Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated

This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn't (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude.     

Stress, Religious Coping Resources, and Depressive Symptoms in an Urban Adolescent Sample

We surveyed low-income urban adolescents about their total exposure to urban stressors and their use of religious coping resources, specifically in the areas of social support, spiritual support, and community service opportunities provided by their congregations. Additionally, we assessed their current levels of depressive symptomatology. Among females, the relationship between stress and depressive symptoms was moderated by the use of spiritual support and community service opportunities. The moderating relationship was such that at low levels of stress, high usage of these resources protected against the development of depressive symptoms. At high levels of stress, however, the protective relationship was lost. Lastly, when the social support aspects of religious coping were statistically controlled, the moderation effect disappeared, suggesting that within this sample, the social support seeking aspects of the resources, rather than their religious nature, was responsible for the effects.     

Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence

How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that 1 see something green?” Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such a connection, the proper functioning of our faculties, and objective epistemic norms. A superior view, developed here, is that our experience of being appeared to greenly evidences for us that something is green because we have learned to identify green objects by experiences of that sort. Our learning to do so amounts to our adopting an epistemic norm directing us to form that belief on the basis of that experience.     

DIVINE NECESSITY AND CREATED CONTINGENCE IN AQUINAS

It is becoming increasingly more common in Christian theism to conclude that the classical predication of a necessary God who interacts with contingent creation is logical inconsistency. This criticism is especially made by Process theists, but joining with them have been proponents of Open theism as well as others who seek to more closely unite God with the contingency in creation. It is feared that a God who is the transcendent cause of all that exists is unable to relate to creation without necessarily determining it. Yet Thomas Aquinas was not unaware of the potential difficulty in maintaining both a necessary God and created contingency and postulated a solution to the dialectic that fits comfortably within the classical synthesis. This paper examines Aquinas' solution against the charge of incoherence and finds that far from being inconsistent, it coherently succeeds in reconciling the dialectic.     

A MINOR MATTER? THE FRANCISCAN THESIS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY1

The Franciscan thesis maintains that the primary motive of the Incarnation is to glorify the triune God in the person of Jesus Christ: though Christ atones for human sins, his coming isn't relative to our need for redemption but rather has an absolute primacy. The Franciscan thesis is sometimes associated with the counterfactual claim that Christ would have come even if humans hadn't sinned. In recent work on the Franciscan thesis, an attempt is made to prove the counterfactual claim on the basis of a purely logical argument drawn from the writings of Bl. John Duns Scotus. After showing that this proof fails, I construct an axiological argument for the Franciscan thesis that disentangles it from unsubstantiated counterfactual claims while respecting the subtle interplay between natural and revealed theology. I then provide a metaphysical interpretation of the axiological argument that builds upon Scotist notions. Seen through this interpretive lens, Scotus's logical argument can be understood not as attempting to prove a counterfactual claim but as articulating Scotus's vision of what is required of any created order that is radically contingent on God's will yet perfectly glorifies its Creator. Thus understood, the Franciscan thesis challenges a powerful and influential picture in philosophical theology.     

Military leaders and followers – do they have different decision styles?

There are five different, although not mutually exclusive, styles exhibited by military officers when making decisions: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous ( Scott & Bruce, 1995 ). The purpose was to investigate if elected leaders of military planning teams had a different configuration of decision-making styles than their team members. Participants were 98 army captains organized in 16 brigade-level planning teams. The results indicate that team leaders tended to be more spontaneous and less rational, dependent and avoidant in their style configuration than their team members. One possible explanation is that the style configuration exhibited by many of the elected leaders comes through to others as forcefulness and decisiveness and that such a profile is in line with a general leadership culture. The results also provide support for the General Decision-Making Style inventory as a measurement of decision styles, because they suggest that the self-reports coincide with displayed, observable behavior.