Contextual conditioning and reinstatement of extinguished instrumental responding

In three experiments we studied the relationship between contextual conditioning and the reinstatement of extinguished lever pressing that occurs when noncontingent food is introduced following extinction. In all three experiments the non-contingent food was presented off-baseline (with the response levers not present). On subsequent tests, with the response levers present, animals that had been exposed to food showed more reinstatement of lever pressing than control animals. This finding rules out alternative mechanisms for the reinstated responding that rely on the interaction of non-contingent food and responding, such as superstitious reinforcement or the discriminative after-effects of food. In addition, in each experiment we demonstrated that manipulations known to affect contextual conditioning (signalling the food in Experiment 1, context extinction in Experiment 2, and switching contexts in Experiment 3) reduced the reinstatement. These results are consistent with the claim that contextual conditioning is important in controlling instrumental conditioning and closely parallel findings concerning the reinstatement of Pavlovian responsing following extinction.     

Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk.

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.     

Understanding action control: predicting physical activity intention-behavior profiles across 6 months in a Canadian sample.

Intention is theorized as the proximal determinant of behavior in some theories of motivation, but the need to understand predictors of action control (i.e., translating an intention into behavior) is warranted to tailor physical activity intervention efforts. The purpose of this study was to examine constructs of the transtheoretical model of behavior change (TTM) as predictors of physical activity intention-behavior profiles across 6 months in a large Canadian sample (N = 1,192). Results showed that 5 of the 8 possible intention-behavior profiles had a substantial number of participants: nonintenders, unsuccessful adopters, successful adopters, unsuccessful maintainers, and successful maintainers. Constructs of the TTM distinguished (p < .01) intention-behavior profiles. Self-efficacy and the behavioral processes of change were particularly good predictors of action control (p < .01), but disaggregated beliefs and processes identified specific intervention targets for successful physical activity adoption and maintenance. The results validate that both action planning and action control are important when understanding physical activity behavior.     

Staying Together: A Bidirectional Delay–Coupled Approach to Joint Action

To understand how individuals adapt to and anticipate each other in joint tasks, we employ a bidirectional delay–coupled dynamical system that allows for mutual adaptation and anticipation. In delay–coupled systems, anticipation is achieved when one system compares its own time‐delayed behavior, which implicitly includes past information about the other system’s behavior, with the other system’s instantaneous behavior. Applied to joint music performance, the model allows each system to adapt its behavior to the dynamics of the other. Model predictions of asynchrony between two simultaneously produced musical voices were compared with duet pianists’ behavior; each partner performed one voice while auditory feedback perturbations occurred at unpredictable times during live performance. As the model predicted, when auditory feedback from one musical voice was removed, the asynchrony changed: The pianist’s voice that was removed anticipated (preceded) the actions of their partner. When the auditory feedback returned and both musicians could hear each other, they rapidly returned to baseline levels of asynchrony. To understand how the pianists anticipated each other, their performances were fitted by the model to examine change in model parameters (coupling strength, time‐delay). When auditory feedback for one or both voices was removed, the fits showed the expected decrease in coupling strength and time‐delay between the systems. When feedback about the voice(s) returned, the coupling strength and time‐delay returned to baseline. These findings support the idea that when people perform actions together, they do so as a coupled bidirectional anticipatory system.     

On Making and Keeping Promises

Do the conditions under which promises are made determine whether they ought to be kept? Philosophers have placed a number of conditions on promising which, they hold, must be met in order to make promise-keeping obligatory. In so doing, they have distinguished valid promises from invalid promises and justified promises from promises that are not justified. Considering such conditions, one by one, we argue that they are mistaken. In the first place, the conditions they lay down are not necessary for either valid or justified promise-making. In the second place, promises need not meet such conditions in order to create moral obligations. In general, such analyses of promising fail because they suffer from a confusion between promise-making and promise-keeping. Philosophers have wrongly supposed that obligations to keep promises are dependent upon, or derivable from, the quality of the promises themselves, at the time they are made, instead of focusing on conditions that must be satisfied at the time when promises are supposed to be kept. It is not the quality of a promise that determines an obligation to keep it but the rightness or wrongness of performing the promised act.