Preschoolers' perspective taking in word learning: do they blindly follow eye gaze?

When learning new words, do children use a speaker's eye gaze because it reveals referential intent? We conducted two experiments that addressed this question. In Experiment 1, the experimenter left while two novel objects were placed where the child could see both, but the experimenter would be able to see only one. The experimenter returned, looked directly at the mutually visible object, and said either, "There's the [novel word]!" or "Where's the [novel word]?" Two- through 4-year-olds selected the target of the speaker's gaze more often on there trials than on where trials, although only the older children identified the referent correctly at above-chance levels on trials of both types. In Experiment 2, the experimenter placed a novel object where only the child could see it and left while the second object was similarly hidden. When she returned and asked, "Where's the [novel word]?" 2- through 4-year-olds chose the second object at above-chance levels. Preschoolers do not blindly follow gaze, but consider the linguistic and pragmatic context when learning a new word.     

Overconfidence in an objective anticipatory motor task

Overconfidence can place humans in hazardous situations, and yet it has been observed in a variety of cognitive tasks in which participants have to rate their own performance. We demonstrate here that overconfidence can be revealed in a natural and objective visuo-motor task. Participants were asked to press a key in synchrony with a predictable visual event and were rewarded if they succeeded and sometimes penalized if they were too quick or too slow. If they had used their own motor uncertainty in anticipating the timing of the visual stimulus, they would have maximized their gain. However, they instead displayed an overconfidence in the sense that they underestimated the magnitude of their uncertainty and the cost of their error. Therefore, overconfidence is not limited to subjective ratings in cognitive tasks, but rather appears to be a general characteristic of human decision making.     

Elevated content of cortisol in hair of patients with severe chronic pain: a novel biomarker for stress

Hair analysis has been used to reflect long-term systemic exposure to exogenous drugs and toxins. Several studies have demonstrated the feasibility of measuring endogenous steroid hormones, e.g. cortisol, in hair. Recently, a study in macaques showed a significant increase in hair cortisol levels induced by stress. We explored whether hair cortisol levels may be used as a biomarker for long-term stress in humans. Patients with severe chronic pain, aged 18 years or older, receiving opioid treatment for at least one year were recruited. Controls were non-obese (body mass index, BMI < 30 mg/kg(2)) adults. The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) questionnaire was used to assess perceived stress over the last 4 weeks. A hair sample was obtained from the vertex posterior. Cortisol was measured using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. We included fifteen patients (nine females and six males) and 39 non-obese control subjects (20 females, 19 males). PSS scores (median and range) were significantly higher in chronic pain patients (24: 12-28) than in controls (12: 3-31)(P < 0.001). Hair cortisol contents (median and range) were significantly greater in chronic pain patients (83.1: 33.0-205 g/mg) than in controls (46.1: 27.2-200 pg/mg) (P < 0.01). We conclude that hair cortisol contents are increased in patients with major chronic stress. Measurement of cortisol levels in hair constitutes a novel biomarker of prolonged stress.     

Severity Indices of Personality Problems (SIPP-118): development, factor structure, reliability, and validity

This article describes a series of studies involving 2,730 participants on the development and validity testing of the Severity Indices of Personality Problems (SIPP), a self-report questionnaire covering important core components of (mal)adaptive personality functioning. Results show that the 16 facets constituted homogeneous item clusters (i.e., unidimensional and internally consistent parcels) that fit well into 5 clinically interpretable, higher order domains: self-control, identity integration, relational capacities, social concordance, and responsibility. These domains appeared to have good concurrent validity across various populations, good convergent validity in terms of associations with interview ratings of the severity of personality pathology, and good discriminant validity in terms of associations with trait-based personality disorder dimensions. Furthermore, results suggest that the domain scores are stable over a time interval of 14-21 days in a student sample but are sensitive to change over a 2-year follow-up interval in a treated patient population. Taken together, the final instrument, the SIPP-118, provides a set of 5 reliable, valid, and efficient indices of the core components of (mal)adaptive personality functioning.     

