Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness

I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of total evidence—are given a weight in attentive consciousness which does not correspond to our reflective judgement of their weight. Successful interpretation does not involve ascribing beliefs and desires by reference to what a subject ought to believe and desire, contrary to what Interpretists suggest.     

Expanding Catholicity through Ecumenicity in the Work of Yves Congar: Ressourcement,Receptive Ecumenism and Catholic Reform

With particular reference to Yves Congar (1904–95), this article first explores the relationship between ressourcement theology and the emergence of Catholic ecumenism. A critical issue is identified concerning the coherence of Congar's ecumenical work. In support of the reading pursued here – which finds a developing articulation of what has come to be called Receptive Ecumenism – Congar's three great works of ecumenical theology are closely engaged: Chrétiens désunis (1937); Chrétiens en dialogue (1964); Diversités et Communion (1982). The conclusion indicates the abiding significance of Congar's ecumenical work, which articulates a call to the fullness of catholicity into which Catholicism has still to grow.     

The Stepparent Relationship Index: Development,validation, and associations with stepchildren’s perceptions of stepparent communication competence and closeness

There is a growing consensus among family researchers that many of the challenges facing members of stepfamilies revolve around the role of the stepparent. Using schema theory, this study extends recent research on the stepparent role by developing an empirically reliable measure for the primary dimensions that stepchildren identify as part of their stepparent relationship schemas. Participants included 522 young adult stepchildren from 4 different states who completed an inventory assessing key dimensions of the stepparent‐stepchild relationship, as well as stepchildren’s perceptions of stepparents’ communication competence and closeness. The results produced a new multidimensional measure, the Stepparent Relationship Index, as three dimensions of the stepparent‐stepchild relationship emerged from factor analytic techniques: positive regard, (step)parental authority, and affective certainty. Each subscale produced acceptable reliability estimates, and initial evidence of concurrent validity was obtained.     

What Is a Parergon?

Despite important recent work, the rehabilitation of parergon as a critical concept in the history of art has yet to be fully broached. From the time Jacques Derrida introduced the term into contemporary critical theory in The Truth in Painting, its character and function have been largely understood as referencing a threshold or boundary—in particular, that of the border of the artwork. Yet a review of the term's long history suggests a meaning that differs in significant ways from its current near‐univocal characterization as a synonym for a frame. In particular, premodern art theory and criticism identifies a parergon with matters such as the background action in a history painting, the inclusion in a landscape of picturesque embellishments, or, following Kant, the addition of ornament to a painting, a statue, or a building. This article therefore proposes we ask again: What is a parergon?     

Descartes's Theory of Distinction

In the first part of this paper I explore the relations among distinctness, separability, number, and non-identity. I argue that Descartes believes plurality in things themselves arises from distinction, so that things distinct in any of the three ways are not identical. The only exception concerns universals which, considered in things themselves, are identical to particulars. I also argue that to be distinct is to be separable. Things distinct by reason are separable only in thought by means of ideas not clear and distinct. In the second part I argue that the notion of separability in Descartes's account of real distinction between mind and body is subject to five different interpretations. I claim that the heart of Cartesian dualism concerns the separability of the attributes thought and extension. It does not require that mind and body are separable in the sense that each can exist without the other existing.