The development of general competence and domain-specific competencies

The development of competence was studied in a longitudinal sample of 98 children, with measurement points when the children were 7, 10, and 12 years old. Competence was defined in terms of adequate adaptation to developmental tasks, both on a general and on a domain-specijic level. The general form of competence was measured by ego-resiliency, reflecting fexibility and ability to solve developmental problems Domain-specific competencies were measured by school achievement and social preference. The results showed that ego-resiliency was related to the two domain-specific competencies, although the hypothesized causal direction from general competence to specific competencies was not supported. Both domain-specific competencies were found to have a feedback effect on ego-resiliency. This feedback effect was stronger for social preference. These results suggest a transactional relationship between general and domain-specific competencies, and point to the importance of domain-specific competencies (especially social preference by the peer group) in the development of general competence in the child.     

Confidence in expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis

Kelley and Stahelski's (1970) triangle hypothesis states that competitors hold homogeneous views of others by assuming that most others are competitive, whereas cooperators or pro-social people hold more heterogeneous views by assuming that others are either cooperative or competitive. To evaluate the triangle hypothesis, this study examines differences between pro-socials, individualists, and competitors not only in their expectations about others' choice behaviour, but also in the confidence with which such expectations are held. It was found that pro-social subjects expected more cooperation than individualists and competitors. More importantly, as predicted on the basis of the triangle hypothesis, pro-socials were less confident about their expectations than competitors, with individualists holding intermediate levels of confidence.     

Suggestiveness in photospread line-ups: Similarity induces distinctiveness

The present research examined whether line-ups based on target (‘suspect’) face similarity are biased or suggestive. Four experiments are described in which subjects constructed photographic line-ups by selecting foils similar in appearance to a target. Later, another group of subjects who had not seen the faces before (mock witnesses) were asked to pick out the targets from the line-ups. All four experiments showed that mock witnesses selected the target significantly more often than expected by chance, thereby demonstrating suggestiveness. Three alternative line-up construction methods were also evaluated. In these methods, foil selection was based not only on target similarity but also on similarity with one or more of the other line-up faces. Results showed that alternative line-up targets were not selected significantly more often than chance, suggesting that bias was reduced. An overall analysis showed that the alternative line-ups were significantly less suggestive than target-based line-ups. The results indicate that foil selection procedures that incorporate foil-to-foil similarity produce fairer line-ups than those exclusively based on target similarity.     

Family reunions: Visionary encounters with the departed in a modern-day psychomanteum

A poignant feature of many near-death experiences is a visionary encounter with deceased loved ones. Over the centuries, researchers have sought safe ways to replicate near-death and related experiences, hoping to induce the powerful aftereffects of these events. The ancient Greeks contructed psychomanteums, or oracles of the dead, where seekers could consult spirits of the deceased. I describe a modern attempt to recreate the psychomanteum. Like near-death experiences, visionary encounters in this modern psychomanteum are experienced as real and not as hallucinatory, and have profound personal aftereffects. This novel experimental technique may permit the scientific study of phenomena that previously occurred only spontaneously and under uncontrolled circumstances.     

A study of “Belief” and “Non-belief” items from the jones irrational beliefs test with implications for the theory of RET

Evidence supporting the fundamental position of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) that dysfunctional emotions and behaviors are heavily influenced by irrational beliefs has been questioned due to the fact that many measures of beliefs contain items that actually refer to emotions and behaviors. In this study individual items on the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) (Jones, 1968/69) were rated by a panel of experts in RET as to whether they referred to beliefs, behaviors, emotions, or were ambiguous. Then Belief items and Non-belief items from the responses of 368 participants were extracted and scored separately. The Non-belief scores, based on items mostly referring to emotions and behaviors, were strongly related to measures of distress, as would be expected. But scores based on items unequivocally referring to beliefs were also significantly related to measures of emotional distress, psychosomatic symptoms, and suicidal contemplation. These findings are interpreted as clear support for RET's position on the relationship between irrational beliefs (B's) and dysfunctional emotions and behaviors (C's).Co-Editor of thisJournal, is a Fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York City, a Professor of Psychology at Hollins College, and a Licensed Psychologist in independent practice in Roanoke, Virginia.     

La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)

Aristotle considers all examples, as far as they are used as rhetorical arguments, to be inductions (Rhetoric 1, 2, 8). On the other hand, he finds it worthwhile to distinguish different kinds of examples (viz., historical example, comparison, and fable). Moreover, comparisons and fables are said to be made by the orator, whereas historical examples are not (Rhetoric 2, 20, 2s). The present article attempts to explain this opposition.A close examination of what can be meant by induction reveals that this term applies differently to historical examples and to comparisons and fables. In a broader sense, all examples can be called inductions, insofar as a certain logical relation, different from the syllogistic one, obtains between conclusion and premises. This relation, however, is unable to explain why examples can serve as arguments. Applied to historical examples only, the term induction preserves its original meaning of checking samples in a number sufficient to yield generalization. In its narrow sense, induction gives a satisfactory account of how historical examples work. As for comparisons and fables — to which induction applies in a broader sense only — Aristotle fails to explain what makes them arguments. The explanation, missing in Rhetoric 2, 20, can, however, be given according to the general lines of Aristotelian dialectics and rhetorics. The main task of comparison and fable is to elaborate a so far unconsidered middle term (M) meeting the following conditions: the hearer is prepared to agree that M applies to the subject of the conclusion and that the predicate of the conclusion applies to M. All examples make use of a general proposition from which their conclusion can be inferred. Historical examples (like real inductions) produce instances, in order to confirm a proposition previously admitted as suitable premise, provided that its truth can be proved. Comparison and fables, by introducing a new middle term, try to form a premise susceptible of being admitted without proof.

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La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)

     

Political families in therapy: The impact of media coverage and therapeutic issues

Many political families are ultra cautious about seeking therapy because of the stigma it carries in the political arena. Various cases on record show where an aspiring political candidate's chances to run for high elected office were destroyed because of publicity over her or his involvement in therapy. Nonetheless, members of families in politics do seek treatment and bring with them their idiosyncratic circumstances. This article attempts to provide an interior view of the politician's family life as seen in the therapist's sanctuary and a consideration of how media coverage may impact politician and family. Clinical data and information from interviews with six acquaintances whose main occupation is politics are presented. It is hoped that the data will enable therapists to understand and treat political families more effectively.Florence Kaslow, PhD, is director of Florida Couples and Family Institute in West Palm Beach. She is a visiting professor of medical psychology in psychiatry at Duke University Medical Center in Durham, NC, and a visiting professor of psychology at Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, FL.