and choices and in authentic conflict situations. The implications of these findings for our understanding of social perception phenomena and for our analysis of the divergent perceptions of actors and observers are discussed. Finally, cognitive and perceptual mechanisms are proposed which might account for distortions in perceived consensus and for corresponding biases in social inference and attributional processes.