Rostro‐caudal and dorso‐ventral gradients in medial and lateral prefrontal cortex during cognitive control of affective and cognitive interference

Characterizing the anatomical substrates of major brain functions such as cognition and emotion is of utmost importance to the ongoing efforts of understanding the nature of psychiatric ailments and their potential treatment. The aim of our study was to investigate how the brain handles affective and cognitive interferences on cognitive processes. Functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation was performed on healthy individuals, comparing the brain oxygenation level dependent activation patterns during affective and cognitive counting Stroop tasks. The affective Stroop task activated rostral parts of medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and rostral and ventral parts of lateral PFC, while cognitive Stroop activated caudal parts of medial PFC and caudal and dorsal parts of lateral PFC. Our findings suggest that the brain may handle affective and cognitive interference on cognitive processes differentially, with affective interference preferentially activating rostral and ventral PFC networks and cognitive interference activating caudal and dorsal PFC networks.     

Social Context Effects in the Display of Emotion: Accountability in a Simulated Organization1

Emotional labor involves employees' displays of appropriate emotions done to comply with emotional display rules created to attain organizational goals. This study examined whether display rules operationalized as process accountability (being held accountable for the quality of emotional displays during social interactions) and as outcome accountability (being held responsible for producing desired outcomes in others) would affect participants' emotional labor. In a simulated job interview, process accountability increased emotional labor; this occurred only in the absence of outcome accountability. The findings imply that display rules that encourage attention to sustaining quality interactions are likely to be more successful in achieving organizational goals than are rules that focus directly on producing predetermined outcomes.     

Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated

This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn't (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude.     

PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE, VICTIM PRECIPITATION, AND ABUSIVE SUPERVISION

We used data collected from a field survey of 334 supervisor–subordinate dyads to test a model of the antecedents of abusive supervision. Path analytic tests of moderated mediation provided support for our prediction that supervisors' depression mediates the relationship between supervisors' procedural justice and subordinates' perceptions of their supervisors' abusiveness and that the mediation framework is stronger when subordinates are higher in negative affectivity. We discuss the study's implications for theory, research, and practice.     

Stress, Religious Coping Resources, and Depressive Symptoms in an Urban Adolescent Sample

We surveyed low-income urban adolescents about their total exposure to urban stressors and their use of religious coping resources, specifically in the areas of social support, spiritual support, and community service opportunities provided by their congregations. Additionally, we assessed their current levels of depressive symptomatology. Among females, the relationship between stress and depressive symptoms was moderated by the use of spiritual support and community service opportunities. The moderating relationship was such that at low levels of stress, high usage of these resources protected against the development of depressive symptoms. At high levels of stress, however, the protective relationship was lost. Lastly, when the social support aspects of religious coping were statistically controlled, the moderation effect disappeared, suggesting that within this sample, the social support seeking aspects of the resources, rather than their religious nature, was responsible for the effects.     

Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence

How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that 1 see something green?” Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such a connection, the proper functioning of our faculties, and objective epistemic norms. A superior view, developed here, is that our experience of being appeared to greenly evidences for us that something is green because we have learned to identify green objects by experiences of that sort. Our learning to do so amounts to our adopting an epistemic norm directing us to form that belief on the basis of that experience.