Pain, dissociation and subliminal self-representations

According to recent evidence, neurophysiological processes coupled to pain are closely related to the mechanisms of consciousness. This evidence is in accordance with findings that changes in states of consciousness during hypnosis or traumatic dissociation strongly affect conscious perception and experience of pain, and markedly influence brain functions. Past research indicates that painful experience may induce dissociated state and information about the experience may be stored or processed unconsciously. Reported findings suggest common neurophysiological mechanisms of pain and dissociation and point to a hypothesis of dissociation as a defense mechanism against psychological and physical pain that substantially influences functions of consciousness. The hypothesis is also supported by findings that information can be represented in the mind/brain without the subject's awareness. The findings of unconsciously present information suggest possible binding between conscious contents and self-functions that constitute self-representational dimensions of consciousness. The self-representation means that certain inner states of own body are interpreted as mental and somatic identity, while other bodily signals, currently not accessible to the dominant interpreter's access are dissociated and may be defined as subliminal self-representations. In conclusion, the neurophysiological aspects of consciousness and its integrative role in the therapy of painful traumatic memories are discussed.     

Towards a sensorimotor aesthetics of performing art

The field of neuroaesthetics attempts to identify the brain processes underlying aesthetic experience, including but not limited to beauty. Previous neuroaesthetic studies have focussed largely on paintings and music, while performing arts such as dance have been less studied. Nevertheless, increasing knowledge of the neural mechanisms that represent the bodies and actions of others, and which contribute to empathy, make a neuroaesthetics of dance timely. Here, we present the first neuroscientific study of aesthetic perception in the context of the performing arts. We investigated brain areas whose activity during passive viewing of dance stimuli was related to later, independent aesthetic evaluation of the same stimuli. Brain activity of six na?ve male subjects was measured using fMRI, while they watched 24 dance movements, and performed an irrelevant task. In a later session, participants rated each movement along a set of established aesthetic dimensions. The ratings were used to identify brain regions that were more active when viewing moves that received high average ratings than moves that received low average ratings. This contrast revealed bilateral activity in the occipital cortices and in right premotor cortex. Our results suggest a possible role of visual and sensorimotor brain areas in an automatic aesthetic response to dance. This sensorimotor response may explain why dance is widely appreciated in so many human cultures.     

Awareness of action: Inference and prediction

This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential "sense-making" process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role. When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes.     

Spoken and written dream communication: differences and methodological aspects

Based on structural differences between spoken and written language, the purpose of this paper was to investigate whether spoken and written communication imply a different representation in reporting an experienced dream. In fact, the clausal-dynamic quality of the former and nominal-synoptic quality of the latter, with the consequent differences in length, cohesion and density, could enhance/reduce the perceptual character and narrative structure of report features often considered in order to assess sleep mentation. In particular, we wondered whether, after eliminating all the elements responsible for the more conspicuous quantitative differences across the two forms (false starts, repetitions, digressions, redundancies), we would obtain two equivalent ways of reporting dreams. Three hundred and two (101 males and 201 females) subjects, raging in age from 18 to 40 years, participated as volunteers in the study and were asked to complete a dream diary daily for 14 days, by tape-recording their own dreams and putting them down in writing. The reports were analyzed by a psycholinguistic system. Results indicated that the report modality is able to affect the dream experience representation, conditioning the figurative (re)translation carried out by the tester: written forms show a loss of hallucinatory information and a non-complete correspondence also of the bizarreness features with respect to the spoken texts. Partialling out for length eliminated any difference between spoken and written dream reports on bizarreness; on the other hand, controlling the sequence effect of the report did not introduce changes. Methodological and theoretical implications were discussed.     

Influence of aesthetic perception on visual event-related potentials

The aim of the study was to assess the effects of visual aesthetic perception on event-related potentials (ERPs). Eight subjects assigned an aesthetic judgment (beautiful, neutral, or ugly) and a 10-step beauty estimation to the target stimuli, consisting of famous artistic pictures and geometric shapes. In a further task, the subjects performed a motor response to the previously judged pictures and geometric shapes. ERPs were recorded through 54 scalp electrodes during both tasks. The P3b amplitude was increased during the categorization of the geometric shapes compared to the artistic figures and during the vision of the beautiful targets preceding the motor response. The categorization of the aesthetic qualities of geometrical shapes seems to induce a higher level of attention, while a higher arousal variation was elicited by the recognition of beauty, in any form that was presented.     

Emotional consciousness: a neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience

This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory explains numerous phenomena concerning emotional consciousness, including differentiation, integration, intensity, valence, and change.