Aristotle On Well-Being And Intellectual Contemplation: Dominic Scott

In Nicomachean Ethics X 7-8, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of eudaimonia , primary and secondary. The first corresponds to contemplation, the second to activity in accordance with moral virtue and practical reason. My task in this paper is to elucidate this distinction. Like Charles, I interpret it as one between paradigm and derivative cases; unlike him, I explain it in terms of similarity, not analogy. Furthermore, once the underlying nature of the distinction is understood, we can reconcile the claim that paradigm eudaimonia consists just in contemplation with a passage in the first book requiring eudaimonia to involve all intrinsic goods.     

Ethical Advocacy Across the Autism Spectrum: Beyond Partial Representation

Abstract

Recent debates within the autism advocacy community have raised difficult questions about who can credibly act as a representative of a particular population and what responsibilities that role entails. We attempt to answer these questions by defending a set of evaluative criteria that can be used to assess the legitimacy of advocacy organizations and other nonelectoral representatives. With these criteria in hand, we identify a form of misrepresentation common but not unique to autism advocacy, which we refer to as partial representation. Partial representation occurs when an actor claims to represent a particular group of people but appropriately engages with only a subset of that group. After highlighting symbolic and substantive harms associated with partial representation, we propose several strategies for overcoming it.     

Children's prosocial behavioural intentions towards outgroup members

When will children decide to help outgroup peers? We examined how intergroup competition, social perspective taking (SPT), and empathy influence children's (5–10 years, N = 287) prosocial intentions towards outgroup members. Study 1 showed that, in a minimal group situation, prosociality was lower in an intergroup competitive than in a non‐competitive or interpersonal context. Study 2 revealed that, in a real groups situation involving intergroup competition, prosociality was associated with higher empathy and lower competitive motivation. In a subsequent non‐competitive context, there were age differences in the impact of SPT and competitive motivation. With age, relationships strengthened between SPT and prosociality (positively) and between competitiveness and prosociality (negatively). Among older children, there was a carry‐over effect whereby feelings of intergroup competitiveness aroused by the intergroup competitive context suppressed outgroup prosociality in the following non‐competitive context. Theoretical and practical implications for improving children's intergroup relationships are discussed.     

Improving Arguments for Local Carbon Rights: The Case of Forest-Based Sequestration

Land-based climate mitigation schemes such as REDD+ imply the creation of ‘rights to carbon’ for actions that enhance carbon sinks. In many cases, the legal and normative foundations of such rights are unclear. This article focuses on special rights on the basis of improvement. Considering improvement in relation to carbon sinks requires asking what it means to ‘improve’ an environmental resource. Our answer departs in two significant respects from the standard conception of improvement, namely by reconceiving action in relation to ecosystem services, and accordingly, making the case for a counterfactual baseline to be used to compare an improved and unimproved state. Our modifications potentially allow for a variety of agents to claim special carbon rights on the basis of beneficial interactions with land-based carbon sinks. We give three archetypical examples of agents who may claim pro tanto special rights to carbon based on their interaction with carbon sinks.