Disruption and Desire Discussion: Commentary on Papers by Dianne Elise and Jonathan H. Slavin

Dr. Slavin's and Dr. Elise's paper are discussed, with reference to clinical theory.     

Evaluating Differences in Cognitive Appraisal and Coping Over Stages of a Transaction

We evaluated appraisal of and coping with a college examination over three stages of the transaction for 138 American undergraduate students. The transactional process approach allowed for the identification of differences in the magnitude and direction of appraisal and coping between adjacent stages and stages separated by an intervening stage. Repeated measures tests revealed that differences in appraisal and coping could occur between all pairs of stages, suggesting that, in research limited to investigating changes between adjacent stages only, the concept of a transactional process may be attenuated and important changes overlooked as the process of a stressful encounter unfolds.     

Are waves of relational assumptions eroding traditional analysis?

The author designates as ‘traditional’ those elements of psychoanalytic presumption and practice that have, in the wake of Fordham's legacy, helped to inform analytical psychology and expand our capacity to integrate the shadow. It is argued that this element of the broad spectrum of Jungian practice is in danger of erosion by the underlying assumptions of the relational approach, which is fast becoming the new establishment. If the maps of the traditional landscape of symbolic reference (primal scene, Oedipus et al.) are disregarded, analysts are left with only their own self‐appointed authority with which to orientate themselves. This self‐centric epistemological basis of the relationalists leads to a revision of ‘analytic attitude’ that may be therapeutic but is not essentially analytic. This theme is linked to the perennial challenge of balancing differentiation and merger and traced back, through Chasseguet‐Smirgel, to its roots in Genesis. An endeavour is made to illustrate this within the Journal convention of clinically based discussion through a commentary on Colman's (2013) avowedly relational treatment of the case material presented in his recent Journal paper ‘Reflections on knowledge and experience’ and through an assessment of Jessica Benjamin's (2004) relational critique of Ron Britton's (1989) transference embodied approach.     

Client and therapist variability in clients' perceptions of their therapists' multicultural competencies

This study examined therapist differences in their clients' ratings of their therapists' multicultural competencies (MCCs) as well as tested whether therapists' who were rated as exhibiting more MCCs also had clients who had better therapy outcomes (N = 143 clients and 31 therapists). All clients completed at least 3 sessions. Results demonstrated that therapists accounted for less than 1% of the variance in their clients' Cross-Cultural Counseling Inventory–Revised (CCCI-R; T. D. LaFromboise, H. L. K. Coleman, & A. Hernandez, 1991) scores, suggesting that therapists did not differ in terms of how clients rated their MCCs. Therapists accounted for approximately 8.5% of the variance in therapy outcomes. For each therapist, their clients' CCCI-R scores were aggregated to provide an estimate of therapists' MCCs. Therapists' MCCs, based on aggregate CCCI-R scores, did not account for the variability in therapy outcomes that were attributed to them. Additionally, clients' race/ethnicity, therapists' race/ethnicity, or the interaction of clients'–therapists' race/ethnicity were not significantly associated with clients' perceptions of their therapists' MCCs.     

Fichte's Voluntarism

Abstract: In recent work Stephen Darwall has attacked what he calls J. G. Fichte's ‘voluntarist’ thesis, the idea—on Darwall's reading—that I am bound by obligations of respect to another person by virtue of my choice to interact with him. Darwall argues that voluntary choice is incompatible with the normative force behind the concept of a person, which demands my respect non‐voluntarily. He in turn defends a ‘presuppositional’ thesis which claims that I am bound by obligations of respect simply by recognizing the other as a person. In this paper I argue Darwall has misidentified the voluntary element in Fichte's account (sections 4–5). This requires me first to explain what Fichte's voluntarism really consists in (sections 1–3), and I suggest an apparent ambiguity in Fichte's position is responsible for Darwall's misreading. Clarifying this ambiguity, however, exposes some limitations to Darwall's thesis, and I end by discussing what those limitations are and what we can learn from them (sections 6–8).