Hopelessness as a Predictor of Suicide Ideation in Depressed Male and Female Adolescent Youth

We examined hopelessness as a predictor of suicide ideation in depressed youth after acute medication treatment. A total of 158 depressed adolescents were administered the Children's Depression Rating Scale‐Revised (CDRS‐R) and Columbia Suicide Severity Rating Scale (C‐SSRS) as part of a larger battery at baseline and at weekly visits across 6 weeks of acute fluoxetine treatment. The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) was administered at baseline and week 6. A negative binomial regression model via a generalized estimating equation analysis of repeated measures was used to estimate suicide ideation over the 6 weeks of acute treatment from baseline measure of hopelessness. Depression severity and gender were included as covariates in the model. The negative binomial analysis was also conducted separately for the sample of males and females (in a gender‐stratified analysis). Mean CDRS‐R total scores were 60.30 ± 8.93 at baseline and 34.65 ± 10.41 at week 6. Mean baseline and week 6 BHS scores were 9.57 ± 5.51 and 5.59 ± 5.38, respectively. Per the C‐SSRS, 43.04% and 83.54% reported having no suicide ideation at baseline and at week 6, respectively. The analyses revealed that baseline hopelessness was positively related to suicide ideation over treatment (p = .0027), independent of changes in depression severity. This significant finding persisted only for females (p = .0024). These results indicate the importance of early identification of hopelessness.     

Historical Moral Responsibility: Is the Infinite Regress Problem Fatal?

Some compatibilists have responded to the manipulation argument for incompatibilism by proposing an historical theory of moral responsibility which, according to one version, requires that agents be morally responsible for having their pro‐attitudes if they are to be morally responsible for acting on them. This proposal, however, leads obviously to an infinite regress problem. I consider a proposal by Haji and Cuypers that addresses this problem and argue that it is unsatisfactory. I then go on to propose a new solution inspired by the libertarian theory of Robert Kane.     

Just Plain "Ought'

Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp's recent attempt toshow that in fact there is no such thing asjust plain ``ought.'' A theory of just plain``ought'' emerges along the way.     

Tolerance as a Primary Virtue

The commonly perceived tension between authentic moral and ethical action and action involving tolerance is held to be the illusory product of an unduly individualistic frame of thought. Moral and ethical actions are produced not by independent individuals but by participants in cultural traditions. And even the wholly routine continuation of a single homogeneous tradition must always and invariably involve mutual tolerance: participants must interact not as independent individuals but as tolerant members. Tolerance deserves recognition, accordingly, as a primary virtue, not merely compatible with authentic moral and ethical action, but required by it. An explicit rhetoric enjoining tolerance needs to be understood as performative discourse employed to change, or else to sustain, the systems of tolerances in which all cultures, whether simple or differentiated, homogeneous or diverse, unified or fragmented, invariably consist. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.