On the difficulty of distinguishing “good” and “poor” perceivers: A social relations analysis of empathic accuracy data

Two studies were conducted to explore the reasons why replicable individual‐difference correlates of empathic accuracy have proved so difficult to find. In Study 1, we examined sources of variance in empathic accuracy data using the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1988, 1994; Kenny & Albright, 1987; Malloy & Kenny, 1986). The results revealed substantial perceiver variance only in the type of research design in which a relatively large set of individual perceivers inferred the thoughts and feelings of the same set of target persons. In Study 2, we found evidence that even in this apparently optimal type of research design, the significant individual‐difference correlates of empathic accuracy were fewer and subject to more unexpected qualifications than the results of Davis and Kraus's (1997) meta‐analysis would suggest. So far, the “best candidate” predictor of empathic accuracy appears to be verbal intelligence, but it remains to be seen whether it and two other recently proposed predictors of interpersonal accuracy will survive the test of replicability.     

“Quo Vadis” the Scientific Study of New Religious Movements?

The study of new religious movements has been developing in recent decades in an intellectual context in which both religion and its scholarly investigation appear to be more significant and more controversial than seemed to be the case in the earliest decades of SSSR. The present paper recounts the main themes of early work on nrms in the 1970s and 80s and subsequently explores three current areas of conceptual ambiguity and/or intellectual ferment and conflict. Key contemporary issues represent 1) The Boundary Problem or what is a “new religious movement”?; 2) The growing salience of the analysis of catastrophic episodes of mass violence_involving nrms; and 3) Recent claims to the effect that scholars in the sociology of religion and religious studies who do research on nrms have been led by their strong ideological commitment to the defense of religious liberty to take up a defensive attitude toward controversial “cults” to a degree which has undermined objectivity.     

ASSESSING THE INCREMENTAL VALIDITY OF TEAM CONSENSUS RATINGS OVER AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA IN PREDICTING TEAM EFFECTIVENESS

Using data collected from 98 work teams, empowerment levels were assessed based on the aggregation of individual team member ratings as well as on a team consensus approach utilized after aggregation. These 2 methods of measuring team empowerment were then compared on their ability to predict manager ratings of team effectiveness on 4 dimensions. Findings demonstrated that the consensus method of measuring team empowerment explained significantly greater variance in team effectiveness than did the aggregation method alone. We discuss implications for team research and practice based on these findings and include a discussion on when using consensus after aggregation may be most appropriate.     

CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN RELATIONSHIPS OF WORK DEMANDS, JOB SATISFACTION, AND TURNOVER INTENTIONS WITH WORK–FAMILY CONFLICT

A study of work interference with family (WIF) among managers is described, contrasting four clusters of countries, one of which is individualistic (Anglo) and three of which are collectivistic (Asia, East Europe, and Latin America). Country cluster (Anglo vs. each of the others) moderated the relation of work demands with strain-based WIF, with the Anglo country cluster having the strongest relationships. Country cluster moderated some of the relationships of strain-based WIF with both job satisfaction and turnover intentions, with Anglos showing the strongest relationships. Cluster differences in domestic help were ruled out as the possible explanation for these moderator results.     

Axiology,Realism, and the Problem of Evil*

Discussions of the problem of evil presuppose and appeal to axiological and metaethical assumptions, but seldom pay adequate attention to those assumptions. I argue that certain theories of value are consistent with theistic answers to the argument from evil and that several other well‐known theories of value, such as hedonism, are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with theism. Although moral realism is the subject of lively debate in contemporary philosophy, almost all standard discussions of the problem of evil presuppose the truth of moral realism. I explain the implications of several nonrealist theories of value for the problem of evil and argue that, if nonrealism is true, then we need to rethink and re‐frame the entire discussion about the problem of evil.